Albania

Albania is a parliamentary republic. The Assembly has 140 Members of Parliament (MPs) elected based on a proportional electoral system on regional level with a national threshold of one per cent and semi-opened lists, with citizens having one preferential vote. The tenth legislature started on September 2021.[i]

There is a lack of independence of the legislature from the executive due to the effects of the electoral system, lack of intra-party democracy, a single-party government and weak opposition actions due to internal fractions and conflicts. The Assembly oversight of the executive directly or through supporting the implementation of recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) and Ombudsperson for the government is weak.

The Assembly has recently increased its transparency and accountability by engaging more actively in public consultation and with civil society, but this engagement remains mostly formal for the Assembly’s decision-making. While there are mechanisms for ensuring the MPs’ integrity, the Assembly does not monitor their implementation, ethics and integrity provisions are enforced poorly, and MPs’ misbehaviour goes mostly unsanctioned. The Assembly has adequate planned financial resources, but its existing political and administrative staff in support of the MPs is insufficient for the vast activity of the Assembly.

The Assembly has prioritised anti-corruption reforms through ratifying international conventions and by approving a vast legislative framework, and has also prioritised other reforms related to good governance in the framework of the European Union (EU) integration process. However, the legislative framework is still fragmented. It contains gaps related to political parties and campaign finances, and the reforms are mostly ineffective or have yet to produce tangible results in combatting corruption in the country.

_{[i] The Socialist Party has 74 MPs, the Democratic Party 59 MPs, the Social Movement for Integration (Party of Liberty) four MPs and the Social Democratic Party three MPs.}

In Albania, the executive branch consists of the President, the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. The President of Albania (since 2022 Bajram Begaj) is the head of state and is elected by the Assembly for a five-year term. The President's role is largely ceremonial, and their powers are limited. The Prime Minister (since 2013 Edi Rama from the Socialist Party of Albania), as the head of government, holds significant power within the executive branch. The Prime Minister is usually the leader of the majority party or coalition in the Assembly. The Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, is responsible for implementing government policies and managing the day-to-day affairs of the state.

The executive faces challenges in merit-based recruitment, salary reform transparency, professional development infrastructure, administrative capacity for policymaking and financial sustainability of reforms. There are laws for executive transparency, but some provisions, especially regarding ‘state secrets’, are vague and can be misused to limit transparency. There are laws for executive accountability, but they do not address the government's use of normative acts to amend laws without immediate parliamentary scrutiny.

Oversight provisions are only partially effective due to political polarisation and underutilisation of oversight tools by the Assembly. Independent oversight institutions like HIDAACI and the SAI have minimal impact. The legal framework, including the Ministerial Code of Ethics, has gaps in addressing ‘revolving door’ scenarios, a lack of clear enforcement mechanisms and vague provisions on free speech. While there are reforms to combat corruption, they are ineffective due to limited political will, inconsistent efforts and inadequate resources. The executive’s power over the Assembly is significant, and its interactions with the public sector, SAI and HIDAACI suggest limited substantive pressure on the executive to design effective anti-corruption policies. The oversight power of HIDAACI is limited, focusing mainly on asset and private interest declarations.

In 2015, the ad hoc committee of the Albanian Parliament on Justice System Reform assessed that “the judiciary is considered as one of the areas with high level of corruption.”[i] Since then, the Albanian justice system has undergone a deep reform. In 2016, the new legal framework was adopted, which included the establishment of the vetting institutions and the Judicial Appointments Council (JAC).[ii]

The vetting institutions include the Independent Qualification Commission (IQC), composed of 12 commissioners, elected by the parliament in 2017;[iii] the Special Appeal College (SAC; a special chamber of the Constitutional Court with a nine-year mandate until the completion of the vetting process), composed of seven judges, elected by the parliament in 2017;[iv] and the Institution of Public Commissioners (IPC), composed of two commissioners, elected by the parliament in 2017.[v]

The vetting institutions are supported and monitored by the International Monitoring Operation, composed of international observers from the US and the EU, which include judges and prosecutors with at least 15 years of professional experience in their respective countries. The International Monitoring Operation is led by the EU Commission.[vi]

At the end of 2018, the new governing institutions, the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) were established, followed by the establishment of the High Justice Inspector (HJI) in 2020. The HJC is composed of 11 full time members who are engaged exclusively with the governance of the judiciary. The reform also placed the High Court under its mandate.

The new judicial map overhauled the territorial competences of the courts, closing down nine smaller courts of general jurisdiction, as well as four administrative courts and five courts of Appeal in order to increase their efficiency and to cope with the reduction in the number of judges by half, mainly as a result of the vetting process.[vii]

The vacancies in the judiciary remain one of the main challenges for this pillar. Up to the end of July 2023, after verifying the three components[viii] stipulated in the law (assets, integrity and professional capacity), IQC had dismissed 138 judges and 96 prosecutors (often only for one of three criteria).[ix] This has had a serious impact on the efficiency of the courts and their efforts to clear the accumulated backlog of cases. In 2022, the backlog at the High Court reached over 36,000 cases, whereas the backlog at the courts of appeal of general jurisdiction reached over 28,000 cases.[x] Among the shortcomings identified in the decisions of IQC are the insufficient professional capacities of its members and the double standards of its decisions.[xi]

The other challenges are related to the support needed in terms of financial and human resources, a functioning case management system and stronger cooperation with the media and the civil society to increase transparency in order to strengthen the public’s trust in the judiciary.

_{[i] Ad hoc Parliamentary Committee on Justice System Reform - Group of High Level Experts, “Analysis of the justice system in Albania”, June 2015, p.10. https://euralius.eu/images/Justice-Reform/Analysis-of-the-Justice-System-in-Albania.pdf (consulted on 08.08.2023).}

_{[ii] http://www.gjykataelarte.gov.al/web/Funksionet_5588_1.php: The JAC is composed of nine members, judges and prosecutors, selected by drawing lots by the President of the Republic, between December 1 and 5 of each year: two judges of the Constitutional Court, one judge of the High Court (who presides over the Council), one prosecutor of the General Prosecution, two judges and two prosecutors of appeal, and one judge of the administrative court. The JAC conducts the verification of the legal, professional and moral criteria and provides the ranking of the candidates for election as judges of the Constitutional Court and the High Justice Inspector. The JAC ranks the candidates according to their professional merits. The President of the Republic, the Assembly and the Supreme Court elect the judges of the Constitutional Court among the three candidates ranked highest by the JAC. The Assembly elects the High Justice Inspector from among the five candidates ranked highest by the JAC. In cases when these institutions fail to elect the candidates, the candidate ranked highest by JAC is considered to be appointed}

_{[iii] https://kpk.al/.}

_{[iv] https://kpa.al/.}

_{[v] https://ikp.al/.}

_{[vi] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/international-monitoring-operation_en?s=214 (consulted on 31.08.2023)}

_{[vii] High Judicial Council, “New Judicial Map”: https://klgj.al/harta-e-re-gjyqesore/ (accessed 24.10.2023)}

_{[viii] However, in practice this has not always been the case. Vetting authorities have dismissed judges and prosecutors only for one criterion, mainly assets, therefore not examining the two other criteria.}

_{[ix] Independent Qualification Commission Statistical Report February 2018-July 2023, p.1. https://kpk.al/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/RAPORTI-STATISTIKOR-2018-KORRIK-2023.pdf (consulted on 09.08.2023).}

_{[x] High Judicial Council, Annual Report of the judiciary in 2022, p. 60 and 76. https://klgj.al/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/RAPORT-VJETOR-2022-shkarko.pdf (consulted on 09.08.2023).}

_{[xi] Albanian Helsinki Committee, Study Report - Monitoring the process of the vetting of judges and prosecutors during the period January 2017 – June 2018, p. 45-46. https://www.osfa.al/sites/default/files/raport-studimor-monitorimi-i-procesit-te-vettingut-te-gjyqtareve-dhe-prokuroreve_jan17-qer18.pdf (consulted on 09.08.2023).}

The Prosecution Service of Albania is composed of the General Jurisdiction Prosecution (GJP)[i] and the Special Prosecution.[ii] The former was the only prosecution service in Albania up until the justice reform in 2016, which established the Special Prosecution Office to prosecute Corruption and Organised Crime, as well as the independent investigation unit, the National Investigation Bureau, which together compose the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK).

The Albanian justice system has undergone deep reform. The new legal framework was adopted in 2016, while the new governing institutions, the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) and the High Judicial Council (HJC), were established in 2018, followed by the establishment of the High Justice Inspector (HJI) in 2020. The HPC is composed of 11 full time members, and it appoints, evaluates, promotes and transfers all prosecutors at all levels, decides on disciplinary measures imposed on all prosecutors at all levels, proposes candidates for Prosecutor General to the Assembly, adopts rules of ethics for prosecutors and supervises their observance, proposes and administers its own budget, and informs the public and the parliament on the state of the prosecution offices.[iii]

The new judicial map overhauled the territorial competences of the courts, closing down 9 smaller courts of general jurisdiction and five courts of appeal. As a consequence, the prosecution offices were affected in the same manner.

The public prosecutor faces significant challenges stemming from vacancies resulting from the vetting process, with 96 prosecutors[iv] dismissed by the IQC as of September 2023. This impacts prosecutorial efficiency. Additional challenges include the need for increased financial and human resources as well as enhanced cooperation with media and civil society to boost transparency and public trust. There are no constitutional guarantees provided for the prosecution budget to stipulate that the prosecution must be allocated a certain percentage of the general budget in order to carry out its mission efficiently.

Furthermore, there has been a lack of assessment by the HPC and the General Prosecution to determine optimal prosecutor workload, necessitating a comprehensive analysis. Until substantial vacancies are filled, a balanced distribution of workload among prosecutors is crucial for enhanced efficiency.

The initial training programme for prosecutors lacks differentiation from judges and should focus on criminal law. Constitutional guarantees for the prosecution budget are absent, hindering efficient mission fulfilment.

The prosecution is reactive rather than proactive in transparency, responding to information requests as per the right to information law.

Critical accountability gaps include the absence of performance evaluations for prosecutors to guide promotions and a lack of specific provisions preventing prosecutors from receiving reimbursements, compensation and honoraria related to privately sponsored trips in the Standards and Rules.

_{[i] General Jurisdiction Prosecution are the prosecution offices that prosecute cases in the courts of general jurisdiction of the first instance, the courts of appeal and the General Prosecution. Law no.97/2016, “On the organisation and functioning of the prosecution”, Art. 2§d.https://euralius.eu/index.php/en/library/albanian-legislation?task=download.send&id=181&catid=89&m=0 (accessed 05.11.2023)}

_{[ii] The Special Prosecution prosecutes and represents the accusation in the name of the state in the Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Court of First Instance, Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court, takes measures and oversees the execution of criminal judgments, and performs other duties as provided by law. Law no.95/2016, “On the organisation and functioning of institutions for combatting corruption and organised crime”, Art. 4. Available at: https://klp.al/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/lligj_nr_95_2016_per_organizimin_dhe_funksionimin_e_institucioneve_per_te_luftuar_korrupsionin_dhe_krimin_e_organizuar_s_1728.pdf Consulted on 16.06.2023.}

_{[iii] Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Art. 149/a. https://klp.al/.}

_{[iv] Independent Qualification Commission Statistical Report February 2018-September 2023, p.1. https://kpk.al/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/RAPORTI-STATISTIKOR-2018-SHTATOR-2023-.pdf (accessed 01.11.2023).}

The Albanian public sector suffers from low salaries, unclear professional and accountability standards, and is prone to corruption and political interference. Albania has implemented an ambitious public administration reform agenda since 2015. The reforms have improved some aspects of the recruitment process (such as standardisation of job descriptions, online recruitment of the civil service and implementation of court decisions favourable to dismissed civil servants) and transparency mechanisms (increase in number of institutions publishing transparency programmes, electronic register of requests and responses, publication of key budget documents), but they have not effectively addressed the need for a professional and accountable public sector.

Multiple agencies and heads of directorates such as the National Authority for Veterinary and Plant Protection, the National Youth Agency, the State Expropriation Agency, the National Institute for Registration of Cultural Heritage, and the National Food Authority, which should be part of the civil service, are not included in the civil service legislation and thus are political appointees. Internal accountability mechanisms to foster integrity and prevent conflicts of interest are not effective, while the use of public resources during political campaigns has been documented in virtually every election cycle. Lack of transparency continues to be a key obstacle to public sector accountability. Several reports from Albanian CSOs demonstrate the need for greater proactive disclosure of information and a stronger enforcement of the Law on the Right to Information through a more rigorous sanctions regime by the Access to Information and Data Protection Commissioner.

The Albanian State Police (ASP) is the principal law enforcement body in Albania, tasked with maintaining public order, preventing and investigating crime, and other related duties. On the other hand, the Agency for Police Oversight (APO) serves as an external entity dedicated to overseeing, monitoring, and evaluating the actions and conduct of the ASP to ensure accountability and adherence to established standards.

The ASP grapples with systemic issues including corruption and susceptibility to political influence, both of which compromise its professionalism and operational efficiency. These issues are further exacerbated by an ambiguous career progression system within the ASP, which lacks clear and merit-based criteria for appointments and rank advancements. The appointment process for the General Police Director (GPD) is criticised for lacking clear professional criteria, and there have been instances of GPDs being moved to government positions. The ambiguous nature of the “return provision”, allowing former members to re-enter the ASP without clarity on their positions, further clouds the organisation's structure.

This politicisation has raised concerns about potential obstruction of investigations into criminal conduct by public officials. Investigations into political interference and corruption within the ASP have been launched, but there is a perception that these probes lack thoroughness or are influenced by political factors. Allegations of corruption involving police officers themselves have also been reported, leading to claims of widespread impunity.

While the ASP has shown capability in addressing organised crime, it is handicapped by insufficient resources to consistently handle economic crimes and internal corruption. The ASP's efforts to combat corruption are primarily reactive, meaning they respond to corruption cases as they arise rather than proactively seeking out high-level corruption. The ASP budget has remained relatively unchanged, with only a minor increase in 2018. The 2023 budget is considered inadequate because the ASP relies on donations from international aid organisations, foreign states, private national companies and individuals. This reliance on donations raises concerns about potential corruption and quid pro quo arrangements. Additionally, there are no specialised units for investigating corruption-related offences.

The public faces challenges in accessing basic information about the ASP, such as its organisation, budget, asset declarations and donations. The ASP website experienced disruptions and content related to transparency could not be found after it was restored. Asset disclosures are made but not published as required by law. Various oversight bodies, including HIDACCI, have not published the asset declarations of police officers as legally mandated. Effective accountability practices are fragmented, with a lower number of investigations and inspections compared to the complaints filed. The APO has been slow in responding systematically to complaints, leading to a low number of investigations and inspections conducted. The Albanian Assembly has not exercised effective oversight over the ASP, despite concerns about corruption and politicisation. Proposed amendments to the Law on State Police have faced criticism and were challenged in the Constitutional Court.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) is the electoral management body responsible for overseeing and administering elections in Albania. The CEC is responsible for various election-related tasks, including voter registration, candidate nomination and registration, overseeing campaign financing, training election officials, organising polling stations, conducting voter education campaigns and announcing election results. It also handles complaints and disputes related to the electoral process. The CEC is headed by the State Election Commissioner, who is assisted by the Deputy State Election Commissioner.

In July 2020, the Albanian Assembly adopted a bill amending the Electoral Code,[i] which changed the institutional structure of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the administration of the electoral process. The previous Commission had seven members, including the chair and deputy chair, who had the power to enact regulations and impose sanctions for election violations. The July 2020 amendments established two five-member commissions: one responsible for regulations (the Regulatory Commission) and another responsible for addressing complaints and sanctions (the Complaints and Sanctions Commission).

The new arrangement has improved the management of the electoral process, while the amendments have improved the regulations for campaign financing. Still, the regulatory framework for political party financing has deficiencies and the CEC's implementation of provisions is not proactive. This is also because the CEC still lacks sufficient resources to be able to effectively monitor political party financing and issue timely and effective sanctions on political parties that fail to adhere to the Electoral Code provisions. Furthermore, the politicisation of the CEC continues to remain a significant issue. There are also difficulties with access to elections for minorities and voters with disabilities. Provisions are in place to promote women's political participation in elections, but effective implementation is lacking, leading to underrepresentation.

_{[i] Law no. 101/2020 “On some amendments to Law no. 10019, dated 29.12.2008 ‘Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania’ as amended”, https://qbz.gov.al/eli/ligj/2020/07/23/101.}

The office of the Ombudsperson is enshrined in the Constitution and is designated as the promoter of the highest standards of human rights and freedoms in accordance with the Constitution, national laws and international human rights instruments.[i] The Ombudsperson handles cases of violations of rights by the public administration, although its scope does not cover the entire executive.[ii] The Ombudsperson reports directly to the Assembly.[iii] The Ombudsperson is elected by a three-fifths majority of the Assembly for a renewable five-year term,[iv] with the Ombudsperson’s Office divided into five specialised sections, each led by a Commissioner elected by the Assembly from candidates proposed by the Ombudsperson.[v] Local representatives can be appointed as needed, and local government institutions provide necessary facilities and conditions.[vi]

The Ombudsperson enjoys an adequate constitutional mandate to both promote human rights and prevent violations and unjustifiable restrictions.[vii] Although there is an enabling legal framework, the Ombudsperson’s work is obstructed by insufficient financial and human resources (section 8.1.1), unresponsiveness of public administration bodies and low implementation rate of its recommendations (section 8.3.1). The Ombudsperson has regularly asked for more support from the executive and the Assembly to carry out its functions, but its requests are often dismissed.[viii] The well-functioning of the institutions is occasionally impeded by political deadlocks, particularly concerning the appointment of the Ombudsperson.[ix] While not widely recognised by the citizens, the Ombudsperson enjoys a high level of public trust.[x]

A constant weak point is the poor implementation of its recommendations by the public administration, despite frequent calls for it to be made more systematic. As a result, the Ombudsperson struggles to ensure public institutional accountability (section 8.3.1).

_{[i] Article 60, Constitution of Albania.}

_{[ii] Article 25, Law. no. 8454, dated 4.2.1999 on "People’s Advocate".}

_{[iii] Article 63, Constitution of Albania.}

_{[iv] Article 61, Constitution of Albania.}

_{[v] Article 31, Law on the People’s Advocate.}

_{[vi] Article 32, Law on the People’s Advocate.}

_{[vii] Article 2, Law on the People’s Advocate.}

_{[viii] People’s Advocate, Annual Report on the Activity of People’s Advocate 2021, pg. 181.}

_{[ix] European Commission, Albania 2018 Report, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2018:0151:FIN:EN:PDF, pg.26.}

_{[x] OECD, Monitoring Report of the Principles of Public Administration in Albania, 2021, pg. 98.}

Albania’s Supreme State Audit Institution (ALSAI)^[i] is the supreme audit institution of the Republic of Albania. ALSAI is a constitutional institution mandated to audit the consolidated state budget and central and local government public entities, including public funds provided by the European Union or other international organisations, legal entities in which the state holds more than half of the shares, or when loans, credits and their obligations are guaranteed by the state, activities or sectors with concession contracts and political parties.

ALSAI is organised in directorates and departments. The eight directorates and departments related to audit activity, such as the department of audit of central institutions, the department of audit of local units, the department of audit of the state budget, the department of performance audit, the directorate of quality management and standards, etc., and are grouped in a General Directorate under the authority of the Chair. Directly under the authority of the Chair are also the ALSAI internal audit and legal departments. Meanwhile, directorates dedicated to the administrative functioning of ALSAI, like human resources, communication and administrative services, are under the authority of the ALSAI Secretary General.

ALSAI’s Chair is elected from the Assembly after being nominated by the President of the Republic. While the legislative safeguards on ALSAI are considered adequate and in line with international standards, there are loopholes in terms of the election of the Chair with only a simple majority, undefined criteria related to “adequate financial experience” and unclear processes in cases where the Chair resigns before the end of his or her term.

The ALSAI budget and approved staff have increased over years. However, significant human resource gaps in the audit staff lead to a certain degree of ineffectiveness in carrying out its audits.

ALSAI lacks some transparency in its decision-making from the preliminary audit reports to the final reports and also does not comply fully with the law on the right to information which requires the information required by law to be made publicly available on a dedicated section of its website.

While ALSAI has to report and is answerable to the Assembly, the Assembly has failed to discuss audit findings and select external auditors to audit ALSAI’s finances. ALSAI is still not effective at improving public financial management due to the failure of the Assembly to keep the executive and other public bodies accountable for implementing recommendations. Many of ALSAI’s findings in the last five years are recurring, which suggests that its practical effectiveness in improving the financial management of the government is rather marginal. In 2018, the Assembly recognised the necessity of a parliamentary subcommittee on ALSAI activity. While ALSAI has persisted in its willingness for this dedicated parliamentary subcommittee, in which its findings would be debated by all interested parties and therefore create greater support for implementing the audit recommendations, this subcommittee has not yet been established by the Assembly.

_{[i] Albanian: Kontrolli i Lartë i Shtetit.}

There are several entities in charge of fighting corruption in Albania. The legislature, the executive, the judiciary and several independent bodies have functions and responsibilities in the area of fighting corruption. The legislature approves anti-corruption laws and is responsible for their ex-post evaluation (see Pillar 1 Legislature). The Minister of Justice serves as the National Coordinator for fighting corruption and is responsible for drafting and coordinating the implementation of anti-corruption policies as well as directing the Network of Anti-Corruption Coordinators established in 2021 (see Pillar 2 Executive).^[i] In the framework of the justice reform, the Special Prosecution Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK), which comprises the National Bureau of Investigation as well as the Special Courts of first instance and of appeal against corruption and organised crime, were established in 2016 (see Pillar 4 Public Prosecutor and Pillar 3 Judiciary). There are also several independent bodies which are in charge of preventing and fighting corruption. The most important are the Albanian Supreme Audit Institution (See Pillar 9 SAI) and the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interests (HIDAACI).[ii] As there are several bodies involved in anti-corruption activities in Albania, this pillar will focus on HIDAACI, which, although it cannot be considered a multi-purpose anti-corruption agency, has a mandate which spans three important anti-corruption laws: (i) the declaration of assets and other financial disclosures, (ii) the prevention of conflicts of interests in the public sector, and (iii) monitoring the appropriate functioning of the internal whistleblower mechanism from responsible units in the public and private sectors, and serving as the external unit for whistleblowers if there is no internal unit in an organisation or if there are reasonable doubts that the investigations of such a unit may be compromised.[iii]

HIDAACI is an independent body accountable to the Assembly. However, the legislative safeguards for HIDAACI’s independence are weak in terms of the lack of a dedicated law to be approved by a qualified majority providing for its organisation and functioning. The organisation and functioning of HIDAACI is provided for in the law on declaration and audit of assets, which can be amended with a simple majority. There have been several amendments of the law in practice, which have included the Assembly majority necessary for electing the chair of HIDAACI, the General Inspector, upon whom the institution’s independence essentially relies. Since the three laws covered by HIDAACI’s mandate aim to prevent and fight corruption of high-level officials as well, including MPs, ensuring its political independence is a prerequisite for properly fulfilling its mission.

HIDAACI has 70 employees in total under the direct authority of the General Inspector, of which 28 are inspectors and 12 are assistant inspectors, who enjoy the status of civil servants. The General Inspector is supported by a cabinet with two advisers and by a General Secretary who directs the administrative staff. The administrative staff are divided into two directorates, the Legal and Institutional Relations Directorate and the Finance and Administration Directorate.[iv] While the financial and technical resources of HIDAACI have increased notably since 2016, its human resources still remain insufficient for complying with HIDAACI’s vast role in educating about, preventing and investigating corruption. Apart from modest results in the implementation of the law on the audit of assets, the implementation of the laws on preventing conflicts of interests and on whistleblower protection remain poor in practice. The Assembly has failed to approve the new law on preventing conflicts of interest, which was supposed to be enacted in December 2022 and which, according to HIDAACI, would have introduced proper mechanisms for enabling the prevention of conflicts of interest of public officials in practice.

HIDAACI also lacks some transparency. While the public is able to obtain relevant information on the organisation and functioning of the HIDAACI pursuant to the law on the right to information, information on its decision-making regarding the implementation of the law on preventing conflicts of interest, the number of referrals to the prosecutor’s office and their follow-up, and the results of its decision-making in the framework of the law on whistleblowing and whistleblower protection lack clear statistical data and details, and the Assembly has failed to hold the HIDAACI accountable for this. Such lack of transparency. especially with respect to HIDAACI’s actions and decision-making with respect to protecting whistleblowers, can impact the further solicitation of whistleblowers in the public and private sector.

_{^[i] Decision of Council of Ministers no. 618, date 20.10.2021 “On the establishment and organisation of the network of anti-corruption coordinators”, https://qbz.gov.al/eli/vendim/2021/10/20/618, [Accessed 15 June 2023].}

_{[ii] In Albanian: Inspektorati i Lartë i Deklarimit dhe Kontrollit të Pasurive dhe Konfliktit të Interesave (ILDKPKI).}

_{[iii] Law no. 9049 dated 10.04.2003 “On the Declaration and Audit of Assets, Financial Obligations of the Elected and certain Public Officials”, amended; Law no. 9367, dated 7.4.2005 “On the Prevention of Conflict of Interest in the Exercise of Public Functions”, amended; Law No. 60/2016 “On whistleblowing and whistleblower protection”, amended, accessed at https://www.ildkpki.al.}

_{[iv] The assembly of Albania decision no. 48/2016 “On additions and changes of the decision no. 55/2014”, “on the approval of the structure, and categorisation of work positions at the high inspectorate of declaration and audit of assets and conflict of interests””, at https://www.ildkpki.al/organika-en/?lang=en.}

Political parties are civil society organisms, formed by free-willed citizens, which share the same political ideals and organise themselves through democratic principles to influence decision-making and win elections.[i] There were 132 registered political parties in Albania in 2022, out of which only 10 have elected members of parliament.[ii] The major parties are the Socialist Party of Albania (SP) and the Democratic Party of Albania (DP), who have the highest number of members and elected representatives. The Freedom Party, formerly the Socialist Movement for Integration (FP), is a medium-sized party that has formed part of the governing coalitions. Small political parties like the Social Democratic Party, the Party for Justice, Integration and Unity, the Republican Party, etc., have one to three elected members of parliament.

The Central Elections Committee (CEC) is the monitoring and oversight body for political parties’ finances.[iii] The CEC standardised central electoral financial reporting in 2021 and fully standardised annual reporting and local election templates in 2023.[iv] To facilitate the analysis, this pillar includes data on the three leading political parties in the country: the SP, the DP and the FP, and a few smaller parliamentary parties, unless indicated otherwise.

Political parties register and deregister at the District Court of Tirana and can appeal decisions. The existence of “ghost parties” that are registered but have no declared activity is a continuous problem. Only one-third of registered political parties reported their annual finances for 2021. The state facilitates the operation and the electoral campaign of political parties based on their results in general elections, favouring the financial sustainability of already-established political parties. Delayed court decisions have interfered with political parties’ activities, while political parties have allegedly interfered in state resources and data. Despite issuing fines for political parties and media outlets that breached campaign regulations in 2021, oversight institutions have not applied the law effectively regarding the use of state resources, favouring the ruling SP against other competing parties. Under-reporting of electoral expenditures have been signalled by the media and CSOs. The impartiality of investigations into electoral crime is in doubt.

In practice, intra-party democracy involves non-contested party leadership, consultation farces and strategies to align members’ opinion with that of the leadership. Although gender quotas are established, women maintain that political parties are the main perpetrators of political violence against them. Ideological and political differences between the SP (left) and DP (right) have been fading away, while political parties have embraced clientelism, providing benefits in exchange for electoral and financial support, increasing suspicions of criminal groups as another beneficiary-supporter of the clientelistic scheme. Anti-corruption is a daily narrative in political parties’ rhetoric, but public accountability has remained an individual responsibility so far.

_{[i] See Law no. 8580 On Political Parties, updated 29.12.2020, Article 1, https://qbz.gov.al/eli/ligj/2000/02/17/8580 [accessed 11 January 2023].}

_{[ii] Central Electoral Commission (2021), Parliamentary Elections 25 April 2021, https://kqz.gov.al/results/results2021/results2021.htm [accessed 27 January 2023].}

_{[iii] Law on Political Parties, Article 15/2, Point 1.}

_{[iv] Central Elections Commission (2023), Decision no. 20, dated on 27.1.2023 On the approval of the rules for the annual financial reporting of the political parties, the verification of their financing and expenditures, and the payment modality of legal accountants, https://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Vendimi-nr.-20-date-27.01.2023-Per-miratimin-e-rregullave-per-raportimin-financiar-vjetor-te-partive-politike-1.pdf [accessed 27 July 2023].}

Albania has a vibrant media landscape[i] which includes 42 audiovisual broadcasters, 55 radio broadcasters, 22 broadcasters authorised to transmit audiovisual broadcasts, 63 cable operators, 15 over-the-top/internet protocol television providers (OTT/IPTV)[ii] and around 800 online media outlets. The number of printed daily journals is estimated to range from 7 to 13, plus a handful of magazines. TV is the most popular outlet[iii] and national licences are held by the public service broadcaster Albanian Radio Television (RTSh); private outlets TV Klan, Top Channel and Media Vision; and two digital platforms, DigitAlb and Tring. Despite the high number of outlets, national TV outlets have not yet managed to expand their signal to the entire state population,[iv] while the internet penetration rate of Albanian families is reported to be 77 per cent in 2022, with a significant gap between urban and rural areas.[v]

The Institute for Development, Research and Alternatives (IDRA)’s data show that 87 per cent of the television audience is divided between TV Klan, Top Channel, News 24 and Report TV.[vi] Referring to the Alexa assessment of 2021, the ten most clicked online websites consist of news portals connected to traditional media (like Balkanweb, Panorama.com.al, Syri.net, etc.) and a few lifestyle online magazines.[vii]

The legal framework guaranteeing media operation is favourable. However, it favours the right of ownership over the freedom of mass media and media plurality, allowing for market ownership concentration and a restricted plurality of perspectives. Allegations on media outlets promoting the agendas of the government, businesses and criminal groups in return for advancing their own business interests and profits in lucrative markets like construction, banking, gambling, etc., are reported. Media owners’ business interests, state funding, state pressure, verbal and physical attacks, journalists’ dismissals, lawsuits and organised crime are recognised as threats to its independence.

Ownership data are available for most media outlets, except for non-profit online media. However, the transparency of media financial resources is a pressing issue. Research data on advertisements, hidden ads, public discourse, etc., is limited, but when available, they are not in open data formats. Audiovisual media outlets often do not answer for their activities to supervisory bodies, partly due to restricted supervisory resources and a low collection of fines. Even though self-regulatory mechanisms to ensure the integrity of media employees are in place, the biggest media groups in the country have not joined them, resulting in mostly unsanctioned misbehaviour.

Government is broadly televised, but business interests of media owners, the quality of reporting, sensational news and the government’s ready-made materials hinder the informing of the public on its regular activities. Investigative journalism has been strengthening its role, but it is limited to single media outlets and individual journalists.

_{[i] Bino, Blerjana, Safe Journalists.net, Albania Indicators on the Level of Media Freedom and Journalists’ Safety in Albania 2022, (Tirana: Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia, 2022), p.9, https://safejournalists.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ALB-ENG-2022.pdf [accessed 15 July 2023].}

_{[ii] AMA, Audio and Audiovisual Subjects, http://ama.gov.al/oshma/ [accessed 15 July 2023].}

_{[iii] Semini, Irma et al., Opinion Poll 2022: Trust in Governance, 10^th Edition, (Tirana: Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2023), p.5 https://idmalbania.org/publica... [accessed 18 July 2023].}

_{[iv] AMA, Annual Report 2021, p.54. https://ama.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RAPORTI-VJETOR-I-AMA-s-2021-1.pdf accessed 15 April 2023].}

_{[v] Monitor.al, (2022), AKEP: 77% of families already have access to the Internet, https://www.monitor.al/akep-77-e-familjeve-tashme-kane-akses-ne-internet/ [accessed 15 April 2023].}

_{[vi] BIRN (2023), Media Ownership Monitor Albania 2023, Television, https://albania.mom-gmr.org/en/media/tv/ [accessed 12 December 2023].}

_{[vii] Monitor.al, (2021), The 50 Most Clicked Websites in Albania, Based on Alexa.com, https://www.monitor.al/alexa/ [accessed 15 April 2023].}

Civil society entails a narrow field of organised civic engagement of members of society, which focuses on the development of the social realm. It includes non-profit organisations (NPOs) such as civil society organisations (CSOs), associations, foundations and centres whose activity is independent from the state,[i] as well as unregistered civic initiatives. Civic organisations such as political parties and the media are analysed separately, while academia, religious organisations, labour unions, business chambers, sports federations and arts organisations are not included in the analysis.

There were 12,515 NPOs registered in Albania in 2022, out of which only 2,497 NPOs had an active status at the General Directorate of Taxation.[ii] The sector counted 11,927 employees.[iii] The civil society environment appears to be vibrant on paper.[iv] However, the overall sustainability of the sector is still evolving and their financial sustainability in particular is on the margins of impeded sustainability.[v]

To address these evolving issues, the government of Albania uses the Road Map for Government Policy Towards an Enabling Environment for the Development of Civil Society 2019-2023. In that spirit, the Agency for Civil Society Support is a state funding body which offers grants to NPOs and civic initiatives to enable their sustainable development.[vi] The National Resource Centre for Civil Society is a civil society-run platform for information and service provision for strengthening NPOs.[vii] The National Council for Civil Society and the National Council for European Integration, both founded in 2015, are consultation mechanisms for facilitating dialogue between the government and the civil society sector,[viii] in order to meet goals for the sector’s development and the accession process of Albania in the European Union.

NPOs are subject to oversight by various state institutions which inspect their activity related to taxes, anti-money laundering, customs, social insurance, economic and social activity, and whenever they use state funds for the implementation of their activities.[ix]

NPOs in Albania are free to establish. Their registration or deregistration is centralised in the Tirana Court District and takes up to 83 days to be completed. Based on NPOs’ estimations, the government has implemented only 20 per cent of the actions of the roadmap for Enabling Environment for the Development of Civil Society 2019-2023. Systematic data on NPOs’ employment are missing. Most NPOs have insufficient financial and human resources, putting their sustainability into question. However, the number of NPOs taking advantage of alternative state funding opportunities such as tax refunds, participation in public procurement tenders, etc. is low.

NPOs’ independence is legally affirmed, but amendments to the anti-money laundering legislation have created a risk of state interference. Tax authorities’ fines to the sector have tripled in 2022. The amendment of the Criminal Code in 2021 deems exercising freedom of assembly a criminal act, sanctioned by up to a year of imprisonment. The government, political parties and the media have pressured, intimidated and harassed civil society activists, while police detentions of activists increased during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In general, NPOs are not accountable to their board structures and members, or constituencies. Relevant information on NPOs’ annual activity and financial reports are not generally published. Despite efforts for developing their Code of Conduct and other self-regulatory initiatives, staff and board integrity remain to be ensured in many NPOs.

Despite proving their capacity to produce evidence in the fight against corruption, in general, NPOs are inactive and unsuccessful in engaging with the government on anti-corruption policies and in holding the government accountable. In rare cases, NPOs have proven successful in using strategic litigations and filing criminal reports against irregular government decisions.

_{[i] Law no. 8788 Për Organizatat Jofitimprurëse [On Non-profit Organisations], 03.04.2013, Article 2, https://qbz.gov.al/eli/ligj/2001/05/07/8788 [accessed 4 February 2023].}

_{[ii] Partners Albania for Change and Development, Monitoring Matrix on the Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development, Country Report Albania 2022 (Tirana: Partners Albania for Change and Development, 2023), p.9, https://www.partnersalbania.org/publication/monitoring-matrix-on-enabling-environment-for-csos-development-country-report-for-albania-2022/ [accessed 20 July 2023].}

_{[iii] Partners Albania for Change and Development, 2023: 20.}

_{[iv] Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2022 Albania, https://freedomhouse.org/country/albania/nations-transit/2022 [accessed 22 July 2023].}

_{[v] The overall sustainability for 2021 was 3.7, and financial sustainability was 4.5, where 1-2 is enhanced sustainability and 5-7 is impeded sustainability. Source: FHI360, 2021 Civil Society Organisation Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 25th Edition (USAID, ICNL and FHI360, 2023), p.10, https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/csosi-europe-eurasia-2021-report.pdf [accessed 5 February 2023].}

_{[vi] Agency for Civil Society Support, Mission and Objectives of ASCS, https://amshc.gov.al/en/mission-and-objectives-of-ascs/ [accessed 12 February 2023].}

_{[vii] National Resource Centre for Civil Society in Albania, https://resourcecentre.al/ [accessed 5 February 2023].}

_{[viii] Partners Albania for Change and Development, 2023: 22.}

_{[ix] Law On Non-profit Organisations, Article 41.}

The private sector is primarily regulated by the Law on Merchants and Commercial Enterprises, the Law on Business Registration and legislation on accounting, statutory auditing, tax and customs, as well as the Code of Administrative Procedure.

The Ministry of Finance and Economy sets economic policy, whereas the Minister of State for the Protection of Entrepreneurship is established to support and safeguard private entrepreneurship, enhance cooperation among different institutions to improve public services for businesses and create a conducive environment and favourable conditions for entrepreneurship to thrive.

In 2022, there were 125,222 economically active companies, and 15,700 new companies were registered that year.[i] The majority of businesses operate in the trade sector, followed by accommodation and food services, as well as the industrial sector. Most businesses in Albania are small and medium-sized enterprises that provide services or trade and manufacturing. The National Business Centre (NBC) is the competent authority that handles the registration and licensing of businesses as well as administering the beneficial ownership register. There are more than a dozen industry and trade chambers, and two councils serve as mediators between public and non-public institutions.

Regulatory reform has streamlined the opening and closing of businesses, but difficulties remain regarding bankruptcy procedures, property rights, construction permits, authorisations and access to finance. Oversight authorities need stronger capacity and independence. However, there are challenges in categorising enterprises as small, medium or large in Albania, as different laws employ different definitions. This inconsistency creates legal gaps and overlaps with the tax law, law for small and medium-sized enterprises, and the law on accounting offering distinct classifications for businesses of different sizes.

Transparency provisions are comprehensive, with laws on beneficial ownership registers and financial reporting standards. However, ownership of less than 25% of shares for beneficiaries is not mandated to be disclosed in the beneficial ownership register. Audited financial reports of larger companies are submitted to tax authorities and made publicly accessible through the NBC online database. In contrast, small and medium-sized businesses are only obligated to have their balance sheets signed by an accountant and publication is not mandatory for them. Delays in publishing annual reports and imprecise reporting are observed. Some large companies fail to submit financial statements after receiving state contracts. Progress has been made in the market of legal auditors, but challenges persist in sanctioning non-compliance.

Efforts to establish codes of conduct and anti-corruption measures exist, with sector-wide codes in industries like banking. Implementation of Codes of Ethics and integrity standards is limited, with challenges in confidentiality and independent investigation mechanisms. Transparency in punishing companies for corruption is limited, with reports often anonymised and infrequently updated.

While women's representation in management positions of large companies slightly exceeds the EU average, significant gender gaps persist in both political and economic power. Initiatives like the National Action Plan for Women Entrepreneurs have had limited impact.

Anti-corruption is on the business sector's agenda, but it is not a top priority. Additionally, cooperation between the private sector and civil society is underdeveloped.

Albania's business environment is prone to corruption due to challenges such as informality, low capacity and ineffective public administration, and low trust in the justice system. The level of corruption in Albania is assessed as one of the biggest problems, even by the American Chamber of Commerce. In the 2021-2022 Business Index, this component was ranked the fifth most worrying in the business climate among 27 indicators in total. “The main drivers of business climate performance - fair, equal and transparent practices – are still far from the expectations of companies and investors. During 2021, the respondents’ perception has declined on ‘Monopoly and Unfair Competition’ (-2.95 points), ‘Corruption Level’ (-0.79 points), ‘Government Bureaucracy’ (-1.64 points) and ‘Application of Laws and Regulations’ (-1.32 points).”^[ii]

The online registration system faced initial issues but contributed to reducing corruption at lower administration levels. The government established the Ministry of State for the Protection of Entrepreneurship to handle administrative complaints.

However, there is an absence of a blacklist identifying firms engaged in corrupt practices and money laundering. The only available public list pertains to individuals or companies associated with financing terrorism, mandated by legal obligation. In many instances, information about companies involved in corruption is only revealed during police investigations or court hearings. The lack of a comprehensive database hinders the assessment of progress and implementation of anti-corruption standards by businesses.

_{[i] Business Register 2022, INSTAT, https://www.instat.gov.al/al/temat/industria-tregtia-dhe-sh%C3%ABrbimet/regjistrat-e-biznesit/publikimet/2023/regjistrat-e-biznesit-2022/.}

_{[ii] American Chamber of Commerce Business, “Climate Business Index 2021-2022”, 14 December 2022, https://amcham.com.al/amcham-business-index-2021-2022/, p.5, [accessed: 6 November 2023].}