Montenegro

Montenegro has a unicameral parliament consisting of 81 MPs, elected based on the general and equal electoral right and by a secret ballot. Parliament exercises legislative power, and its mandate lasts for four years, but it can end before by dissolution or shortening of the mandate.^[i] Following parliamentary elections in June 2023, the following lists earned mandates: Europe now – Milojko Spajić, 24 mandates, TOGETHER! For the future that belongs to you – Danijel Živković (DPS, SD, DUA, LP), 21 mandates, For the Future of Montenegro (New Serbian Democracy, Democratic People’s Party of Montenegro, Workers’ Party), 13 mandates, Aleksa and Dritan – Courage counts, 11 mandates, It is clear! – Bosniak Party - Mr Ervin Ibrahimović, 6 mandates, Albanian forum - Nik Gjeloshaj BESA for European Development, 2 mandates, SNP – DEMOS – FOR YOU, 2 mandates, HGI – On the right side of the world, 1 mandate, and Albanian Alliance, 1 mandate.^[ii]

Parliament independently adopts its budget, and the executive cannot interfere in the dynamic of its spending. However, the parliament lacks the capacities to analyse laws proposed by the government, and lacks staff and premises for the work of its committees and administrative staff.

The change of government in 2020 contributed to strengthening the independence of parliament, which was previously a voting machine for the executive. However, since then, two more governments were appointed with elections in 2023, changing the composition of the parliament, and it was not always clear which political structures composed the parliament’s majority, while boycott by large sections of the parliament affected its work. The Law on Parliament, for which the working group for drafting it was established in July 2022,^[iii] was not adopted.

Parliament adopted some changes to systemic laws such as the Law on President, and the Law on State Prosecutor’s Office, without broader consultations and contrary to recommendations provided by the European Commission and the Venice Commission. In the last three years, legal anti-corruption reforms conducted by parliament were limited to only one adopted law: the Law on State Prosecutor’s Office.

Mechanisms to hold the executive accountable, such as inquiry committees, were not used, and others, such as control and consultative hearings, did not produce concrete results. Also, there are no prescribed sanctions for the government’s non-compliance in providing requested information as part of such inquiries.

Parliament is one of the most transparent institutions in the country, and information on its activities are available on a comprehensive website.

On the other hand, the legislative branch lacks accountability and integrity, even though basic mechanisms such as reviews of laws by the constitutional court and codes of conducts are in place.

However, citizens cannot complain against actions by the legislature or its individual members, nor can they report ethical violations. Contacts with lobbyists do not have to be reported. The obligation lies on the lobbyists to report their contact with parliamentarians, which they rarely comply with in practice. Most MPs submit their asset declarations, but they are not properly scrutinised and meaningful sanctions are missing.

Parliament had an uneven practice of lifting MPs’ immunity, typically targeting opposition MPs in the past, but it does give consent for corruption related cases.

Despite legal requirements for political parties to have at least 30 per cent of female candidates in their electoral list, 27 per cent of MPs in the current assembly are women. Women do not have balanced participation in legislative leadership or parliament’s committees.

_{[i] Parliament of Montenegro. O Skupštini [About the Parliament], https://www.skupstina.me/me/skupstina/o-skupstini.}

_{[ii] OSCE. 2023. Montenegro Early Parliamentary Elections 11 June 2023, pp.31-32, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/9/560256_1.pdf.}

_{[iii] Parliament of Montenegro. Radna grupa za izradu Nacrta zakona o Skupštini Crne Gore [Working group for drafting the Law on Parliament of Montenegro], https://www.skupstina.me/me/radna-tijela/radna-grupa-za-izradu-nacrta-zakona-o-skupstini-crne-gore.}

The current executive has been in office since 31 October 2023, when the new government led by Milojko Spajić was voted in. The government consists of 19 ministries and has five vice-prime ministers. Europe Now has nine ministers and the prime minister; Democratic Montenegro has four ministers and two vice-prime ministers; Socialist People’s Party, two ministers, of which one is a vice-prime minister; and Albanian Forum has three ministers, of which one is vice-prime minister, and Civis has one vice-prime minister.

Executive power remains one of the largest branches of power in Montenegro, defined by the constitution of Montenegro as responsible for the implementation of domestic and foreign policies. The government of Montenegro remains one of the largest consumers of the state budget (96 per cent), but also one of the least transparent branches of power. Over the past few years, the government has become one of the largest employers in the country, with public administration reform still failing to deliver desired results. For instance, optimising public administration is one of the objectives of the public administration reform strategy 2022-2026.^[i] However, the number of employees at both central and local levels continued rising, without proper prior assessment.^[ii]

Due to the lasting political crisis, the government was in a so-called technical mandate, after losing majority support in the parliament in August 2022. This left the executive without proper institutional control and with very few control mechanisms following problematic government decisions in the previous year. Following the parliamentary elections in June 2023, the new government was formed in October 2023.

Overall, the executive role in the country on EU integration is limited by the general political crisis, but also due to the particular interests of political parties. This was particularly visible during the mandate of the so-called caretaker government of ex-prime minister, Dritan Abazović. The new administration of Prime Minister Spajić is taking a somewhat more proactive approach towards the process of EU integration, but is still failing to jumpstart stalled reforms. This is clear in the implementation of reforms, especially those related to the fight against corruption and organised crime. Key anti-corruption legislation is not aligned with the real needs of the country, which is suffering from systematic corruption, while the executive is not investing sufficient effort in recovering captured institutions. This is particularly visible in the case of judicial reforms and the provision of material support to the prosecution by the executive.

Furthermore, Montenegro still does not have a law on government, which is, according to the latest report by the European Commission, one of the crucial pieces of legislation to improve overall governance.^[iii] For instance, this law could help clarify the integrity related measures targeting ministers and their advisers.^[iv] When it comes to internal control in the public sector, important challenges persist, namely in governance responsibility and the system for detecting irregularities.

There are challenges with transparency as well, as the public is often not able to obtain any relevant information, such as cabinet minutes. The absence of this legislation was obvious during the mandate of the caretaker government that exploited to the maximum the fact that its jurisdiction compared to the ’regular’ executive was not limited in any manner.

_{[i] European Commission. 2023. Montenegro 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_694%20Montenegro%20report.pdf.}

_{[ii] European Commission. 2023. Montenegro 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_694%20Montenegro%20report.pdf.}

_{[iii] European Commission. 2023. Montenegro 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_694%20Montenegro%20report.pdf.}

_{[iv] GRECO. 2022. Montenegro, Fifth Evaluation Round Report, p.15, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680a8a106.}

Montenegro’s court system consists of basic courts, high courts, the appellate court, which decides on appeals against first instance decisions of the higher courts, and the supreme court, which is the highest court, responsible for the uniform application of law and for resolving disputes between courts.^[1] There are 15 basic courts, responsible for resolving disputes and hearing cases at first instance, and two high courts (in Podgorica and Bijelo Polje), which are second instance courts, deciding on appeals made against the basic courts’ decisions.^[2] Montenegro also has specialised courts, such as the administrative court, deciding on cases related to administrative law, and the commercial court, deciding on commercial disputes.^[3] In addition, there are also three misdemeanour courts, located in Bijelo Polje, Budva and Podgorica, and a high misdemeanour court in Podgorica.^[4] The judicial council is, next to the prosecutorial council, a central institution for the self-government of the judicial system, responsible for the careers of judges in Montenegro.^[5] Among its other legal competences, the judicial council is in charge of appointing and dismissing judges and court presidents.^[6] It is composed of the president of the supreme court, who is elected by the judicial council, the minister of justice and eight elected members, of which four are from the ranks of judges, elected by the conference of judges, and four from the ranks of reputable lawyers, with at least 15 years of experience, who are elected by parliament.^[7]

The budget of the judiciary is not sufficient to perform its duties. The judiciary lacks human resources in terms of judges and working premises. This has led to the release from custody of nearly 1,000 people arrested for serious crimes and for stealing of evidence from court premises. Further, merit-based recruitment of lay members of the judicial council is not ensured, and other reforms are needed, such as introducing vetting, especially for top roles, and abolishing the ex officio

membership of the minister of justice in the judicial council.

The constitution and the law guarantee the independence of the judiciary. In practice, judges and especially members of the judicial council were not appointed based on professional but political criteria.

The mandate of the judicial council’s members expired, and parliament failed to reach the required two-thirds majority for new appointments until late 2023. On 21 December 2023, parliament elected three members of the judicial council from the ranks of reputable lawyers.^[8] These years of incomplete composition undermined the decision-making of the judicial council as it required a two-thirds majority in several instances, such as the appointment of the supreme court president, which undermined the overall functioning of the justice system.^[9]

Prior to the political changes of the ruling elite in 2020, selected high-level judges were provided with financial benefits in the form of beneficial loans or apartments from the government in secret procedures, contrary to the law.

Public access to judicial records is limited to final judicial verdicts. Their annual reports are not comprehensive.

The judiciary lacks accountability, and existing mechanisms are not effective. The number of judges who fail to accurately report their property and/or income is increasing, but they are not held accountable. The commission for the ethical code of judges was not operational until the end of March 2024,[10] and it severely lacked results before its work was blocked.

The administrative court has the jurisdiction to review the actions of the executive, but it is not effective in practice.

The judiciary is not committed to sanctioning corruption, and its results remain very limited. Widespread use of plea agreements with sanctions below the statutory minimum is further hindering results in this area. Citizens believe that corruption within the judiciary represents one of the key obstacles in achieving results. Recent arrests of top-level judicial officials for corruption and organised crime offences confirm such impressions.

_{[1] Law on Courts of Montenegro, Articles 8, 19, 20, 23, 24.}

_{[2] Law on Courts of Montenegro, Articles 13, 14, 15, 16.}

_{[3] Law on Courts of Montenegro, Articles 17, 18, 21, 22.}

_{[4] Law on Courts of Montenegro, Articles 9, 10, 11, 12.}

_{[5] European Commission. 2023. Montenegro 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e09b27af-427a-440b-a47a-ed5254aec169_en?filename=SWD_2023_694%20Montenegro%20report.pdf.}

_{[6] Constitution of Montenegro, article 128.}

_{[7] Constitution of Montenegro, article 127 and the Law on Judges and the Judicial Council, article 16 .}

_{[8] RTCG. 2023. Iličković, Kurgaš i Medojević izabrani za članove Sudskog savjeta [Ilickovic, Kurgas, and Medojevic elected as members of the judicial council] https://rtcg.me/vijesti/politika/500832/ilickovic-kurgas-i-medojevic-izabrani-za-clanove-sudskog-savjeta.html; Judicial Council of Montenegro. 2023. Press release, https://sudovi.me/sdsv/sadrzaj/dN7x.}

_{[9] European Commission. 2023. Montenegro 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e09b27af-427a-440b-a47a-ed5254aec169_en?filename=SWD_2023_694%20Montenegro%20report.pdf.}

_{[10] Vijesti. 2024. Dražen Medojević, president of the commission for monitoring the implementation of the code of ethics for judges, https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/drustvo/699426/drazen-medojevic-predsjednik-komisije-za-pracenje-primjene-etickog-kodeksa-sudija.}

Within the state prosecution, there is the supreme state prosecution office, the special state prosecution office, the high state prosecution office in Podgorica, the high state prosecution office in Bijelo Polje and 13 basic state prosecution offices.^[i] The supreme state prosecution office supervises the work of the special state prosecution office, and the high and basic prosecution offices.^[ii] The prosecutorial council has a president who is the supreme state prosecutor and ten members.^[iii]

Between October 2019 and January 2024, Montenegro only had a temporary supreme state prosecutor, because parties in parliament could not agree on a candidate for that position. On 27 January 2024, parliament elected Milorad Marković to be the supreme state prosecutor.^[iv] Political influence over the prosecution has been an issue of serious concern for a long time, and that did not change following the change in government in 2020. Firstly, changes in the law regulating the work of the prosecution were adopted by the new majority, which also introduced a simple majority for the election of the members of the prosecutorial council from the ranks of reputable lawyers and changed the structure of the prosecutorial council.^[v]

Adoption of those changes led to new appointments in the prosecution. That resulted in a more efficient prosecution of high-level corruption and a somewhat more active prosecutorial council. Consequently, it improved public trust in the prosecution, especially the chief special prosecutor’s office. However, the executive did not provide the prosecution with the necessary financial resources for their work nor direct access to some information important for financial investigations, and politicians frequently publicly criticise them.

In first half of 2024, the law was changed again in a procedure that lacked transparency and inclusion.^[vi] The new structure of the council has a majority of prosecutors,^[vii] but the current prosecutorial council, elected under the previous law, will continue to operate until the end of its term.^[viii] Importantly, changes in the law stipulate that members of the prosecutorial council are suspended if a criminal investigation is initiated against them.^[ix]

It should be noted that, before the establishment of the prosecutorial council, prosecutors were selected by a simple majority in parliament. Consequently, there is significant concern that the majority of the prosecutorial council, which is made up of prosecutors, might also be subject to politicisation.

Many citizens believe that the majority of prosecutors are corrupt. Mechanisms for accountability and integrity of prosecutors are not efficient, and prosecutors are almost never disciplined or held accountable for disciplinary or ethical violations. Instead, many prosecutors who made mistakes in prominent cases were never questioned but promoted.

Existing regulations do not ensure the integrity of prosecutors. Breaches of the law related to asset declarations, conflict of interest, post-employment restrictions or hospitality regulations are either not identified or not sanctioned. Conflicts of interest for members of the prosecutorial council is not defined precisely enough, while the criteria for the evaluation of prosecutors are not objective enough.

Transparency of prosecution has somewhat improved, but some important information is not publicly available, which is hindering the monitoring of that institution.

_{[i] Law on State Prosecutor’s Office of Montenegro. Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 011/15, 042/15, 080/17, 010/18, 076/20, 059/21, 54/2024, article 11.}

_{[ii] Annual report of the prosecutorial council and public prosecution for 2022, p.41, https://zakoni.skupstina.me/zakoni/web/dokumenta/zakoni-i-drugi-akti/732/3100-17953-00-72-23-9.pdf.}

_{[iii] Annual report of the prosecutorial council and public prosecution for 2022, p.15, https://zakoni.skupstina.me/zakoni/web/dokumenta/zakoni-i-drugi-akti/732/3100-17953-00-72-23-9.pdf.}

_{[iv] Vijesti. 2024. Milorad Marković novi vrhovni državni tužilac [Milorad Markovic is the new supreme state prosecutor], (accessed 21 February 2024), https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/691621/milorad-markovic-novi-vrhovni-drzavni-tuzilac.}

_{[v] Four representatives of the state prosecution, four reputable lawyers, one representative of the Ministry of Justice, and one reputable lawyer proposed by the NGOs, resulting in the state prosecution losing their majority in the prosecutorial council. Ana Nenezić, Analiza rada Tužilačkog Savjeta, Vrhovnog Državnog Tužilaštva i Specijalnog Državnog Tužilaštva u Crnoj Gori, November 2022, Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Crne Gore (CIN-CG), Centar za građanske slobode (CEGAS), Nedjeljnik Monitor, https://www.cin-cg.me/dokumenta/analiza-rada-tuzilackog-savjeta-vrhovnog-drzavnog-tuzilastva-i-specijalnog-drzavnog-tuzilastva-u-crnoj-gori/; European Commission. 2023. Montenegro 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e09b27af-427a-440b-a47a-ed5254aec169_en?filename=SWD_2023_694%20Montenegro%20report.pdf.}

_{[vi] Montenegro - urgent opinion on the revised draft amendments to the Law on the State Prosecution Service, issued pursuant to article 14a of the Venice Commission’s rules of procedure on 10 May 2021, endorsed by the Venice Commission at its 127th plenary session (Venice and online, 2-3 July 2021), https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2021)030-e; Montenegro – urgent follow-up opinion to the opinions on the Law on the State Prosecution Service, issued on 16 May 2024 pursuant to article 14a of the Venice Commission’s revised rules of procedure, endorsed by the Venice Commission at its 139th plenary session (Venice, 21-22 June 2024), https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2024)013-e.}

_{[vii] Law on State Prosecutor’s Office of Montenegro. Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 011/15, 042/15, 080/17, 010/18, 076/20, 059/21, 54/2024, article 18: Members of the prosecutorial council are: the supreme state prosecutor, five state prosecutors, two distinguished jurists who are not lawyers, elected and dismissed by parliament, one representative from the Ministry of Justice, one distinguished jurist representing non-governmental organisations, one distinguished jurist from the ranks of lawyers, who are elected and dismissed by parliament on the proposal of the bar association of Montenegro.}

_{[viii] Law on State Prosecutor’s Office of Montenegro. Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 011/15, 042/15, 080/17, 010/18, 076/20, 059/21, 54/2024, article 184.}

_{[ix] Law on State Prosecutor’s Office of Montenegro. Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 011/15, 042/15, 080/17, 010/18, 076/20, 059/21, 54/2024, article 32.}

One-third (32.7 per cent) of employed people in Montenegro work in the public sector,^[i] which encompasses state bodies, including ministries, administrative bodies, expert services of the president, parliament and government, the state audit institution, the protector of human rights and freedoms, the prosecutorial administration, the judicial administration, local administration bodies and services, agencies and other regulatory bodies, public institutions, public enterprises/companies, the central bank, the audit authority, state commission for control of public procurement procedures, accreditation bodies, etc.^[ii]

The public sector still struggles with systematic corruption, affecting the transparency of operations and the quality of public services delivered. Public administration reform has so far not delivered the desired results as frequent election processes in the previous period exposed the sector to harmful political influence, resulting in political interests being prioritised over those of Montenegrin citizens’ desire to have professional public sector.

This has led to public institutions being captured by political interests, with human resources management entirely engulfed by the desires of political parties to strengthen their voter base via politically fuelled employment. With the introduction of the tax reform by Europe Now and the increase in salaries in the public sector, employment in state institutions became more attractive than in the private sector. Unfortunately, amendments to the Law on Public Servants and State Employees introducing lower professional criteria for jobs in the public sector contributed to lowering the quality of public services.

There is also no consistent enforcement of the code of ethics in the public sector, while monitoring of the enforcement of complaint mechanisms is not sufficient to produce enough data to analyse and introduce improvement measures. Transparency of work in the public sector is not satisfactory either, in that there should be proactive publishing of information and proper enforcement of the Law on Free Access to Information. While CSOs, media and citizens use their rights to free access to information, the quality of enforcement of the law needs improvement, particularly with the rising number of complaints coupled with declining response rates.

Citizens are moderately aware of anti-corruption mechanisms to report cases related to the public sector, while CSOs and the media remain the main sources of information and support for citizens interested in learning more about this topic. Public campaigns do not deliver the desired results and, despite an increased number of whistleblowers from the public sector, their reports are not being properly treated.

Public procurement still lacks transparency that is sufficient to establish proper civil control,^[iii] while business still recognises corruption as the main burden, especially in the area of awarding decisions and the quality of tender documentation.

There are also issues with data availability, as there is a lack of state-level statistics on the enforcement of codes of ethics. Further, oversight mechanisms need improvement, particularly regarding audits, as there is still no appropriate staffing at either central or local levels in the area of internal audit.

_{[i] European Commission. 2023. Montenegro 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_694 Montenegro report.pdf.}

_{[ii] Institute Alternative. 2023. Milena Muk, Neither a Client, Nor a Patron! for Greater Resilience to Clientelism and Corruption in the Area of Public Sector Employment in Montenegro, pp.5-6, https://media.institut-alternativa.org/2022/12/NKNG-eng-2.pdf.}

_{[iii] For example, the 2023 European Commission (EC) report suggests that the number and value of negotiated procedures without a prior publication of the contract notice should be greatly reduced. See: European Commission. 2023. Montenegro 2023 Report, p.78, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_694%20Montenegro%20report.pdf.}

The police directorate was established as one of the administrative structures within the Ministry of Interior, whose authorities are defined in the Law on Internal Affairs. It is a civil organisation under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, performing basic law and order functions.^[i] The police directorate is hierarchically organised, consisting of five units (sector for combating crime, sector for border police, special purpose police sector, sector for financial intelligence affairs and general police sector), four departments (international police cooperation and public relations, analytics and improvement of police work, internal audit, telecommunication and electronic technologies), two centres (forensics centre, centre for information security and data processing), two offices (office for human resources and legal affairs, office for financial, general and ancillary affairs), and eight police centres.^[ii]

Within the Ministry of Interior, there are several bodies with anti-corruption competencies, including the ethics committee, an anti-corruption unit and an internal control unit.^[iii] External oversight consists of parliamentary oversight, which is exercised by the committee for defence and security.^[iv]

Salaries of police officials are not satisfactory, and the police lack staff, equipment and access to information held by other institutions, which is hampering investigations. An important challenge is the incomplete digitalisation of the cadastre and the absence of a digital case management system shared between the police and prosecution services, creating long delays in investigations.^[v]

Even though the law envisages some professional criteria for appointments to top managerial positions, the police is not perceived as independent.

In addition to political influences over the police, most recently, the prosecution disclosed a criminal web at the highest levels of the police department. High-profile cases initiated by the special prosecutor suggest a deep infiltration of organised crime into law enforcement agencies.

The law prescribes only a general obligation for the police to inform the public about its work, but access to its information is only partially allowed. Asset declarations of the police director and deputies are publicly available. All police officers, including those no longer in service, are required by the law to submit reports on their assets and income, but the latest bylaw governing these expired at the end of 2015.

The police is subject to parliamentary, civil and internal control, but these mechanisms do not produce results in practice. In law, police officials are not immune from criminal proceedings, but in practice, they are nearly never held accountable for misuse of their power or for torture. Further, after recruitment, no further integrity checks before appointing ordinary police officers are required.

The police has a code of ethics with rules on conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality. However, those are not effective in practice, and asset declarations submitted by police officials are not properly scrutinised.

Police officers have legal powers to apply proper investigative techniques in detecting corruption cases, but in practice they rarely use them, especially in relation to high-level corruption. Citizens believe that the police are not efficient in investigating corruption, which is also widespread within the police.

_{[i] GRECO. 2022. Montenegro, Fifth Evaluation Round Report, pp.33-34, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680a8a106.}

_{[ii] The Government of Montenegro, Organizacija Uprave Policije [The Organisation of the Police Directorate], https://www.gov.me/clanak/organizacija-uprave-ppolicije.}

_{[iii] GRECO. 2022. Montenegro, Fifth Evaluation Round Report, p.444, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680a8a106.}

_{GRECO. 2022. Montenegro, Fifth Evaluation Round Report, p.45, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680a8a106.}

_{[v] European Commission. 2023. Montenegro 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_694%20Montenegro%20report.pdf.}

The law stipulates that election management bodies are the following: polling station committees (PSC), municipal election commissions^[i] (MEC) and the state election commission (SEC).^[ii]

Electoral management bodies (EMBs) are composed of representatives of political parties, with the exception of the president of the SEC and one member from civil society and academia. Therefore, their decisions are not impartial or unbiased and they are not perceived as independent or impartial.

Legislative provisions that define the transparency of election management bodies exist to some extent, but they are vague, especially in relation to the work of local election bodies. While the public can obtain relevant information on the organisation and functioning of the SEC, which recently improved its transparency, many decisions made by local election bodies are not publicly available.

There are no legal provisions for the dismissal of EMB members nor other mechanisms that would ensure their accountability. Concrete cases show that their actions seriously undermined the integrity of the election process without any consequences. Complaints/dispute resolution mechanisms are not working in line with international standards because shortcomings in the legislation are allowing EMBs to be selective or not to act and freeze the election process.

The ethical code for the EMB was adopted with only seven articles more than a decade ago, and it has never changed. The code does not regulate conflicts of interest, nor is it applied to the administrative staff of the election bodies. Most EMB members vote along political lines on key decisions, which, in practice, seriously undermines their integrity and public trust in the election process. However, there is a complete absence of actions to ensure the integrity of members of the EMB, and their misbehaviour goes unsanctioned.

The SEC does not contribute to the accuracy of voter registration, despite its authority given by the law. Voter education campaigns are lacking, and observers have not been allowed to monitor all phases of the election process. Laws and bylaws describe the procedures for handling election material.

Despite the constitutional and legal guarantees, in practice, political parties fail to promote women's participation, and sometimes they fail even to respect the legal minimum. Women are underrepresented at all levels of the election administration; they are less visible in the election campaigns, and political parties rarely include gender-specific issues in their programmes. Intensified online violence against women is further hindering their political participation.

_{^[i] Including the Capital City Election Commission and Election Commission of Old Royal Capital of Cetinje.}

_{^[ii] Law on Election of Councillors and MPs. Official Gazette of Republic of Montenegro no. 04/98, 05/98, 17/98, 14/00, 18/00, 09/01, 41/02, 46/02, 45/04, 48/06, 56/06. Official Gazette of Montenegro no. 46/11, 14/14 and 47/14, article 23.}

The protector of human rights and freedoms of Montenegro (hereafter the ombudsperson)^[1] is an independent and autonomous body that takes measures to protect human rights and freedoms^[2] and prevent torture and anti-discrimination. The ombudsperson also raises awareness of the rule of law and legal protection of citizens, as well as the protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms and the unbiased work of state institutions with respect to the law.^[3]

Since the current ombudsperson took office in 2019, capacities of the institution were raised to a higher level than in the past, particularly employing professionals to deal with all four areas of work,^[4] as well as the secretary general and integrity manager, revising and adopting internal acts, documents, strategies and guidelines, and adopting an integrity plan. However, there is still a lack of financial support; moreover, certain laws and regulations make this institution dependent and overburdened, especially the increase in the number of complaints and cases by the year.

The legal framework provides for the independent and autonomous work of the ombudsperson, and the NGO activists believe the election and the work of the ombudsperson is not politicised.^[5] This is the only institution whose head was not changed during the political changes from 2020. The institution is accredited with B status by the Accreditation Subcommittee of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. The institution enjoys the highest trust of citizens when it comes to dealing with human rights and freedoms.

The transparency of the institution has been enhanced recently, particularly with the redesign of its website in 2021. The ombudsperson submits annual reports to the national parliament, and head and deputies submit reports on property and income to the APC.

Complaints have been considered in a more active and efficient manner recently. However, the implementation of the ombudsperson’s recommendations by the authorities needs to be more systematic, effective and prompt. Civil society points out the lack of criticism by the ombudsperson when state institutions fail to implement its recommendations.

_{[1] This body was established by a special law adopted by the Parliament of Montenegro on 10 July 2003. The institution’s establishment can be found on the following link https://www.ombudsman.co.me/O_instituciji.html (accessed 12 December 2022).}

_{[2] Law on Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms of Montenegro, article 2.}

_{[3] The institution’s website can be found on the following link https://www.ombudsman.co.me/O_instituciji.html (accessed 12 December 2022).}

_{[4] The four areas are: i) justice, public administration and other competences; ii) protection against abuse, and security and national preventive mechanism against torture (NPM); iii) children rights, youth and social protection; iv) ​​protection against discrimination, vulnerable groups and gender equality (institutional mechanism for protection against discrimination), more information can be found at https://www.ombudsman.co.me/O_instituciji.html (accessed 23 December 2022).}

_{[5] The European Commission has noted that the regulatory and institutional framework for the functioning of the ombudsperson is in place and that the capacities of the office to handle complaints and the quality of its decisions continued to improve. Furthermore, it has noted that the capacities of the national prevention mechanism (NPM) embedded in the ombudsperson’s office were further strengthened.}

The state audit institution (SAI) is an independent and supreme authority for national audits. The SAI is functionally, operationally and financially independent. SAI is spearheaded by a senate, whose five members are appointed and dismissed by parliament.

SAI audit reports are comprehensive and cover various aspects of financial management. The SAI provides well-grounded recommendations to improve financial management and engages the government in follow-up activities. However, the implementation of recommendations remains low. The SAI has the means to detect and investigate misbehaviour but lacks the power to apply sanctions. There is limited information on whether it has discovered misbehaviour and if sanctions were applied to other authorities.

There are comprehensive laws ensuring the functional, operational and financial independence of the SAI. Senate members cannot be members of a political party during their term of office, but they can be prior to that. Some senate members come from high-ranking positions in political parties. This can be a concern for independence since the SAI also audits the financial statements of political parties. Political parties have been trying to discredit the SAI's reports when dissatisfied with the findings.

The SAI mostly has adequate financial, infrastructure and staff resources to meet its goals, but there have been delays in providing suitable premises for its work. Provisions exist for the SAI to report to the parliament and government through an annual activity report. However, there is no obligation to submit the results of the SAI's financial audit to parliament or the public.

There are comprehensive provisions to ensure the integrity of SAI officials and staff, including a code of ethics and an ethics committee. However, some cases of alleged conflict of interest and misconduct in audit reports have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the SAI's integrity system.

The Agency for the prevention of corruption (APC) was established on 1 January 2016 as an independent state institution whose work is governed by three laws: the Law on Prevention of Corruption, Law on Financing of Political Entities and the Law on Lobbying.

The APC is managed by the director, who is supervised by the council of the APC, composed of members elected by the parliament via open competition.^[i] The APC operates through two departments, the department for preventing conflict of interests and control of political party and election campaigns financing and the department for the prevention of corruption, for integrity, lobbying and the application of international standards.^[ii]

Since 2016, the APC has boosted the process of proactive control of the income and assets declarations submitted by state officials, but it is still struggling to achieve an impartial approach in processing high-ranking officials. Most of the high-profile cases are still brought to light by civil society organisations and investigative journalists, with the APC failing to process in a timely manner even well documented cases.

When it comes to control over financing political parties and election campaigns, the APC is still producing limited results, with significant setbacks in securing transparent and corruption-free election processes in Montenegro.

Seven years after its establishment, the APC is still understaffed and it lacks the political will to achieve sustainable results in curbing corruption.

In June 2024, parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Prevention of Corruption that failed to address key recommendations for improvement,^[iii] but instead introduced a number of provisions^[iv] that would practically disable a more effective fight against corruption.

_{[i] Agency for the Prevention of Corruption. 2016. Annual Report 2016, p.5, https://www.antikorupcija.me/media/documents/ASK_Izvjestaj_2016.pdf.}

_{[ii] Agency for the Prevention of Corruption. 2016. Annual Report 2016, p.5, https://www.antikorupcija.me/media/documents/ASK_Izvjestaj_2016.pdf.}

_{[iii] MANS. 2023. Analysis of the Law on Prevention of Corruption with Recommendations, https://www.mans.co.me/en/?p=9617.}

_{[iv] Daily Vijesti. 2024. Vrijeme igra i za milionere: Funkcioneri sa sakrivenom imovinom brojaće dane do zastare, https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/drustvo/702117/vrijeme-igra-i-za-milionere-funkcioneri-sa-sakrivenom-imovinom-brojace-dane-do-zastare, accessed in July 2024.}

There are 51 active political parties in Montenegro registered with the Ministry of Public Administration in 2023.^[1] During the June 2023 elections, 15 party lists and coalitions participated, with 9 of them securing seats in parliament, as confirmed by the final official results published by the state election commission.^[2] Montenegro's political scene has undergone significant transformations in recent years, marked by the emergence of new parties and the fall of long-standing political forces dominated by strong leaders.

The Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), led by Milo Đukanović, had long dominated Montenegrin politics. Accusations of corruption plagued the party, which was defeated in the 2020 elections, following protests organised by the Serbian Orthodox Church in relation to a law regulating property rights. Since the political turnover, there have been two changes of government, and the 2023 parliamentary elections resulted in another defeat of the DPS. A new political structure emerged, the Europe Now Movement (PES), which secured victory in the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections, emphasising economic reforms and a pragmatic approach to governance. However, Montenegro is currently waiting for the new government to be established, a process that is severely complicated due to major political differences within the new majority.^[3]

The legal framework pertaining to the existence and operations of political parties is conducive to the free and effective formation and operation of political parties, but some provisions limit funding of new and non-parliamentary parties and expose them to unfair competition in financing election campaigns. Some political parties extensively misuse public resources and/or are frequently accused of illegal funding of election campaigns. The constitution guarantees freedom of political association and action, without approval, but there are no specific safeguards in the legislation to prevent unwarranted external interference in the

activities of political parties. In practice, the state and foreign political entities have been interfering heavily in the activities of some political parties, through illegal wiretapping, arresting opposition leaders based on unconstitutional provisions and unregulated foreign financing.

Transparency in the financing of political parties is limited. Existing legal provisions do not require political parties to report whether they actually paid for election related costs. Proactive financial reports by political parties are of low quality and provide only partial information on their financing. It is difficult to access more detailed information, and responsible institutions are not checking their accuracy thoroughly.

Most political parties lack adequate procedures for regulating internal democratic governance, and they frequently do not follow the existing ones. Legal provisions on the participation of women exist, but have loopholes and in practice are only partially followed. In practice, women’s participation in politics is scarce, especially at the local level. Political parties are entitled to special funds for women’s organisations, but they are not accountable for spending those funds.

On the ideological spectrum, Montenegro's political parties can be broadly categorised as left, centrist and right. However, these ideological commitments often remain largely formal and do not significantly influence their actual activities. In many cases, there's a disconnect between the parties' stated programmatic goals and their real-world efforts because most political parties in Montenegro did not originate or primarily coalesce around the interests of specific social strata or groups, nor did they reflect the main social divisions, instead they centred on issues related to state status and national identity. Significant social groups, such as women, the Roma population and people with disabilities, are excluded from representation by the major political parties. A number of political parties are based on clientelism and narrow interests, often influenced by ethnic and foreign factors.

Political parties publicly claim their commitment to the fight against corruption, but in practice, their officials engage in various illicit activities, especially related to election campaign financing by misusing public resources.

_{[1] Government of Montenegro. 2023. Library, Active Political Parties, www.gov.me/dokumenta/9191d98a-4df6-4ce7-bd6e-bba35a3e7ecc.}

_{[2] State Election Commission. 2023. Final Results for the Election of Deputies to the Assembly of Montenegro, https://dik.co.me/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/KONACNI-REZULTATI-2023.pdf.}

_{[3] For example, the Democratic Front (DF) is not an acceptable partner for minority parties (Albanian, Bosniak and Croatian) due to their right-wing and pro-Serbian orientation. Participation of that large party in the government is also problematic for foreign and security cooperation, as they are perceived as a pro-Russian political force in Montenegro.}

In Montenegro, there are 182 registered and active media outlets, including one national public broadcaster (RTCG) with three TV channels, a satellite channel, two radio stations and a digital portal. The media infrastructure in Montenegro includes six local public TV stations, 15 local public radio stations and 15 commercial TV stations, with four having a national frequency. The print sector comprises three daily newspapers, two weeklies and 14 periodical newspapers. Additionally, the radio sector includes 28 commercial stations and three non-profit stations. In the online sphere, there are 115 registered portals. Montenegro's media sector is complemented by Mina News Agency, a privately owned news agency. Digital engagement is significant, with a high internet penetration rate of 89.8 per cent and a substantial presence on social media platforms​.^[i]

The media landscape in Montenegro continues to be characterised by deep polarisation, often reflecting political affiliations and national identities. The process of establishing a media outlet in Montenegro remains fairly simple, although the profitability of media is limited due to a small audience and advertising budgets. The state is still a significant contributor to public broadcasters’ budgets, while private media are exposed to private sector pressures, creating undue influence on their credibility and professionalism.

Ethical codes are adopted by major media outlets, but citizens are largely unaware of the available complaint mechanisms. Journalists work in an environment where there are major, unsolved cases of attacks on the media, with extremely low motivation to engage in investigative journalism. Despite these challenges, the media and CSOs are still an important source of information on cases of high-level corruption and organised crime, being the only non-institutional controllers of the government’s performance in that area.

_{[i] Media Ownership Monitor. No date. Media Consumption, Montenegro, www.montenegro.mom-gmr.org [accessed January 2024].}

The focus of this chapter is on registered not-for-profit non-governmental organisations. In December 2022, they numbered 6,427^[i], including around 6,100 associations, 240 foundations and 120 foreign civil society organisations (CSOs).^[ii] All of them have the status of an active organisation, even though this data cannot be supported in practice; it is estimated that only around 150-200 of them are present in public life through their own work and media.^[iii] Those 150-200 are also the ones most active when it comes to policy preparations (participation in government working groups^[iv] and negotiation chapter working groups for the EU accession process),^[v] addressing social and political issues, fighting against organised crime and corruption, criticising and calling for responsibility of state institutions in public.

For this pillar, the following organisations are used as representative examples:

CSOs are highly dependent on the EU support, both the largest ones (mostly concentrated in the capital) as well as medium and smaller sized NGOs (operating in most Montenegrin cities). They attract most of their funds through the civil society facility programme implemented by the delegation of the European Union to Montenegro.^[vi]

Philanthropy is not well developed in the country, nor is it regulated; therefore, NGOs still mainly depend on donor support.

Some NGOs are capable of attracting young, professional and ambitious people and engaging them through short-term projects; however, without secured sustainable funding, staff cannot be kept for a longer period.

The long process of reorganisation and implementation of the many reform acts and strategies introduced in the two-year period after the 2020 parliamentary elections, as well as the lack of cooperation with civil society, had a negative effect on the work dynamics and potential contributions of NGOs in public policies. Moreover, even though it was expected after 2020, the state does not refrain from regular and severe interference with the activities of the most prominent NGOs that criticise the government. Both the government and political parties use various means of pressure to discredit and intimidate NGO activists.

This leaves the already attenuated civil society with less and less enthusiasm and motivation to contribute to the democratisation of society (some of the most vocal NGO representatives even left their NGOs to join the ruling political parties).

CSOs face many obstacles in their operations and require significant improvement in transparency, accountability and self-regulation. Nevertheless, their contribution to the fight against corruption is significant. Their multiannual advocacy campaigns, research and initiatives for reforms have led to changes in state prosecution bodies and new initiatives on decreasing high-level corruption. Citizens have recognised their work and believe that NGOs are mostly active in the fight against corruption and organised crime.

_{[i] Evidence of the active NGOs, https://ckan.gov.me/dataset/evidencija-aktivnih-nvo-3667/resource/36f4a84e-991a-4fe6-8c0d-edaa85b7562b (accessed 20 August 2022).}

_{[ii] USAID. 2021. 2021 Civil Society Sustainability Index – Montenegro, https://storage.googleapis.com/cso-si-dashboard.appspot.com/Reports/CSOSI-Montenegro-2021.pdf.}

_{[iii] Disability info. 2021. 1 NGO on 100 citizens, https://disabilityinfo.me/resurni-kutak/item/1304-po-jedna-nvo-na-100-gradjana (accessed 21 September 2022).}

_{[iv] The involvement of CSOs in consultation processes and working groups https://eusluge.euprava.me/eParticipacija/RadneGrupe/ (accessed 20 September 2022).}

_{[v] The participation of CSOs in negotiation chapters https://www.eu.me (accessed 20 September 2022).}

_{[vi] Civil Society Facility Programme: http://evropskakuca.me/civil-society-sector/ (accessed 20 September 2022).}

The business sector in Montenegro operates in a dynamic, often uncertain social and political environment. Despite the fact that Montenegro is an EU candidate country, widespread corruption affects all sectors, including business.

While setting up a company is a fairly easy task that is not time-consuming or costly, numerous issues affect the normal operations of companies in Montenegro.

There is direct involvement of state officials in the creation of preconditions for business, and the legal system provides a range of legal mechanisms for disputing their decisions. This is frequently followed by lengthy administrative and court procedures, often mentioned by businesses as one of the obstacles to operating in Montenegro.

The transparency of companies’ operations in Montenegro is not satisfactory, with legal obligations to publish data providing only the minimum information needed for additional oversight, aside from that conducted by state institutions. The most frequent crimes involving companies are tax evasion and participation in a criminal organisation.

Meanwhile, companies recognise corruption as a barrier to business, and their concerns are mostly channelled to the government via the various business associations.

The majority of companies in Montenegro are still owned by men, and the government does not assess data on women’s participation in managerial positions in companies.