Enabler Accountability: Assessing Measures Taken against Professionals Implicated in Cases of Illicit Financial Flows from Africa

Corrupt actors rely on private-sector intermediaries to perpetrate their crimes, and launder stolen public funds and bribes. Professionals in the financial and non-financial sectors play a crucial role in facilitating large-scale corruption schemes by providing access to the international financial system, as well as a range of other services crucial to these schemes. In some cases, they do so intentionally; in others, their services may be misused without their intent.

This working paper examines patterns of enabler accountability in known cases. It builds on Transparency International’s earlier Loophole Masters study, which mapped the roles played by enablers in the non-financial sector in cases of illicit financial flows out of Africa. Using the same underlying case sample, this paper asks whether accountability measures were taken against the individual professionals and firms identified in those cases.

Our findings point to a substantial accountability gap. We were able to identify some form of accountability measure for only 18 per cent of enablers captured in the dataset. This included comparable rates of criminal investigations and administrative action by supervisory authorities. Successful enforcement was particularly rare, as in some cases criminal charges were dismissed, or investigations were discontinued. Furthermore, where supervisory action was taken, fines were often low and unlikely to be dissuasive to enablers that serve corrupt actors worldwide.

The working paper finds that accountability frameworks contain important legal and institutional gaps. Administrative accountability is unavailable where relevant professions or services are not covered by anti-money laundering obligations. On the criminal side, all jurisdictions covered by the analysis criminalise money laundering, while a number also provide for criminal liability for failures to implement preventive measures or failures to report suspicious transactions. Yet these wider criminal tools may have been used only rarely against enablers.

These patterns point to several areas where policy and practice should develop further. At the same time, further research and analysis are required to comprehensively assess gaps in supervisory and enforcement practices, and how criminal and supervisory tools can be used more effectively and proportionately against enablers.