Panama Papers: 10 years on, the promises and the failures

In 2016, the Panama Papers pulled back the curtain on a financial system designed to operate in secrecy. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, working with Süddeutsche Zeitung and more than 100 media partners, analysed a cache of 11.5 million leaked documents from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca. The investigation revealed how anonymous shell companies and offshore accounts were used to conceal wealth, obscure ownership and, in many cases, facilitate corruption and crime.

The level of global exposure, the vast sums moved through the system and its sheer geographic reach were unprecedented – and the first consequences followed swiftly.

Icelandic prime minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson resigned within days of being linked to an offshore company. Pakistan’s prime minister Nawaz Sharif was later disqualified from office following investigations triggered by the leak. Vast hidden financial networks were uncovered, reportedly connected to associates of Russian president Vladimir Putin, while figures close to power in China, Ukraine and across Latin America were also named.

What shocked the world was not only who was named and involved, but how routine it all appeared. Anonymous shell companies, nominee directors and complex offshore structures were not fringe tools – they were standard practice in a parallel financial system operating with minimal scrutiny.

For a moment, it seemed as though the era of financial secrecy might finally be coming to an end.

Many governments moved quickly to pledge reform. The commitments were sweeping and, on paper, transformative.

They promised to end anonymous companies by introducing registers that reveal the real – or “beneficial” – owners behind corporate structures. The UK was among the first to act, committing to a public register, while the EU pledged to embed ownership transparency across member states.

They vowed to crack down on financial secrecy. The G20 and OECD signalled stronger action on tax transparency and information exchange, while countries such as France and Germany pushed for coordinated European measures.

In the years to come, anti-money laundering frameworks were to be tightened. The EU’s subsequent anti-money laundering directives expanded due diligence requirements, while Canada and Australia began taking steps towards strengthening oversight of financial flows and corporate structures.

The Biden administration in the US, the UK and others supported measures to extend anti-money laundering obligations to professionals such as lawyers, accountants and company service providers who design and manage offshore structures.

Property markets also came under scrutiny. The UK pledged to introduce a register of overseas entities owning property, while in the US a rule was introduced – since paused by a legal challenge – requiring the reporting of beneficial ownership information for certain all-cash residential real estate purchases. Meanwhile, cities like Vancouver began investigating the role of real estate in laundering illicit funds.

Finally, there were commitments to strengthen international cooperation. Joint investigative teams and cross-border information sharing was put forward as part of a more coordinated response.

A decade later, there has been progress – but it is uneven, and often fragile.

Beneficial ownership transparency is no longer a fringe concept. In the years following the Panama Papers, the EU required member states to establish publicly accessible beneficial ownership registers.

Beyond Europe, Nigeria has developed one of the most advanced registers in Africa, while Indonesia has introduced rules requiring companies to disclose their real owners. These are just a handful of examples – but they reflect a broader global shift towards transparency.

Anti-money laundering rules have tightened across major economies, at least on paper. The EU has expanded its directives and moved to create a centralised anti-money laundering authority, while the UK has promised to strengthen oversight of professional service providers. In the US, the 2021 Corporate Transparency Act marked a long-overdue shift, requiring companies to disclose their real owners after years as a hub for anonymous companies.

There have also been enforcement actions, though limited in scope. In Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif’s removal from office was one of the most high-profile political consequences. Authorities in countries including Spain, Germany and France pursued tax investigations and recovered some revenues linked to offshore holdings.

The EU effectively shut down “golden passport” schemes – long criticised by Transparency International after a 2025 court ruling forced Malta, the last country still selling citizenship, to end its programme.

The firm at the centre of the scandal, Mossack Fonseca, shut down in 2018 following global scrutiny and legal pressure. Beyond formal reforms, the Panama Papers reshaped public awareness. Offshore secrecy is now widely recognised as a systemic issue, not a niche concern. The role of enablers has entered mainstream policy debates, and investigative journalism has continued to expose similar schemes, from the Paradise Papers to the Pandora Papers.

Yet these gains, while real, remain partial.

Despite a decade of reform, the fundamental architecture of offshore secrecy remains intact.

Anonymous ownership hasn’t disappeared – it has moved. Some countries have introduced registers, but others have resisted or built weak ones. Even where systems exist, cracks show: under the current US administration, delays caused by legal challenges and diluted implementing rules have effectively blunted the impact of the Corporate Transparency Act.

Secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens continue to operate with few real constraints. Traditional offshore hubs in the Caribbean still offer legal and corporate structures that enable anonymity, while global financial centres such as the United Arab Emirates have been repeatedly exposed for facilitating hidden financial flows. Together, these environments allow individuals to move funds across borders with relative ease, exploiting regulatory gaps between national systems.

Gatekeeper professions remain a critical weak point. While regulation has increased, coverage gaps remain, while supervision is ineffective and accountability for facilitating money laundering is rare. Around the world, lawyers often fall outside the full scope of anti-money laundering obligations when they provide financial and corporate services.

Property markets also remain a major channel for illicit wealth. Investigations in cities such as London and Vancouver have shown how real estate has long attracted opaque investment. While the UK’s register of overseas property owners marked progress, similar measures are lacking in many other major markets. The recent Opacity in Real Estate Ownership Index by Transparency International and the Anti-Corruption Data Collective (ACDC) underscores the scale of the problem, finding that in many jurisdictions, weak transparency and loopholes still allow illicit funds to flow into property with little scrutiny.

International cooperation remains uneven. High-profile cross-border cases often face delays, legal barriers and operational constraints. Financial intelligence units, particularly in lower-income countries, continue to struggle with limited resources and access to information.

Ten years on, closing the gap between promise and delivery demands deeper reform. Public officials implicated in corruption must face legal consequences, not just political fallout – Pakistan showed this is possible, though a 2023 Supreme Court decision overturned the Panama ruling against Nawaz Sharif. Regulation must now evolve to close the loopholes that still allow service providers to transfer illicit wealth. Those who enable illicit financial flows must also be held responsible, with penalties that genuinely deter misconduct. At the same time, asset recovery must be scaled up so stolen wealth is returned to the public.

Structural reform has to catch up. Transparency in corporate and trust ownership must be ensured in practice, with authorities and public watchdogs easily accessing and using the data. Gaps between jurisdictions must be closed so illicit actors can no longer shift assets to where rules remain weak. Property markets must also be brought fully into transparency frameworks worldwide.

Stronger anti-money laundering rules mean little without enforcement – financial intelligence units need the resources, data and coordination to act. Given the cross-border nature of cases, international cooperation must move beyond rhetoric to real, coordinated action.

While the Panama Papers helped move the needle, many of the systemic problems it helped expose still remain today. The result is simple and devastating: our economies continue to prop up an illicit one – eating away at public budgets, institutions and our future.

The question is no longer what needs to happen – it is whether governments are willing to follow through. The upcoming UK Illicit Finance Summit in June, which will bring together financial hubs and jurisdictions involved in the generation, movement and storage of illicit wealth, offers a significant opportunity for participants to work together in tackling the systemic weaknesses that are exploited by corrupt and criminal actors. Ambitious actions from coalitions of like-minded countries, with clear plans for implementation and follow-through, can still make a difference and establish a practical precedent for jointly combatting criminal and corrupt wealth.

The anniversary of the Panama Papers is a timely reminder that the networks and techniques used to conceal corrupt and criminal wealth are global, and require a coordinated response from a critical mass of jurisdictions.