Financial intelligence units: Powerful tools against corruption if governments let them work

Financial intelligence units, or FIUs, are meant to spot connections others cannot: the company with a hidden owner, the luxury property bought with unexplained funds, the consultancy fee with no clear service behind it, and the transfer linking people with no obvious financial relationship.

On their own, these details may look incomplete or inconclusive. Viewed together, they can reveal the complex financial architecture behind corruption.

FIUs are public bodies that receive and analyse suspicious transaction reports from banks and other reporting entities, then pass financial intelligence to law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, supervisors and foreign counterparts. Sitting at the centre of national anti-money laundering systems, they connect fragments that no single bank or authority can see alone.

But the value of FIUs is only as strong as the information they can access, their ability to make sense of it, and the action that follows.

New research from Transparency International reveals how 20 countries have designed and supported their FIUs, and asks a simple question: how well-equipped are these institutions to follow flows of dirty money, and what more do they need to help stop it?

At their best, FIUs can turn scattered financial red flags into the first clear picture of a corruption scheme. Their role is not to replace investigators or prosecutors, but to identify suspicious patterns, enrich them with corroborating data and send actionable intelligence to the authorities that can take a case forward.

Chile’s FIU, Unidad de Análisis Financiero, helped detect corruption linked to irregular spending by a police officer from the national police force. A suspicious transaction report triggered further analysis, which helped expose what was later found to be the theft of public funds and a money laundering scheme. The case ultimately resulted in 116 convictions between 2019 and 2022.

In France, financial intelligence revealed how payments to a mayor were disguised as funding for local sports organisations. The payments looked legitimate on their own. Only when the French FIU, Tracfin, connected multiple bank accounts, payment routes and beneficiaries did the alleged scheme become visible, prompting criminal proceedings and later convictions at first instance.

These cases show the value of FIUs at their best. Yet that kind of impact depends on access to information that many FIUs still do not have.

In many countries, FIUs are being asked to follow corrupt money flows without reliable access to information that shows who owns it, where it came from and where it went.

In 14 of the 20 countries we assessed, FIUs have direct access to beneficial ownership information – records showing who ultimately owns or controls a company, trust or other legal structure. However, four countries – Chile, China, Italy and Mexico – do not have operational beneficial ownership registers in place at all, with Italy’s register currently suspended.

Only eight FIUs assessed have direct access to tax records, while only 11 have direct access to law enforcement databases. In more than half of the countries examined, legislation does not clearly define which databases FIUs may access or what level of access is permitted.

These are not simply technical gaps. They are practical obstacles to detecting corruption. Without these sources, analysts may see the movement of money but not the wider structures behind it.

Recent developments in the United States show how quickly a key transparency tool can be hollowed out. In March 2025, the US Treasury suspended enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act for companies created in the US, before issuing a rule exempting them from beneficial ownership reporting altogether. The changes also mean that foreign companies still covered by the law do not have to report any US beneficial owners.

As a result, the country’s FIU, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, now oversees a database that no longer includes US-created companies, their owners, or US citizens who own or control covered foreign entities. By the Treasury’s own estimates, this rollback excludes over 99 per cent of the companies the law was originally meant to cover. This sharply limits its value for spotting complex corruption, sanctions evasion and money laundering schemes involving US companies or US owners.

Those trying to conceal illicit wealth do not rely only on banks. They also use the professionals and sectors that help create companies, buy property and move assets into the legitimate economy.

Banks are generally covered by anti-money laundering rules, including sending suspicious transaction reports to FIUs. But many high-risk non-financial sectors and professions remain only partially covered. These include lawyers, accountants, real estate professionals, and trust and company service providers.

While these professions provide legitimate and often essential services, they can also be misused to hide ownership, structure property purchases, move funds or create companies that obscure corrupt money. When high-risk sectors fall outside reporting systems, FIUs lose sight of the services that can make illicit wealth look legitimate.

Our research finds that coverage of anti-money laundering reporting obligations for non-financial sectors remains incomplete in nearly half of the countries assessed.

The risks vary by country. In Brazil, lawyers are not subject to comprehensive anti-money laundering obligations, meaning they do not report suspicious transactions to the Council for Financial Activities Control (COAF), the country’s FIU. In Canada, lawyers are exempt from submitting suspicious transaction reports to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, following a Supreme Court decision.

In France, lawyers submit suspicious transaction reports to the President of the Bar Association, which reviews and forwards relevant reports to Tracfin. This arrangement is intended to protect professional secrecy, but it can also introduce delays and filtering before information reaches the FIU.

One of the research’s most striking findings is not about what FIUs receive, but what happens after they share it.

FIU data is more likely to be used when it is produced in response to a request linked to an existing investigation, while proactively shared intelligence is less consistently used and less likely to lead to investigative action. In some countries, authorities use up to 97 per cent of the intelligence they request from FIUs, but as little as three per cent of the intelligence FIUs share proactively.

While request-based intelligence helps investigations that are already under way, proactive intelligence can help detect potential new corruption cases. If proactive intelligence is not properly integrated into investigations, FIUs become more reactive than preventive.

Stopping suspicious money is another test. FIUs in seven of the 20 countries assessed cannot suspend suspicious transactions, limiting their ability to prevent funds from moving while authorities investigate.

France offers a practical model. The country’s “short-circuit” system allows temporary transaction suspension to be paired with rapid engagement with prosecutors. When Tracfin identifies high-risk suspicious activity, it can suspend a transaction while working with prosecutors so that judicial freezing or seizure measures can follow before assets disappear.

The point is simple: financial intelligence has the most impact when it moves quickly from detection to action.

Following the money remains one of the most powerful ways to uncover corruption. But the institutions doing it need both the power to act and protection from pressure.

FIUs may handle intelligence involving politically exposed persons – people in prominent public roles or close to them – senior officials or powerful economic interests. This can expose them to pressure through limits on data access, unclear legal powers, leadership changes, budget constraints or disputes over how intelligence can be used.

Brazil illustrates how these dynamics can unfold in practice. In 2018, COAF played a key role in identifying suspicious financial transactions reportedly linked to Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of then-President Jair Bolsonaro, a sitting senator and now a presidential candidate in Brazil’s upcoming election, helping to trigger investigations into alleged corruption and money laundering, which were ultimately archived. As these cases progressed, the use of FIU intelligence became the subject of differing judicial decisions, including a Supreme Court ruling that temporarily suspended a large number of investigations relying on FIU-derived information. Although later rulings reaffirmed the legality of FIU information-sharing powers, subsequent legal disputes have continued to create uncertainty over how financial intelligence can be used in criminal proceedings.

Across the countries assessed, safeguards are uneven. In 12 countries, legal frameworks governing the appointment and dismissal of FIU leadership contain gaps that may affect operational independence.

Many FIUs also face resource constraints, with budgets and staffing levels often sufficient to maintain operations but not to invest in technology that keeps pace with emerging risks, better analysis or deeper cooperation. This means they may not be able to respond to additional operational demands from increased reporting or requests for international cooperation.

The gaps identified in the report are not inevitable. They are the result of policy choices – and they can be fixed.

Governments should give FIUs what they need to do the job: access to the right data, clear powers to act, protection from political pressure and adequate resources. They should also take action to strengthen cooperation with law enforcement, prosecutors, supervisors and foreign counterparts.

Otherwise, FIUs will keep being asked to follow dirty money with only part of the picture. With fuller access to relevant information, they can provide the intelligence needed to investigate and recover stolen assets, and hold those who hide, move and benefit from corrupt wealth to account.