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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study is the result of the evaluation requested from ZIGLA by Transparency International’s Secretariat in April 2016, with the following objectives:

i. document the theory of change behind the approach adopted and the outcomes expected for the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative

ii. analyse the initiative’s general performance, relevance and impact so far

iii. identify the contextual factors that affect implementation, both positively and negatively, as well as the programme’s outcomes to date

iv. capture lessons learned and good practices from the Anti-Corruption Brigades approach in order to derive recommendations that maximise future citizen engagement activities and other initiatives with similar objectives.

The evaluation covered the period from May 2015 to May 2016, which corresponds to the design and implementation period of two Anti-Corruption Brigades. The first initiative took place in the district of Los Olivos (northern metropolitan Lima) from 18 to 22 August 2015. The second one was carried out in the district of Miraflores, in the city of Lima, in March 2016.

From a methodological point of view, the evaluation consisted of a bibliographic review, and a series of in-depth interviews (both in-person and virtual), group interviews with key stakeholders, and focus groups with volunteers from the initiatives. Moreover, thanks to its replicability- and improvement-oriented approach, the evaluation has linked and triangulated data and multi-stakeholder perspectives to identify findings, learnings, and improvement opportunities.

The document begins with a general description (Chapter 1) of the project’s context and institutional framework. The Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative was carried out by Proética (Transparency International’s national chapter in Peru) as part of the Open Governance Project implemented by Transparency International in several countries. The latter is partly funded by one of Transparency International’s private sector partners, the Hewlett Foundation. In 2014, as a result of an alliance with the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, Proética launched a citizen engagement project the goal of which was to make the site INFOBRAS more participatory. The site had been designed by the Office of the Comptroller General to provide access to information on public works. In early 2015, however, after the renewal of Proética’s leadership (the new President and Executive Board took over in April that year), and due to the Office’s marked lack of interest in the programme, the relationship deteriorated and the initiative came to a halt. Thus, the Anti-Corruption Brigades came about as an alternative to the experience with the Office.

In order to encourage citizen engagement and improve governance mechanisms and relationships, Proética designed this strategy for citizen oversight of public management in municipalities and regional governments, aimed at identifying irregularities in files, risks, and/or corruption.

Next, the document offers an overview of the Brigades’ design and implementation process, based on the first two experiences, structured in six stages: 1. design and planning; 2. launch; 3. training; 4. intervention; 5. analysis; and 6. submission.
The document explains that, from its inception, the initiative envisioned the possibility of engaging the Ombudsman, a key stakeholder in Peru. At this initial stage, the project not only built a strategic alliance with the said institution, but also sought the involvement of Asociación Civil Transparencia, one of the most influential civil society organisations in the country. The Ombudsman provided its technical expertise in oversight, audit, and file analysis, and served as a guarantor for monitored institutions. AC Transparencia, in turn, offered its expertise in citizen engagement programme management, as well as its network of volunteers for the first implementation in Los Olivos.

As regards the intervention itself, the document describes that citizen oversight had been planned to take place over the course of three to five days, with actions relating to four components: 1. auditing of public documents and files; 2. evaluation and guidance on transparency websites; 3. legal advice and complaint-filing system, and 4. sensitisation and dissemination.

The document also delves into the theory of change underlying the experience implemented so far, as a result of an iterative ad hoc exercise in reconstruction and conceptualisation among the evaluating team, the Proética team, and the Transparency International Secretariat team.

This analysis has resulted in a graphic rendition of the conceptual model of the theory of change. The graphic illustrates a logical sequence of outputs and results that are a prerequisite for achieving the vision for success or long-term change Proética intends to create within an eight- to 10-year horizon, which focuses on increased transparency, accountability, and citizen engagement in public management in Peru.

The Brigades theory of change was structured around four levels to achieve the vision for success: a. outputs; b. short-term outcomes; c. mid-term outcomes, and d. long-term outcomes. The document provides an in-depth analysis of each of the results and interventions in each of these levels, the stakeholders involved and their dynamics, and the assumptions made regarding the contextual factors required for outcomes to materialise as expected.

Next, the document adopts an evaluative perspective (Chapter 2) to approach four evaluation dimensions: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.

In the relevance analysis, the document states that, within a context in which corruption is a critical issue on the country’s political agenda, sensitisation and citizen oversight initiatives are highly valuable. Therefore, the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative is deemed to be relevant and innovative, insofar as it offers a means to channel citizens’ discontent about, and mistrust in, institutions and public officials toward public management oversight.

Based on the available information, the Anti-Corruption Brigades are a unique initiative in Peru. They are not aimed at encouraging citizen engagement through already established institutions, but rather seek to mobilise “ordinary citizens” as volunteers (who may lead or collaborate in oversight activities), or simply as beneficiaries of guidance and sensitisation actions, which is seen as a precondition for empowerment.
In the **effectiveness analysis**, the evaluation concludes that, to date, the Brigades experience is seen as having had highly positive outputs and achievements, taking into account that the initiative is still a high-potential project at an exploration stage, with a view to continuous improvement.

In this regard, the Brigades’ actions so far may correspond to the initial level of outputs in the theory of change. From an **outputs**-level perspective, the evaluation acknowledges that the initiative has yielded the following results:

I. forms and factsheets have been designed for file review
II. over 100 volunteers have been trained in file auditing and transparency website usage diagnosis and guidance, with a relatively equal distribution between men and women
III. a management report has been drafted and submitted with findings and recommendations for the municipality of Los Olivos
IV. a graphic identity and a set of dissemination materials have been developed, such as signage in public places and radio spots

As a complement to these outputs, and taking into consideration that the results are still establishing themselves, the evaluation has found evidence of the following **achievements**:

I. a national strategic alliance has been built with the Ombudsman at several jurisdictional levels. In the first experience in Los Olivos, the civil society organisation AC Transparencia had a key role in calling for and coordinating volunteers
II. a scalable and sustainable methodology and intervention model for anti-corruption citizen oversight has been consolidated
III. two pilot interventions have been carried out (Los Olivos and Miraflores) to test the methodology and intervention model
IV. a team has been created with volunteers trained in citizen audit and oversight who are committed to maintaining their involvement in citizen oversight actions

The **efficiency analysis** mentions that the programme had an initial 30-month implementation timeframe, later extended for five additional months, to September 2016. The document explains that, although the initiative was realistic in regard to its planning and implementation stages, there have been delays and timing issues (analysis, finding presentation, and follow-up) due to a lack of technical and human resources, which may signal missed opportunities and inefficiencies in this specific aspect. The budget for the citizen engagement component of the Open Governance Project in Peru, funded by the Hewlett Foundation (through the Transparency International Secretariat) has been limited. Of a total of €27,000, nearly €17,000 was allocated to the project implemented with the Office of the Comptroller General. Therefore, the Anti-Corruption Brigades, as an alternative to the continuation of this line of action, has functioned on a €10,000 budget. The first two experiences have driven the management at Proética to estimate the minimum investment for a typical Brigade at US$3,500. However, this amount does not include plane tickets, accommodation, transportation, etc., which should be taken into account if these actions are to take place in the country’s interior. In sum, the document suggests that the programme has used its resources in an efficient manner, and has made progress consistent with them.
It also states that Proética’s current organisational structure is adequate and conducive to advancing the programme.

The sustainability analysis concludes that the approach will be financially and conceptually sustainable after the closure of current funding. The Proética team kept in mind the sustainability dimension from the outset of programme design. Now that the funding from the Hewlett Foundation is nearing its end, TI Peru has successfully reached new agreements with several donors, such as the Open Society Foundation, which ensures the necessary funds to continue developing and implementing the initiative. Conceptually, the multi-stakeholder logic (based on strategic alliances at the national/local level), which leverages citizen engagement through volunteers, provides a conducive platform for mid- and long-term sustainability.

Lastly, from a forward-looking perspective (Chapter 3), the document presents a possible version of the implementation process divided into seven stages, with learning, improvement opportunities, and recommendations for a replicable and scalable citizen oversight initiative.

The following are a few of the main recommendations for future Brigade experiences provided in the last chapter:

- In order to implement Anti-Corruption Brigades in different municipalities or public institutions in all Peruvian regions, with or without their endorsement, we recommend revising and refining the eligibility criteria for municipalities, and consolidating a criticality index that may aid target selection for intervention based on the expected impact in a given context. This index might take into consideration certain dimensions, such as the degree of transparency in each municipality, the receptiveness of public officials, the level of compliance with regulations, the level of citizen involvement, the poverty index, the number of potentially allied local social organisations, and the presence of the Ombudsman, among others.

- Given the general lack of training or expertise in public management or corruption among citizens (as was the case in the Los Olivos and Miraflores experiences), it is key to characterise the volunteer profile based on the minimum competencies and skills required, or to classify volunteers bearing in mind the kinds of public documents and files that need to be reviewed, and to provide guides and tools for file revision and other actions carried out in the framework of the citizen oversight days.

- A second recommendation is to carry out a public launch event to present the initiative and the intervention timeframe. The attendees should include representatives from Proética, allied organisations, volunteers and the media.

- Towards the end of the launch stage, each initiative should have an adapted graphic identity and dissemination materials of its own, as well as a wide coverage in the media.

- One recommendation regarding the training stage is to advertise for volunteers through various media outlets and social networks, and to later select volunteers based on the criteria established and profiles required for implementing Brigades.
If the public authorities agree to participate, we recommend including public officials in the volunteer training and sensitisation sessions. To that end, an induction and sensitisation workshop should be carried out for public officials from the participating institution, preferably in managerial positions, not only on the operation and development of the initiative, but also on the implementation of transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms, and the advantages they may offer for public management.

Another recommendation for the training stage is to include the creation and induction of a volunteer team to take part in the analysis and evaluation process of the intervention, and in the preparation of the report.

For the intervention days, as regards the diagnosis and evaluation of transparency websites, we recommend preparing a grid or systematisation tool to collect website information based on pre-established variables, as well as to ensure the quantitative or qualitative recording of the ordinary citizens trained at the stand. Generating some sort of record, such as coincidental questionnaires in situ, might contribute to improving the evaluation of certain aspects of project management and effectiveness. Lastly, for the intervention process and the period immediately afterwards, primary information collection should be assigned to the volunteer analysis team. This process should cover the information collected by participants using recording tools for each of the four components of the initiative and its activities, the information from the coincidental questionnaires for volunteers, and the questionnaires filled out by participants after intervention completion.

For the stage of systematisation and analysis of the information collected, we recommend involving a team of trained volunteers in the analysis. In view of the objectives of legitimacy, ownership, and sustainability of the project’s achievements, and given the main pillar of transparency, it is crucial to include the team in these activities, under Proética’s coordination.

Next, we recommend carrying out a participatory process of reflection and feedback on findings and outcomes, in which the public authorities may or may not be involved, depending on their willingness to participate. If the authorities choose not to take part in the process, the reflection and feedback will be limited to Proética, volunteers and allies. In general, reflection and feedback may help to adjust and revise the preliminary document that sets out the findings and results.

Unlike in the two pilot tests, the process of joint reflection should ensure the preparation of a final report, with findings and recommendations, that covers the analysis of the experience from beginning to end, its outcomes, and measurable indicators to assess later improvements, as opposed to a management report that merely describes the process.

In order to maximise impact and visibility, we recommend carrying out a public event for the media, the volunteer analysis team, and representatives from allied organisations and from Proética. If the public authorities take part in the project, the report giving findings and recommendations should be presented to them during the event.
• At the follow-up stage, we recommend that Proética should mostly take on a supporting role, and promote ownership among volunteers and other stakeholders, in order to encourage autonomy in the Anti-Corruption Brigades. With or without the involvement of the authorities, it is crucial for Proética to ensure the Brigades’ commitment to following up on the progress made and to performing regular oversight activities with a view to establishing a replicable and scalable process.
1. A DESCRIPTIVE PERSPECTIVE

1.1 Context of the Anti-Corruption Brigades

The Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative is a part of the Open Governance Project being carried out in several countries by Transparency International. The main objective of this project is to support the work done by a set of country Transparency International chapters selected to tackle corruption. The project is funded by the Hewlett Foundation, one of Transparency International’s partners from the private sector.

The programme rests on three lines of action, one of them being citizen involvement. Through it, the programme intends to empower people in the exercise of their rights in regard to access to information, participation, and governance accountability for a higher quality of life.

One of the chapters selected to carry out the project and its lines of action is Proética in Peru. In 2014, Proética began implementing a project in collaboration with the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic for the citizen engagement line of action, the aim of which was to make the site INFOBRAS more participatory. The site had been designed by the Office of the Comptroller General to provide access to information on public works.

In early 2015, however, after the renewal of Proética’s leadership (the new President and Executive Board took over in April that year), and due to the Office of the Comptroller General’s marked lack of interest in the programme, the relationship deteriorated and the initiative came to a halt. The remaining funds, the available economic resources, and a political context marked by the accession to office of new sub-national authorities and the election of new authorities in the executive and the legislative branches were all incentives for the development of a new initiative within the framework of the citizen engagement component of the Open Governance Project in Peru.

Thus, the Anti-Corruption Brigades, a collaboration with the Ombudsman, came about as an alternative to the experience with the Office of the Comptroller General, largely oriented towards citizen oversight of public management for the identification of irregularities and corruption risks in state institutions, such as municipalities or regional governments.

Next, we present the initiative implementation model and process in detail, as of this evaluation.

1.2 The actual process

To date, the initiative has been carried out in two municipalities in Lima. The first experience took place in the Los Olivos district (northern metropolitan Lima) from 18 to 22 August 2015. The second one was carried out in the Miraflores district, in Lima city, in March 2016.

Drawing on information collected through interviews with key stakeholders and document reviews we present here an overview of the Brigades design and implementation process based on the first two experiences, structured in six stages:
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the initiative model and its implementation process to date, we provide an in-depth description of each of these stages.

1.2.1 Design and planning

In order to increase citizen engagement and improve governance mechanisms and relationships, Proética designed this strategy to identify irregularities in public documents, corruption risks and/or cases through citizen oversight of public management in municipalities and regional governments.

From its inception, the initiative envisioned the possibility of having the collaboration and commitment of the Ombudsman, a key stakeholder in Peru. At this initial stage, the project not only built a strategic alliance with the said institution, but also sought the involvement of AC Transparencia, one of the most influential civil society organisations in the country.
The Ombudsman provided its technical expertise in oversight, audit, and file analysis, and served as a guarantor for monitored institutions. AC Transparencia, in turn, offered its expertise in citizen engagement programme management, as well as its network of volunteers for the first implementation in Los Olivos.

Thus, under Proética’s leadership, the experience in Los Olivos benefited from the contributions of the Ombudsman and AC Transparencia for content, modules, and training dynamics development. It is worth mentioning that the Ombudsman carried out critical work as regards tool design for file auditing by volunteers over the course of the oversight days in the municipality.

When the second experience was to take place, however, AC Transparencia was fully committed to follow-up actions relating to the election process. As a result, coupled with Proética’s decision to become autonomous in volunteer calling and training, AC Transparencia did not take part in the Miraflores experience.

After the first stage, there was an analysis and selection of a municipality for the new initiative. In the Los Olivos experience, the selection was guided by a set of criteria: closeness to Lima, political will among the authorities, representativeness of the working and middle classes, and not being a leading district in the areas of transparency and accountability. However, not all of these criteria were maintained for the second experience, when the choice of district was resolved by reference to it closeness to Lima and the political willingness to participate. The municipality of Miraflores promotes transparent public management, and is staffed by well-trained, experienced officials. It is one of only two districts in the country that have open government legislation in place and an open data website. Moreover, its high-income population and its high socio-educational level distance it from the country’s average.

1.2.2 Launch

The second implementation stage involved launch and communication actions. A public launch event was held for the pilot in Los Olivos, with attendees from Proética, AC Transparencia, the Ombudsman, the municipality and the media. The event was also used as an opportunity to discuss current corruption issues.
Conversely, there was no launch event in Miraflores. However, there was a formal introductory meeting between the Proéctica authorities and the Mayor at his office. A memo relating to this meeting was later distributed.

Another element assessed was the media coverage before, during and after the interventions themselves. We found that the Los Olivos experience was the most widely covered – notably with radio spots. It also had more impact on newspapers and news websites, several of which were national in scope and had a vast readership.

Lastly, billboards, brochures and dissemination materials were created for both initiatives. The one in Los Olivos even developed an exclusive graphic identity. Today, that graphic identity is leveraged for the rest of the Brigades, by adapting the time and place information.

1.2.3 Training

A key aspect of the initiative, as will be seen over the course of this report, has been a call for, and training of, volunteers. The intervention model was designed to include a volunteer team as a key programme stakeholder.

Therefore, a third stage of the process consisted in a call for volunteers and their training in file auditing, use of transparency websites, and complaint-filing (a high-expectation component for Proéctica in the first experience in Los Olivos, later somewhat de-emphasised).

AC Transparencia’s participation in the pilot in Los Olivos was key as regards calling for and coordinating volunteers. The organisation’s experience in this area and its substantial database was instrumental for this task. Fortunately, Proéctica was able to capitalise on this expertise and to successfully assume this role for the Miraflores experience, in the absence of AC Transparencia.

As regards volunteer training, sessions lasting approximately four hours were carried out for both experiences, divided into thematic modules. The sessions were designed in coordination with technical specialists from the Ombudsman on the following issues:

- importance of citizen oversight in the fight against corruption
- corruption risks in sub-national management
LEARNING REVIEW: ANTI-CORRUPTION BRIGADES - PERU

- evaluation of documentation in key processes: operation licences, building permits, public works and acquisitions
- electronic portal supervision: standard transparency websites, the electronic system for public procurement and contracting (SEACE), economic transparency (MEF), INFOBRAS (Office of the Comptroller General), among others.

Each module was directed by a facilitator from Proética, the Ombudsman (both the country agency and the decentralised offices), or, in Los Olivos, from AC Transparencia, depending on each stakeholder's expertise in the matter at hand.

According to the management report prepared for Los Olivos, on the first day of training 37 people were trained — 18 men and 19 women. A higher number of volunteers attended the second day (33 men and 38 women), for a total of 71 citizens. Overall, 108 volunteers were trained for the Los Olivos experience, with a gender distribution of close to 50 per cent\(^1\).

1.2.4 Intervention

The citizen oversight was planned to take place within a timeframe of three to five days. Over the course of the intervention, there were 69 volunteers in Los Olivos — 42 women and 37 men (a less equal gender distribution than during the training). However, the management report makes it impossible to determine whether there were 69 individual volunteers, or whether some of them attended more than one oversight day. The table below, taken from the report, shows the number of volunteers enrolled, as well as actual attendance each day:

\(^1\) The data on the Miraflores Brigade is not yet available.
\(^2\) It should be noted that Miraflores is one of the districts with the best transparency and accountability practices in
Table 1. Volunteer participation in Los Olivos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPANTS</th>
<th>Tuesday</th>
<th>Wednesday</th>
<th>Thursday</th>
<th>Friday</th>
<th>Saturday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed attendance</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of participating volunteers in total enrollment</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The citizen oversight days included a set of actions related to four components. For the first of these, file auditing, volunteers worked on documents in “critical areas” (from the perspective of the fight against corruption), such as public procurement of goods and services, operating licences, and public works in the municipalities of Los Olivos and Miraflores, within the legal framework of the Transparency and Access to Public Information Act. The Ombudsman provided methodological support for the preparation of systematisation spreadsheets.

As an example, the initiative in Los Olivos yielded a total number of 43 public files reviewed, distributed as follows:

a) 17 operation licences  
b) 10 building permits  
c) 12 procurements  
d) 4 public works

Both experiences have made it clear that this is one of the most complex actions covered in the oversight days: first, because of the technical difficulty it entails, and, second, due to political bad habits. In Los Olivos there were obstacles to accessing public files as a result of a certain reluctance on the part of some of the public officials, and due to the fact that the files were divided into several parts and dispersed across different departments according to their domain, which made access to the entirety of the documents rather difficult.

Although there was a lower rate of separated public files in Miraflores, Proética was able to select them through the municipality’s open data website, and thus requested them beforehand from the corresponding agencies, whose staff tracked the files and handed them to the Brigade – which made it clear that they were willing to cooperate². Access was only denied when the files were being subjected to controls by the internal audit.

For the other three actions, a stand was to be placed in a public space (a park or street) to provide information and invite passers-by to take part in flash training sessions in relation to overseeing public management and evaluating state transparency websites. The stands were also to offer legal advice and file complaints.

² It should be noted that Miraflores is one of the districts with the best transparency and accountability practices in Peru.
However, only the pilot in Los Olivos had a stand placed in a public space. In Miraflores, a stand was mounted within the municipality building, which meant a lesser degree of activity and visibility than in the previous experience. This was mainly due to the fact that the only available public space was a small square to the back of the building, with few visitors, which Proética’s staff ruled out as an option.

One of the main components of the experience in Los Olivos was the provision of legal advice and the collection of complaints. However, after completing the experience, Proética deemed the resulting complaints to be of little relevance, given their high degree of inconsistency. Most of the 27 complaints were administrative in nature, rather than criminal or relating to corruption allegations at the municipal level. Proética has since come to understand that the value added by the Anti-Corruption Brigades lies not in taking and channelling complaints from ordinary citizens, but in the work that might be done by the volunteers, trained and technically coordinated by the Ombudsman, during oversight days.

In light of the experience in Los Olivos, it might be concluded that citizens tend to file claims and grievances rather than complaints relating to corruption allegations, which moves the citizen oversight activities away from their original focus, and opens up a space for interaction between Brigades and citizens that might result in frustration if expectations are created that cannot be met by Proética or the Ombudsman. Consequently, this action was left out in Miraflores.

Proética is currently reviewing the complaint-filing component. Although a decision to discontinue it permanently has not been made yet, its effectiveness will be under scrutiny over the next few Brigades to assess whether it is appropriate to continue implementing it. For the time being, and in order to boost file analysis and citizen guidance and sensitisation, complaint-filing will be treated as secondary.

1.2.5 Analysis

Once the intervention was concluded, the information systematisation stage began and a final management report was prepared. The report on the experience in Los Olivos described the Brigade design and implementation process but did not cover the project’s outcomes, findings, or recommendations with a follow-up plan, mainly due to lack of time and human resources. It should also be noted that preparing the document on that first intervention took five months.

The situation has not been much different in Miraflores: over five months after the intervention, the report is still in production.
1.2.6 Submission

For the pilot tests, the last stage of the process was the submission of the report. In January 2016, the management report of the intervention in Los Olivos was submitted to the Mayor at a private event. Walter Albán (Proética), Gerardo Távara (AC Transparencia), and the Ombudsman attended the meeting, which received media coverage.

Once completed, the report on the Miraflores experience should also be formally submitted to the authorities.

1.3 Towards a theory of change

Initially, this evaluation found that Proética lacked a formalised theory of change for the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiatives, as well as a strategic plan with a mid- and long-term perspective. In view of the different written versions of the project (drafted at different times and for different donors throughout the last year), a conceptual umbrella had be established which the following theory of change intends to capture.

The first draft of the theory of change was developed through participatory workshops facilitated by Maximiliano Luft (ZIGLA), with Samuel Rotta and Carlos Arroyo from Proética, and Jorge Cabrejos and Mauro Bensimon from ZIGLA. The workshops took place at Proética’s office in Lima, within the framework of the field visit carried out from May 24 to May 27.

The workshops dynamics was iterative and aimed at building a first draft of the theory of change over those four days, which entailed both joint sessions with the Proética team and internal sessions for the ZIGLA team to refine the results from the previous joint session for discussion and validation at the next.

Over the four joint sessions, the vision of success, the different levels of intervention, the outcome sequence, and the preconditions and assumptions were conceptually approached and validated.

Finally, after the field visit, the ZIGLA team continued to refine and conceptualise the first draft, which, in turn, was iteratively worked on with the Transparency International Secretariat team, composed of José María Marín and Rute Caldeira. They revised, provided feedback, and made contributions to the version presented here.
Next, we show a graphic rendition of the conceptual model of the theory of change, with a logical sequence of outputs and results which are preconditions to achieve the vision of success.

For the Brigades theory of change, we worked on four levels for achieving the vision of success:

- outputs
- short-term outcomes
- mid-term outcomes
- long-term outcomes

**GENERAL FLOWCHART – ANTI-CORRUPTION BRIGADES THEORY OF CHANGE**
Below, we present a detailed analysis of the results and interventions at each of these levels, including the stakeholders involved and their dynamics, and the assumptions made regarding contextual factors needed for the expected results to be verified.

A. VISION OF SUCCESS — LONG TERM

The exercise of building a theory of change for the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative drew on a vision of success, or long-term change, that Proética hopes to achieve within the next eight to 10 years, focused on increased transparency, accountability, and citizen engagement in public management in Peru.

It should be noted that this vision of success covers several areas of intervention that go beyond citizen engagement (which is, as mentioned before, the DNA of the Anti-Corruption Brigades). What the initiative intends to bring about is more ambitious than mere citizen mobilisation at the local level: the ultimate goal is for this involvement — which should be exercised systematically and proactively — to increase transparency and accountability in local public management.

B. PRECONDITIONS AND INTERVENTION LEVELS

1. Outputs

The first theory of change level is based on two elements promoted by Proética’s direct intervention. Firstly, a strategic alliance with key stakeholders, such as the Ombudsman or AC Transparencia, which have different but complementary roles at the initial stage. The building of this alliance between prestigious organisations with an extensive background in the area of ethics, transparency and access to public information, and especially with an institution such as the Ombudsman in Peru, is key to ensuring a successful call for and training of volunteers, as well as to providing a formal framework for entering into a dialogue with the public authorities and requesting access to public files and information.

Secondly, the design and consolidation of an intervention methodology and model that may be replicated in various locations throughout the country and scaled to several government levels is crucial for implementing the Anti-Corruption Brigades strategy. This model should establish, among other things, the volunteer profile, the method for advertising for volunteers, training dynamics and content,
stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities, components and resources for the intervention days, criteria and tools for information collection, etc.

In this context, the Anti-Corruption Brigades’ work on training, sensitisation and guidance on transparency, accountability and citizen participation issues unlocks three key outputs, targeted at three of the main stakeholders in the theory of change: volunteers, public officials and authorities, and citizens.

It should be highlighted that both of the initial interventions (the building and consolidation of the strategic alliance and the methodology and intervention model) are not only important in order to move forward at this basic stage of direct outputs, they are also cross-cutting drivers that impact the whole theory of change, which requires a complementarity between the optimal stakeholders and the optimal tools. This balance between “who-how-what with” is the cornerstone of the scaling strategy for the Anti-Corruption Brigades.

In a way, the Brigades’ theory of change reflects some elements of what Jonathan Fox labels a strategic approach, in that “[s]trategic [social accountability] approaches, […] deploy multiple tactics, encourage enabling environments for collective action for accountability, and coordinate citizen voice initiatives with reforms that bolster public sector responsiveness” (Fox 2014, p. 10).

By including elements of strategic alliances in the citizen intervention model, the Brigades sought to promote both “voice” and “teeth” (state responsiveness). This is important as the Brigades move forward, given that evidence points to the fact that “‘sandwich strategies’ of mutually empowering coalitions of pro-accountability actors in both state and society can trigger the virtuous circles of mutual empowerment that are needed to break out of “low-accountability traps” (Ibid).

It is worth mentioning that, given the characteristics of local governments in Peru and the political culture, which is generally apprehensive as regards transparency and access to public information, the theory of change does not assume that the state (in its various levels) will behave as an ally or a partner. Thus, there may be mayors and officials who are part of or support the alliance, and therefore, at the output level, it is to be expected that some public officials and authorities are sensitised as a consequence of the training and awareness-raising sessions carried out by the Brigades. It would even be desirable that those officials participate in the Brigades’ activities during the oversight days and facilitate access to public files and document analysis. But the probability of them remaining indifferent to or even opposing the actions carried out by the Brigades (often high in Peru’s municipalities) must not prevent or hinder the logical sequence of results established in the theory of change.

Instead, as regards the potential opposition from the authorities, the model foresees that the dynamics among volunteers, local allies and the media, supported by the evidence and findings relating to citizen oversight, may gradually bring about the necessary conditions and incentives for public officials and authorities to become more open to and interested in improving transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms, thus favouring a virtuous cycle that feeds on a growing demand for transparency, accountability and participation from citizens (mid-term outcomes).

For this initial level of results, Proética should consider the following interventions:
a. creation of a national strategic alliance to boost the implementation of Anti-Corruption Brigades
b. design of content, tools and dynamics to train and motivate volunteers for anti-corruption citizen oversight
c. design of intervention components and mechanisms for anti-corruption citizen oversight
d. pilot interventions in municipalities through Anti-Corruption Brigades composed of trained volunteers
e. evaluation, reflection and learning sessions for pilot interventions
f. refinement and planning of a scalable, sustainable implementation strategy based on findings and learnings.

1. Short-term outcomes

The transition from the direct output level to that of the short-term outcomes is essentially framed by four assumptions, which will also apply to all of the following outcome levels:

I. corruption is a relevant issue for the public opinion and citizens
II. citizens are interested in anti-corruption oversight and might potentially be motivated to get involved in it
III. there are implementation regulations in place that allow for citizen oversight, intervention, and access to documentation (Access to Information Act)
IV. there is an agency that can ensure the required expertise and legal competence to intervene in citizen oversight (e.g. the Ombudsman).

On the basis of these assumptions, this level of the theory of change is intended to achieve four outcomes, which require a series of interventions led by Proética and the strategic alliance that was initially built. The following are some of the most significant interventions that should take place during the transition:

a. call for volunteers and creation of local Anti-Corruption Brigades, with trained, committed volunteers
b. identification and establishment of local strategic alliances that may favour Brigades’ interventions and coverage
c. monitoring of local public management through citizen oversight days by Anti-Corruption Brigades
Expected **Outcome 1** is for volunteers to take the lead and become committed to carrying out citizen oversight actions, applying the methodology designed to that aim, with institutional guidance by Proética and its allies. This guidance is vital for volunteers, both in order to efficiently coordinate interventions with the authorities before and during oversight days, and to safeguard the physical safety of those involved, secure the technical soundness of processes and the safety of audited files, and ensure a prestigious institutional framework and operational capacity for citizens and public officials.

Volunteers’ intervention under the coordination of Proética, the Ombudsman and/or other allies advances **Outcome 2** — the attainment of visibility and publicity, through media coverage and dissemination, for the findings from citizen oversight days, once analysed and systematised.

The holding of citizen oversight days and the visibility earned by findings disseminated by the Brigades unlocks interest and commitment from other key stakeholders that should support citizen oversight (**Outcome 3**). These stakeholders include the media, civil society organisations, and other private organisations with an interest in supporting citizen empowerment, access to public information or transparency.

Symbolic or effective support, through the provision of resources (economic or human), is a fundamental precondition for the sequence of results at the following level, as well as **Outcome 4**, in which citizens have been empowered in the use of transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms, after going through sensitisation, guidance and testing during the interventions carried out by the Brigades.

In this transition, Proética should consider the following **interventions**:

a. motivation and creation of a team of volunteers to lead the analysis and presentation of findings and recommendations to the public institution under oversight

b. supporting, empowering, and providing technical assistance for the teams of Brigade members in charge of the follow-up and dialogue with the public authorities

c. creation of a regional and/or national network of Anti-Corruption Brigades to provide technical assistance on demand at the local level and to facilitate learning and good practices exchange among Brigade members from various locations.

The theory of change makes the following **assumptions**, which should favour the logical sequence of short-term outcomes and the transition to the following level:

I. Proética and its allies have the ability to effectively call for, train and motivate volunteers to get involved in the Anti-Corruption Brigades

II. the Ombudsman (or another similar agency) is committed to local interventions

III. the local media and other dissemination agencies are willing to feature and give visibility to the Anti-Corruption Brigades’ interventions and findings
2. Mid-term outcomes

Proética’s role is essential throughout the initial level of the theory of change, both to ensure the call for and training of volunteers, and to lead the institutional political dialogue with the authorities and stakeholders involved before, during and after the intervention.

For the following level —the mid-term outcomes— the expectation is that, in the local sphere, where the citizen oversight days, organised by Proética and its allies, are held, the volunteer team becomes autonomous and is able to sustain citizen oversight in a proactive and systematic manner (Outcome 5). In the model established for the Anti-Corruption Brigades, volunteers take on this leading role once the findings have been disseminated and the follow-up on recommendations and improvement opportunities regarding transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms has been established (with or without allied public authorities).

From Outcome 5 on, an increase is expected in public officials’ and authorities’ receptiveness regarding the importance of transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms in public management (Outcome 6). This improvement in receptivity would be partly an effect of the Brigades’ and local allies’ work to give visibility to the findings collected and progress made at the follow-up stage. Moreover, public officials’ own conviction as to the usefulness of deepening behaviour changes in local management would contribute to accelerating the increase in receptivity and would prompt iterative dynamics between the Brigades and the authorities.

At the same time, citizen demand for transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms is expected to grow (Outcome 7), which would feed back into Outcome 6, and vice versa. In this regard, there is the assumption that the implicit contract between the governing and the governed evolves toward an openness to transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms, which, thanks to these continuous, iterative dynamics over time, tends to elicit more and more receptivity among public officials, as well as a growing citizen demand. As a mediated result of these dynamics, the authorities gradually improve information availability and access to public information (Outcome 8), which increases citizens’ incentives to get directly or indirectly involved in public affairs.

The following are some of the main assumptions at this level of the theory of change:

i. there is a group of volunteers within the anti-corruption Brigade who are able to and interested in leading the dialogue with the public authorities, the media, and other local stakeholders
ii. there are local organisations that are capable of ensuring the sustainability of the Anti-Corruption Brigades’ interventions, and to support volunteers in the dialogue with the public authorities

iii. the local technical teams of the Ombudsman (or a similar agency) have the necessary competences and skills to train and guide the Anti-Corruption Brigades

iv. the volunteers’ and local strategic allies’ receptiveness, motivation and commitment will ensure the autonomy and sustainability of the Anti-Corruption Brigades once TI Peru completes its direct work on the public entity at hand

v. citizen endorsement of the volunteering Brigade members’ work motivates them to maintain their commitment to citizen oversight

These assumptions may, in turn, be effects of Proética’s and its allies’ intervention at the initial stage, given that the call for volunteers, training and sensitisation actions planned as part of the intervention model aim to build this critical mass that mid-term outcomes draw on.

The outcomes at this level of the theory of change are necessary conditions to advance to the next level. Key among them is for the volunteering team to consolidate itself as a local driver of the Anti-Corruption Brigades, once Proética withdraws to foster new Brigades in other municipalities.

3. Long-term outcomes

Finally, the theory of change establishes a long-term outcome level with three preconditions for achieving the vision of success. Two of these are unavoidable steps for a local management with more and better transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms. The first is an increased accountability among public officials and authorities (Outcome 9). Given that access to public information would have been improved by now, local governments open new accountability channels and mechanisms, and/or widen existing ones, and are forced to use them to respond to citizen demands and claims within the legal and institutional framework in place.

At the same time, as a consequence of the empowerment and sensitisation in the importance of transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms of a growing number of stakeholders within the local community, more and more citizens should participate individually or collectively,
occasionally or regularly, in public management matters (**Outcome 10**), which feeds back into Outcome 9, and vice versa.

As an effect of these dynamics, the continuous improvement of access to public information, accountability and citizen engagement is expected to contribute to reducing corruption at the local level (**Outcome 11**), and ultimately to consolidating a more transparent and accountable public management, with a higher degree of citizen participation (**vision of success 12**).

One of the keys for the final sequence of outcomes at this level is the role of the network of local stakeholders that supported volunteers at previous levels. These include local social organisations, the media, the Ombudsman (across its various jurisdictional levels) and the network of Anti-Corruption Brigades that TI Peru hopes to gradually build throughout the country in order to provide technical and institutional support for local volunteers. This local–national network should help support and accelerate the local dynamics mobilising citizens to get involved and demand a more transparent public management.
2. AN EVALUATIVE PERSPECTIVE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter includes a series of sections that aim to provide an answer to the assessment dimensions of the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability).

From the methodological point of view, the evaluation consisted of a bibliographic review, and a series of in-depth interviews (both in-person and virtual), group interviews with key stakeholders, and focus groups with volunteers from the initiatives. Moreover, thanks to its replicability- and improvement-oriented approach, the evaluation has linked and triangulated data and multi-stakeholder perspectives to identify findings, learnings, and improvement opportunities.

Based on the learnings and improvement opportunities, we have been able to develop the theory of change described in the previous chapter, as well as a refined version of the intervention process, aimed at ensuring the model’s sustainability, which is presented in Chapter 3.

2.2 Relevance

This section provides an analysis of the relevance of the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative, with a focus on the questions presented in the terms of reference.

- What is the theory of change underlying the Anti-Corruption Brigades model?
- How relevant is the Anti-Corruption Brigades model in the context of the fight against corruption?
- To what extent does the Anti-Corruption Brigades model add value, and to what extent is it innovative?
- How relevant is the Anti-Corruption Brigades model for direct and indirect recipients, to their experience of corruption, and to their intention of becoming involved in the fight against corruption?

Against the backdrop of an electoral process to choose new Executive and Legislative officials in Peru, corruption is one of the major risks to governability in the country and to the future of Peruvian society.

The serious corruption issues observed in the handling of public resources are coupled with the investigation processes started in 2014 for possible criminal responsibility at the highest levels of 19 of the 25 regional governments. Several reports by the media have not only made these cases visible, but have also been used in the judicial proceedings. These conflicts have revealed how permeable Peruvian

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3 See 4.1 Annex 1: Methodological notes.
4 See 1.3 Towards a theory of change.
5 Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of the former president imprisoned on corruption charges, was one of the candidates to the country’s presidency, even reaching the second-ballot stage and losing by a margin of less than 1 per cent to her rival, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (the current president).
politics are with regard to illegal economies, linked to the proliferation of criminal organisations, which act as networks for drug trafficking, illegal mining, human trafficking, and asset laundering.

In this regard, according to the recently-published 2015 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, Peru is now ranked 89th worldwide, which represents a fall from the 2008 rank (72nd). The national surveys about corruption carried out by Proética in 2014 show that citizens feel that corruption is the second biggest issue in the country (after urban crime): 53% of Peruvians believe corruption will continue to increase in the next five years, according to the IX National Survey of Corruption Perceptions carried out by Proética in Peru in 2015.

In sum, in a context in which corruption is a critical issue on the country’s political agenda sensitisation and citizen oversight initiatives are highly valuable. Therefore, the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative is deemed to be relevant and innovative, insofar as it offers a means to channel citizens’ discontent with, and mistrust in, institutions and public officials toward public management oversight.

Based on the information gathered, the Anti-Corruption Brigades represent a unique initiative in Peru. There are no comparable citizen engagement initiatives that aim to fight corruption. Many of the anti-corruption initiatives currently being implemented in Peru are institutional responses led by agencies largely linked to the government, such as the High-Level Anti-Corruption Commission6 and the National Agreement7.

By contrast, the focus of the Anti-Corruption Brigades is not on encouraging citizen engagement through pre-established institutions. Rather, they seek to mobilise “ordinary citizens” as volunteers (who may lead or collaborate in oversight activities), or simply as beneficiaries of guidance and sensitisation actions, which is seen as a precondition for empowerment.

Moreover, based on national legislation currently in force (the Transparency and Access to Public Information Act), the Anti-Corruption Brigades encourage diagnosis of, and orientation regarding, the use of transparency portals, and they promote citizens’ access to public information. In this sense, they empower society in the use of citizen rights, through the consolidation of oversight and control actions.

In general, according to the interviewees8, citizen oversight initiatives are useful for promoting a citizen-based reduction in corruption. As per the volunteers’ responses, special mention should be made of the fact that Anti-Corruption Brigades allow “ordinary citizens to form a group and have an effect on government bodies”. Thus, the initiative makes it possible to channel citizens’ motivations towards the strengthening and promotion of democratic values, citizen involvement, the fight against corruption and accountability, as good government practices.

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6 A space of coordination between the executive, the judiciary, autonomous bodies, sub-national government representatives, industry associations and the civil society, created in early 2010 to monitor the government’s anti-corruption policies.

7 A three-party forum comprising the government, all political parties with seats in Congress, and civil society organisations from around the country.

8 For the list of interviewees, see Annex 4.1: Methodological notes.
Moreover, the initiative affords the possibility of involving citizens and public officials in a single action. In a national context in which officials and citizens are usually far apart, with the former seen as unwilling to provide information (an attitude referred to as a “culture of secrecy”), any programme that aims to bring both groups together is perceived to be healthy and positive by the groups themselves.

In general, the Brigades’ strategy and theory of change assume that the promotion of citizen oversight is conducive to a sensitisation of public officials as regards transparent public management and accountability, and creates disincentives for corruption and irregularities9.

From Proética’s perspective, against the background of the process of institutional renewal it has embarked upon, the Anti-Corruption Brigades programme emerges as an initiative that aims to involve citizens directly, inviting them to work together to reduce impunity and the scope for corruption. In this sense, the consolidation of a new leadership, capable of widening the organisation’s structure in a pluralistic fashion, bringing in people and institutions that may strengthen its social impact, is expected to cement a more proactive attitude as regards the formulation of public policies aimed at fighting corruption by promoting citizen mobilisation with the goal of improving transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms in public management. Thus, the Brigades emerge as a new attempt to leverage a team of volunteers, create new alliances, etc., which Proética has much to learn from.

From AC Transparencia’s perspective, at the institutional level, the first experience with the initiative provided it with a space in which its volunteer network was able to take part in activities other than electoral oversight. In the staff’s own words: “In the last couple of years, we have been trying for volunteers to oversee more than elections, so this opportunity was perfect for us. It was an important experience, as it engaged volunteers in different oversight activities from the usual ones”.

From the Ombudsman’s perspective, the Anti-Corruption Brigades provide an opportunity to sensitise officials regarding citizen oversight actions, which entails a cultural change. The initiative may help to dismantle the “culture of secrecy” in a gentler way, and to bring public officials closer to citizen oversight and control processes10.

9 In order to broaden the concept of citizen participation and its link to transparency and anti-corruption, “Evidence of citizen engagement impact in promoting good governance and anti-corruption efforts” (Marin Aguirre, 2016) and “How Not to Increase Participation in Local Government: The Advantages of Experiments When Testing Policy Interventions” (Arceneaux and Butler, 2015) are interesting reads.

10 The municipal officials’ perspective could not be properly established due to the difficulties in reaching the said officials. The only reachable official was Roxana Calderón, the Secretary General of Miraflores municipality, who has stressed the importance of citizen involvement initiatives such as the Brigades, particularly for Miraflores, inasmuch as they improve transparency and accountability in public management. In the case of the public officials from Los Olivos, the interview agreed upon during the field visit failed to take place, as officials did not attend. It was not possible to schedule a phone interview, despite the evaluation team’s and Proética’s repeated attempts.
2.3 Effectiveness

The effectiveness analysis presented below is based on the following questions included in the terms of reference:

- How effective has the Anti-Corruption Brigades model been in terms of achievements and outcomes? Which were those achievements and outcomes?
- How do those outcomes relate to the theory of change?
- Which are the medium- and long-term impact indicators?
- Which internal and external factors facilitated or hindered the outcomes?
- How did the project interact with citizens and other relevant actors?

As explained in Chapter 1, the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative was designed gradually, over the course of its implementation, being seen as an alternative to the previous experience with the Office of the Comptroller. Consequently, not being the result of a comprehensive planning process, the assessment conditions are suboptimal.

This low degree of programmatic formality hinders the rigorous measurement of its effectiveness: without a document detailing objectives, baselines, goals, available resources, implementation timeframes, etc., the assessment is not based on percentages or compliance levels. Rather, it shows outcomes and results from different perspectives, and supports reflection and learning based on an approach of participatory reconstruction, with a prospective viewpoint.

In this regard, the Brigades’ actions so far may correspond to the initial level of outputs in the theory of change. From a products- or outputs-level perspective, the evaluation acknowledges that the initiative has yielded the following results:

I. forms and factsheets have been designed for the review of public files and documents
II. over 100 volunteers have been trained in file auditing and transparency website usage diagnosis and guidance, with a relatively equal distribution between men and women
III. a management report has been drafted and submitted, with findings and recommendations for the municipality of Los Olivos
IV. a graphic identity and a set of dissemination materials have been developed, such as signage in public places and radio spots.

As a complement to these outputs, and taking into consideration that the results are still establishing themselves, the evaluation has found evidence of the following achievements:

I. A national strategic alliance has been built with the Ombudsman across its several jurisdictional levels. In the first experience in Los Olivos, AC Transparencia had a key role in advertising for and coordinating volunteers.
II. A scalable and sustainable methodology and intervention model for anti-corruption citizen oversight has been consolidated.
III. Two pilot interventions have been carried out (Los Olivos and Miraflores) to test the methodology and intervention model.

IV. A team has been created with volunteers trained in citizen audit and oversight\textsuperscript{11}, who are committed to maintaining their involvement in citizen oversight actions.

Among the \textbf{contextual factors} that have been conducive to the achievements, special mention should be made of the fact that corruption is a critical issue in the Peruvian socio-political context and a dominant topic on the public agenda, and that the regulatory framework, through the Transparency and Access to Public Information Act, makes it possible to promote access to public information actions. In particular, the Brigades have resorted to an article in this Act that enables “direct access” to documents in real time and in the government institutions’ facilities\textsuperscript{12}.

Among the \textbf{institutional factors} that have been conducive to the Brigades’ experience, the most important is the explicit support of Transparency International’s Secretariat and Proética’s new management, which have granted flexibility and technical guidance to the adaptation of this experience as an alternative in the Open Governance Project. This institutional conviction displayed by Proética was coupled with the leadership and capability of the Brigades’ coordination team, which complemented the design and management with skill over the course of implementation. Moreover, we should highlight the interest and commitment shown by key stakeholders, such as the Ombudsman, AC Transparencia, and the volunteers themselves. This motivation stems from Proética’s track-record, prestige and technical capability in Peru. The organisation has so far acted as a symbolic guarantee at the institutional level.

Having said that, the Brigades faced \textbf{difficulties or challenges} during implementation. In the Los Olivos experience, the lack of willingness to cooperate among certain public officials was highlighted by most participants as the main obstacle during the experience. From a broader perspective, the delays when preparing and presenting final findings and recommendations reports have also hindered the achievement of significant outcomes. On that note, it should be pointed out that the analysis process lacked sufficient resources, which slowed down work. Moreover, after the submission of the report, no iterative process was established to follow up findings and recommendations with public authorities. After the intervention stage, the process “faded out”, showing a clear difference in intensity relative to the design, launch and training stages.

Consequently, while the electoral context represented a motivating framework for the Brigades, it has been a source of more challenges than opportunities. For Proética (and for its allies, the Ombudsman and AC Transparencia) the electoral context implied a high degree of turbulence and operational and institutional requirements, which put off the activation of a new Brigade as had been planned. The

\textsuperscript{11} It should be mentioned that part of the volunteer team has also been involved in other citizen audit exercises besides the Anti-Corruption Brigades, such as the observation and recording of campaign expenditures in the closing rallies of the candidates in Lima.

\textsuperscript{12} Law No. 27806, of Transparency and Access to Public Information, Sections 10, 11 and 12.
significant delay as regards the intervention and the new contact points (e.g., the Los Olivos management report was submitted after several months, volunteers for Los Olivos focus groups were called nine months later) is clearly another negative factor which hindered outcomes at the submission and follow-up stages.

As this is a multi-stakeholder initiative, with different levels of involvement for citizens, public officials, the Ombudsman, and non-governmental organisations, the challenge ahead is for this network to be widened in each of the localities, bringing in other civil society organisations, such as neighbourhood associations and the media, which could support local citizen oversight strategies¹³.

In sum, the evaluation concludes that, to date, the Brigades’ experience is seen as having had highly positive outputs and achievements, taking into account that the initiative is still a high-potential project at an exploration stage, with a view to continuous improvement.

2.4 Efficiency

This section aims to answer the following questions, as per the terms of reference:

- Is the implementation timeframe realistic?
- Has progress been achieved with reasonable costs?
- Are the project’s administration, supervision and governance adequate? Are they managed effectively?
- Is the current organisational structure (national chapter, alliances, and national chapter Transparency International Secretariat dynamics) adequate and functional enough to achieve positive progress?

In order to present the analysis more clearly, this section comprises four sub-sections, each answering one of the questions above.

2.4.1 Implementation timeframe

The programme had an initial implementation timeframe spanning 30 months, from September 2013 onward. However, the change from an initiative coordinated with the Office of the Comptroller to one coordinated with the Ombudsman, which took place in May 2015, entailed a modification of the agreement between Proética and Transparency International, which extended the work plan for an additional five months, according to which the Open Governance Project was to end in September 2016.

One year after their formulation, as of May 2016, the Brigades had been implemented twice. The first one, in August 2015 — barely two months after the beginning of the design stage — was implemented deftly, if one takes into account the tasks involved. The Miraflores experience took place in March 2016,

¹³ For an in-depth look at the challenges going forward, see 3.1 Learnings and improvement opportunities: Towards a replicable and scalable process.
seven months after the Los Olivos experience. The electoral context, the search for volunteers and the summer vacation period affected the development and implementation timeframe from one intervention to the next.

It should be mentioned that, while the initiative has been realistic at the planning and implementation stages, delays and timing issues have been identified (analysis, presentation and findings follow-up) due to the low availability of technical and human resources, and time – which indicates that there were efficiency issues and that opportunities were lost in this particular aspect.

2.4.2 Financial resources

Against the background of the funding provided by the Hewlett Foundation (through the Transparency International Secretariat) there was a limited budget allocated for the citizen engagement line of action of the Open Governance Project in Peru: €27,000, close to €17,000 of which was used for the project implemented with the Office of the Comptroller General. That is to say that, as an alternative to the continuation of the said action line, the Anti-Corruption Brigades were allocated €10,000.

However, the initiative also resorted to funds granted by the Canadian Embassy. As these were close to their expiration date, the Los Olivos and Miraflores experiences were carried out mainly with the resources stemming from the Canadian cooperation, which were used for expenses related to materials and brochures, travel, radio spots (especially in Los Olivos), and food and beverages. According to the financial reports, by March 2016 only €2,000 of the budget provided by the Hewlett Foundation had been used.

The first two experiences made it possible for Proética’s administrative department to estimate the minimum investment needed for a standard Brigade at US$3,500. However, this amount does not include plane tickets, accommodation, transportation, etc., which should be taken into account if these actions are to take place outside the country’s metropolitan capital area.

Based on the information provided by the Proética staff, given the remaining capital at their disposal and the potential to leverage new resources, the team expects to be able to implement three more Brigades (in municipalities in the Peruvian interior) before the programme ends. However, as per what we have observed, this objective would represent a challenge, as it entails a greater complexity than the two Lima municipalities in terms of logistics, local alliances and remote advertisements for volunteers.¹⁴ In this sense, the Brigades have mobilised more human resources than those accounted for in monetary terms. More than half of Proética’s staff have taken part in the initiatives, though financial reports have failed to show this fact.

In sum, even though the estimation of the minimum investment needed for a Brigade action must be adjusted to reflect the aforementioned costs, the programme has used its resources efficiently, and has made progress consistent with them.

¹⁴ During the preparation of the report, two brigades were implemented in Indiana and Trujillo. Three more were scheduled to take place in the second half of August.
2.4.3 Organisational structure

The current organisational structure in Proética is adequate and conducive to the programme’s progress. The organisation’s current headcount comprises 14 people, of which two are devoted to the design and implementation function, with financial and resource-related support from the administrative department. This department, in turn, comprises a director and an assistant, and is in charge of submitting financial and administrative reports to the Transparency International Secretariat. As regards its allies, the chapter’s staff has proven to be capable of cementing key alliances to leverage expertise, resources, funding, etc., with strategic stakeholders, such as the Ombudsman and AC Transparencia. The former provided its technical capital, which was instrumental for training and for designing evaluation scorecards, as well as for facilitating the link between entities and public officials, and monitoring interventions. As mentioned above, the alliance with AC Transparencia was critical as it provided the volunteer network for the Los Olivos experience.

2.4.4 Initiative management

Proética remains at the helm of the project in terms of implementation and management. The allocation of resources is decided by the financial area of the national chapter, based on the programme’s development and implementation needs. Allies, such as the Ombudsman, retain a complementary position in the process, without decision-making powers regarding matters of finance or management. This arrangement has proved efficient for the project’s governance.

2.5 Sustainability

This section is based on the terms of reference questions for the analysis of this dimension:

- How sustainable would the Anti-Corruption Brigades model be — both conceptually and financially — once the current funding dries up?
- What has been done to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Brigades model’s sustainability?

In general, the approach would continue to be financially and conceptually sustainable after the current funding dries up. The Proética team has taken the sustainability dimension into account from the onset of programme design.

As mentioned above, the national chapter’s staff have been able to leverage financial resources from various donors to carry out the initiatives. In this sense, now that the funding from the Hewlett Foundation is nearing its end, the national chapter has successfully reached new agreements with

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15 A distinct case is that of the Brigade to be organised in Huaraz in mid-August 2016. There, the local Ombudsman’s office will cooperate by covering the catering expenses for the training workshop, as part of their allocated budget, which is consistent with the objectives. According to Proética’s staff, this decision could also be related to an “administrative” view taken by the Chief Commissioner in Huaraz.
several donors, such as the Open Society Foundations, which ensures the necessary funds to continue developing and implementing the initiative.

Conceptually, the multi-stakeholder logic (based on strategic alliances at the national/local level), which leverages citizen engagement through volunteers, provides a conducive platform for mid- and long-term sustainability.

In general, a series of steps have been taken towards ensuring the approach’s sustainability. First, Proética has cemented a strategic alliance with the Ombudsman and with other key stakeholders, such as AC Transparencia. As regards the latter, the organisation decided to focus on overseeing the election, as the electoral cycle was nearing its end. In response, Proética launched a process to create its own network of volunteers, which was first used in the Miraflores experience. This network is expected to grow over subsequent initiatives.

Moreover, given the low effectiveness of the component that aims to receive corruption complaints from ordinary citizens, Proética’s staff have decided to move that activity to the background in the programme’s design. Also, the experiences so far have taken place in municipalities where there has been political willingness and certain advantages for the interventions. After these “pilots”, the opportunity (and the challenge) is now to develop the next intervention in public agencies which are not necessarily willing to take part16.

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16 The first experience of this kind took place in the Chimbote municipality, in August 2016.
3. A FORWARD-LOOKING PERSPECTIVE

3.1 Learning and improvement opportunities: Towards a replicable and scalable process

Based on the actual intervention process, the comments from interviewed stakeholders, the remarks from the evaluation team, and the theory of change, we next present a possible version of the implementation process in seven stages, building on learning, improvement opportunities and recommendations toward a replicable and scalable citizen oversight initiative. The stages are:

1. PLANNING AND TAILORING
2. LAUNCH
3. TRAINING
4. INTERVENTION
5. ANALYSIS
6. SUBMISSION
7. FOLLOW-UP

It should be mentioned that this process was designed based on the potential of the programme for replication in various public agencies beyond municipalities (which are the bodies targeted so far). It even provides for the possibility of replicating the initiative in politically unwilling agencies or entities, by taking two potential implementation routes: with or without political endorsement. While the process acknowledges the difficulty of carrying out initiatives of this type in reticent environments, it is clear that it was Proética’s decision to include both routes in the Brigades’ design.

3.2.1 Planning and tailoring

After the design of the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative, a first stage towards the replicable and scalable model would entail a process of planning and tailoring to each intervention location. This should begin with the analysis and the selection of the intervention location and institution. During the pilot stage, as was mentioned in section 1.2.1, the selection of municipalities was based on two primary
factors: distance and political willingness. For that reason, the municipalities chosen were those located in metropolitan Lima which showed interest in the initiative and agreed to be part of it.

With the goal of implementing Anti-Corruption Brigades in different municipalities or public agencies throughout Peru, with or without the authorities’ approval, we suggest consolidating a criticality index to be considered when selecting the intervention target, based on the impact potential in each context.

This index could take into account dimensions such as the following:

- level of transparency in the municipality
- officials’ receptivity
- level of regulation compliance
- level of citizen involvement
- poverty index
- number of local social organisations with potential to become allies
- presence of the Ombudsman

Moreover, these dimensions could take into account different indicators as eligibility criteria:

- risks, and allegations, of corruption
- file accessibility
- availability and condition of transparency websites
- delays in requests to access information
- number of neighbourhood councils in the participatory budget
- availability of trained volunteers

We stress the importance of preparing a criticality index and eligibility criteria in order to choose target institutions under common guidelines, to rank them based on risks and corruption vulnerabilities, and, above all, to improve the Brigades’ adaptation to the context. Moreover, if the institutions are municipalities, this would make it possible to prepare a map of the current condition of selected municipalities, which could then be analysed against the Brigades’ outcomes.

After choosing the target, stakeholders should be mapped, in order to identify and bring public and private institutions into the process, as well as social organisations established at the local level that may contribute to the intervention’s replication and sustainability. Once the target has been chosen and the alliances created, the next step is to tailor the data collection and analysis tools, to adjust the training materials and content to the intervention context, taking into account the characteristics of the local political-institutional environment.

The design of training materials and content carried out beforehand (when reviewing documentation and during sensitisation and dissemination tasks) is critical for the project’s launch, given the specialisation and analysis capabilities required by each type of public file that should be reviewed by volunteers. It might be useful to include the learning derived by other stakeholders with similar objectives.
Given the prevalence of citizens without specialisation or technical knowledge in topics related to public management and corruption (as seen in the Los Olivos and Miraflores experiences) it is key to prepare a description of the profiles of the volunteers to be called based on the minimum capabilities and skills needed for the intervention, including a classification of the types of public files to be reviewed, and to provide training guides and tools to facilitate comprehension and application when reviewing the files or for other actions in the context of the citizen oversight activities.

Thus, the first stage should end with the validation of the tailored intervention plan. Having a final tailored design for the project, which includes the above elements based on the particular intervention scenario, represents a milestone the importance of which should not be understated, given the social, political and economic differences across the various municipalities or public institutions.

3.2.2 Launch

The validation of the tailored intervention plan is thus the prerequisite for starting the launch stage. As a first step, the plan should be submitted to the officials in the public institution chosen as the target. This offers advantages in terms of the sensitisation of the public authorities regarding the confirmation of the initiative’s implementation and the method of intervention. In the Los Olivos experience, while the plan was submitted to the Mayor, communication failed to reach lower-rank officials, leading to consequent ignorance and mistrust of the intervention that was to be carried out. For that reason, the plan should be submitted both to decision-makers and to those serving under them.

Second, we suggest organising a public launch event to present the initiative and intervention timeframe. This event should include representatives from Proética and allied organisations, volunteers and the media. In the specific case of public officials, their inclusion should depend firstly on whether they decide to be part of the intervention or not. At this juncture, the process can take two different roads. Should officials accept to participate, they would not only be part of the launch event, but it would also be expected for them to have a say in the intervention timeframe. Aligning the activities to the agendas of the stakeholders — in this case, government officials — can help increase the intervention’s likelihood of success, insofar as it can reduce transactional costs.
Once participation has been agreed on, after the launch event the next step would be signing agreements that aim to institutionalise the intervention and officials’ commitment to facilitating access to public information and to the files to be reviewed. This would not only allow the initiative to flow smoothly, as government authorities would be part of the process from the onset, but would also work as a contract by which officials assume the responsibility of following up on the Brigade’s recommendations and managing public affairs with improved transparency, accountability and citizen engagement mechanisms.

On the other hand, should the authorities refuse to participate, the public event would be organised without them, and the timeframe would be defined based on the participating stakeholders’ needs. Consequently, resorting to the Transparency and Access to Public Information Act, through the Ombudsman’s office, the officials would be formally requested to grant access to public information and documentation. It is important to note that access would be granted only to requested documents. For that reason, the files to be reviewed should be selected in advance, so as not to leave out any important documents. Consequently, in this scenario the choice of documents would be critical for the initiative’s relevance.

The end of the launch stage should comprise two last actions, either with or without the authorities’ approval. First, each initiative should develop its own graphic identity and dissemination materials. The Los Olivos experience proved that a friendly and innovative visual design can spark greater interest among citizens and improve their chance of remembering and “owning” the initiative. However, we suggest maintaining a similar aesthetic throughout the Brigades, in order to create a “trademark” of sorts. Second, this stage should end with media coverage of the initiative. Good communication is essential to reach and sensitise a greater share of the population. Therefore, we suggest preparing a brief with minimum contents and messages to be replicated at all levels, regardless of the party doing the communication and the media used.

3.2.3 Training
As regards the training stage, the call for volunteers should take place through different media, including social networks, with the volunteers chosen based on the criteria and profiles required for the Brigade. So far, as pilot tests were implemented in metropolitan Lima, putting out a call for volunteers with higher levels of education has not been a problem. However, when it comes to replicating the experience in less densely-populated areas, with lower levels of educational attainment, the call for trained staff will be a highly important challenge for the successful implementation of the citizen oversight experience.

Once again, as in the launch stage, the process can go down two different roads, depending on whether authorities and public officials choose to participate or not. If the authorities choose to participate, they would be expected to take part in the training and sensitisation of volunteers. Volunteers’ profiles, expectations and motivations would be taken into account during training, in order to boost their capability for the task at hand. Moreover, we suggest carrying out an induction and sensitisation workshop with officials – preferably those in managerial positions – not only as regards the initiative’s operation and execution, but also in relation to the implementation of transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms and the advantages they may entail for public management.

On the other hand, should the authorities’ participation fail to be secured, volunteer training would take place without their input.

Regardless of which road the process takes, the training and sensitisation stage for volunteers and officials should be followed by the analysis and prioritisation of intervention areas. This means that, as was the case in Miraflores, a particular action may be set aside or granted lesser attention.

Last, pilot experiences have revealed difficulties as regards the timely preparation of the interventions’ final reports. For that reason, we suggest that the training stage include the creation and induction of a team of volunteers to be part of the process of analysing and assessing the intervention, and preparing the report. This would not only reduce the time needed for report preparation, but also increase participation and ownership by volunteers.

### 3.2.4 Intervention

The actual intervention stage covers the four components of citizen oversight activities, namely:

1. audit of public files
2. transparency website diagnosis and awareness
3. legal advice
4. sensitisation and dissemination
Pilot experiences have provided a series of lessons. As regards diagnosis and evaluation, two aspects should be stressed: first, as to the diagnosis and evaluation of transparency websites, there was no matrix of shared criteria for the variables to be analysed. For that reason, we suggest preparing a document which can be used as a systematisation grid to survey information on websites based on pre-established variables.

Second, as regards sensitisation and awareness, in the experiences no quantitative or qualitative record of the citizens trained at the stand was maintained. Recording this information in some way — for instance, based on coincidental questionnaires on site — could contribute to improving the evaluation of the project’s management and effectiveness.

Moreover, the experiences have proven that filing corruption complaints in the street is not the best way of addressing the identification of corruption risks or public management irregularities. Ordinary citizens are not usually certain as to what constitutes a valid corruption allegation, or, if they are, they may lack evidence to support it. Thus, this component has been relegated to the background, with a view to exploring possible ways to improve its use, given the marked citizen demand in this area.

Finally, during the intervention stage and the stage immediately after, volunteer analysis teams should review primary information. Data collection should include the information gathered by participants through the use of recording instruments for each of the intervention’s four components and their activities, through coincidental questionnaires administered to citizens and through the questionnaires administered to participants after the intervention.

The last step is the activity’s formal closure, which, if deemed convenient, may entail a public presentation in the media, detailing the Brigade’s preliminary findings and future steps.
3.2.5 Analysis

The fifth stage begins with the systematisation and analysis of the previously collected information.

All stakeholders involved in the initiative should contribute their various perspectives and expertise at this stage — especially the analysis team of trained volunteers. In view of the objectives of legitimacy, ownership and sustainability of the project’s achievements, and given the main pillar of transparency, it is essential to involve them in these activities, under Proética’s coordination.

Next, a participatory process of reflection and feedback on findings and outcomes should be carried out, in which the public authorities may or may not be involved, depending on their willingness to participate. If the authorities choose not to take part in the process, the reflection and feedback will be limited to Proética, volunteers and allies. In general, reflection and feedback may help adjust and revise the preliminary document containing the findings and results.

Although this was not the case in the two pilot tests, the process of joint reflection should ensure the preparation of a final report, with findings and recommendations, that covers the analysis of the experience from beginning to end, its outcomes and measurable indicators to assess later improvements – as opposed to a management report that merely describes the process.
3.2.6 Submission

As with the “actual process”, after the final report has been completed, the project will transition to the submission stage.

In order to maximise impact and visibility, a public event should be carried out with the media, the volunteer analysis team, and representatives from allied organisations and Proética. If the public authorities take part in the project, the report containing findings and recommendations should be presented to them during the event.

3.2.7 Follow-up

After submitting the report on each of the pilot experiences, no further action was taken to establish whether the recommendations had been implemented or the extent of the improvements made. In light of several comments made during the interviews and our own observations, we recommend incorporating a final follow-up stage into the process.

When the public authorities have been involved in the project, after the final report has been submitted, with its findings and recommendations, they may be expected to make a public commitment to put these into practice. In this regard, agreements might be signed over the course of the launch stage, which should provide for this kind of commitment to the recommendations included in the final report.

At this point, Proética should mostly take on a supporting role, and should promote ownership among volunteers and other stakeholders, in order to encourage autonomy in the Anti-Corruption Brigades.

Lastly, with or without the involvement of the authorities, it will be crucial at the follow-up stage to ensure the Brigades’ commitment to following up on the progress made and to performing regular oversight activities, with a view to establishing a replicable and scalable process.
4. ANNEX

4.1 Annex 1: Methodological notes

This evaluation was requested from ZIGLA by Transparency International’s Secretariat in April 2016. The professional team involved in the project was composed of:

- **Maxililiano Luft** – Coordinator; monitoring, evaluation, and knowledge management expert.
- **Mauro Bensimon** – In charge of primary information collection, and quantitative and qualitative analysis.
- **Jorge Cabrejos** – Systematisation and qualitative techniques expert.

In line with the terms of reference, the evaluation was carried out with the following objectives:

i. documenting the **theory of change** behind the approach adopted in, and the outcomes expected by, the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative

ii. analysing the initiative’s **general performance, relevance and impact** so far

iii. identifying the **contextual factors** that affect implementation both positively and negatively, as well as the programme’s outcomes to date

iv. capture lessons learned and good practices from the Anti-Corruption Brigades approach in order to derive recommendations that maximise future citizen engagement activities and other initiatives with similar objectives

The evaluation covered a period which spanned from May 2015 to May 2016, the design and implementation period of the two Anti-Corruption Brigades in the Los Olivos and Miraflores districts, in metropolitan Lima. The evaluation reviewed the management report, and the activities, products and processes that ensued from the Brigades’ design and implementation in both experiences.

The main recipients of the evaluation are Transparency International and Proética. However, the report might also serve as a guide for other stakeholders carrying out citizen engagement initiatives with similar goals to those of the Anti-Corruption Brigades.

The methodologies adopted in the framework of this evaluation complemented each other, and the data was triangulated through the various approaches listed below:

**Document review:** The evaluation team collected and reviewed documentation for the Transparency International Secretariat and Proética technical teams. Among these were the following:

- activity report of the Anti-Corruption Brigade in Los Olivos
- training programme
- activity plan and implementation timeframe
- funding proposal
- studies and research on corruption
documents and papers on citizen involvement, transparency and accountability in public management.

The collection of primary information was key to the attempt to understand the initiative process and approach, documenting the theory of change, deriving learning and improvement opportunities, and validating the identified outcomes through the document review.

- **INTERVIEWS:** Five semi-structured individual and group interviews were carried out. The questionnaires were designed to identify products, processes and institutional coordination, within the framework of the Anti-Corruption Brigades. These instruments were applied to nine stakeholders identified as key informants, both in person and virtually, over the end of May and early June 2016.

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<th>#</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Organisation/institution</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Sector Integrity Programme Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Accounting Assistant</td>
<td>Proética</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Project and National Volunteer Network Coordinator</td>
<td>AC Transparencia</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Volunteer Network Assistant Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commissioner of the Ombudsman in Lima</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Municipality of Miraflores</td>
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- **FOCUS GROUPS:** Two mini focus groups were carried out with volunteers from the initiatives, in order to record their experiences and testimonials regarding the Brigades. The groups were set up with an equal distribution in terms of gender and municipality: that is, there was a first group with volunteers who had participated in the initiative in Miraflores, and a second one with volunteers from Los Olivos. It should be noted that the first group included six participants, whereas the second one had only four.

- **PARTICIPATORY WORKSHOP:** In order to systematise a theory of change for the Anti-Corruption Brigades initiative, participatory workshops were facilitated by Maximiliano Luft (ZIGLA) from 24 to 27 May 2016, with Samuel Rotta and Carlos Arroyo from Proética, and Jorge Cabrejos and Mauro Bensimon from ZIGLA. The workshops took place at Proética’s office in Lima, within the framework of the field visit carried out from 24 to 27
May. These workshops were iterative in nature, which entailed carrying out both joint sessions with the Proética team and internal sessions with the ZIGLA team. José María Marín and Rute Caldeira, from the Transparency International Secretariat, reviewed and contributed feedback to the resulting draft theory of change.

For the sake of evaluating the primary collection process, it should be stated that the in-depth interviews and focus groups covered most of the stakeholders identified as key informants. The one interview that could not be carried out was the one planned to take place with staff from the municipality of Los Olivos. During the field trip, the evaluation team visited the municipal building for an appointment with the authorities, but no public official would see them. The interview was then rescheduled with the Secretary General of the municipality, Mr. Giantomaso Arroba. However, it was postponed several times and the effort was ultimately unsuccessful.

It should be highlighted that the evaluation faced two kinds of obstacles and limitations. In the first place, there were contextual and political timing obstacles. The evaluation period coincided with a high-level election: at this time Peruvian citizens voted for president, two vice-presidents, 130 congress people and five Andean parliamentarians for the 2016–2021 period. The elections took place on 10 April 2016 but, given that no presidential candidate obtained over 50 per cent of the valid votes, a second round of elections was held on 5 June 2016.

This context made it difficult to implement Anti-Corruption Brigades in other municipalities. Moreover, it meant that many potential interviewees had over-burdened agendas, as in the case of the Secretary General of Los Olivos.

In the second place, the evaluation also faced technical and methodological challenges. Having been designed over the course of implementation, rather than through a thorough planning process, its evaluability conditions have been less than optimal. Its low degree of programmatic formality has hindered the carrying out of rigorous effectiveness measurement. Since working with percentages or compliance levels has not been a possibility, the evaluation has had to rely on outcomes and products, as seen from different perspectives, drawing on a participatory, forward-looking approach.
4.2 Annex 2: References

Consulted literature


Internal documentation provided by Transparency International Secretariat and Proética


✓ Media coverage of the Anti-Corruption Brigades. Los Olivos.

✓ Evaluation of the Anti-Corruption Brigade in Miraflores. Assessment questionnaire.

✓ Activity report of the Anti-Corruption Brigades. Intervention in the municipal district of Los Olivos (preliminary report).

✓ Open Society Foundations (OSF). Programme for Latin America, in project proposal format.

✓ Citizen mobilisation against corruption in local spheres. Anti-Corruption Brigades. Grant proposal for NED.

✓ Proética. Activity plan of the Anti-Corruption Brigades.

✓ Volunteer training programme. Los Olivos, 15 August 2015.

✓ Data collection proposal for monitoring the Anti-Corruption Brigades.