3.13 The Brazilian experience as ‘role model’

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Brazil’s World Cup experience has been instructive for future hosts, in that it has presented a number of problems related to the transparency of the bidding process, the size of the country and the ambitions of urban authorities, the emergence of strong opposition to infrastructure spending and privatisation, and critical governmental interventions that eventually allowed for the successful realisation of the event.

The major Brazilian sports confederations, Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) and the Comitê Olímpico Brasileiro (COB), have tended to be dominated by a narrow range of vested interests for decades. As these two organisations took the lead role in the bidding for the World Cup and Olympics, respectively, their institutional cultures have negatively impacted the transparency of the events themselves. The lack of public consultation and open debate in the preparation of bid dossiers continues to be one of the major obstacles to ensuring that mega-events serve the broadest range of stakeholders.

The case of Brazil is exemplary in that the bid dossier for the 2014 World Cup was never made public and the Rio 2016 bid book has become the de facto urban-planning document for the city of Rio de Janeiro. These are problematic developments because, in the former case, there is no public record of what the CBF and the Brazilian government proposed or promised to the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA); subsequent developments had major impacts on 12 Brazilian cities. In the latter case, the city of Rio de Janeiro is being transformed to match the proposed ‘Olympic city’, with
dire consequences for tens of thousands of families, which have been forcibly removed from their homes.6

The logistical challenges of organizing a World Cup in Brazil were exacerbated by the ambitions of the Brazilian executive branch to have as many host cities as possible; FIFA required between eight and 10 host cities, but the Brazilians opted for 12. None of the 18 potential host cities circulated their proposals for public input prior to or during the bidding process. This meant not only an increase in costs and impacts, but that several cities without notable football traditions would acquire FIFA-standard stadiums, five-star hotels and world-class training facilities. Although the realisation of the World Cup in Manaus, Cuiabá, Brasília and Natal may have accelerated necessary upgrades to airports, these cities have not experienced an improvement in urban mobility or basic services, or an increase in tourism.7 To the contrary, these cities have gone into debt since the World Cup to maintain ‘white elephant’ stadiums that will remain a burden on municipal budgets for the foreseeable future.8
In addition to the problem of ‘white elephant’ infrastructure, all the World Cup projects were exempted from normal contracting procedures so that the building process could be accelerated. The combined
effects of the so-called Differential Public Procurement Regime (RDC in Portuguese) and an exemption to the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, which requires cities to have balanced budgets, have pushed all the World Cup host cities into debt, as municipal and state governments took advantage of the situation to build on a massive scale in an accelerated time frame. The inclusion of infrastructure projects in World Cup development agendas typically falls under the category of ‘legacy’, but when these projects occur under emergency planning and execution regimes their transparency tends to decrease.

Another problematic of the 2014 World Cup was the way in which municipal and state governments interpreted FIFA’s host city demands. When FIFA declared, as early as 2007, that Brazil did not possess a single stadium capable of hosting a World Cup match, the Brazilians interpreted this to mean that they should build or renovate 12 stadiums that met or exceeded all FIFA’s technical requirements. As the FIFA documents had no provisions for social, economic or urban sustainability, however, the Brazilians constructed stadiums that are isolated from their urban contexts, very expensive to maintain and dependent on imported technologies, and that do not fit within the cultural paradigms of Brazilian ‘fandom’. The majority of the World Cup stadiums were formerly public installations, were demolished and rebuilt with public money, and are now operated through so-called public–private partnerships (typically 30-year concessions won by the civil construction firms hired for the rebuilding). This has resulted in a transfer of public space to private interests and an increase in the cost of attending football matches, and further exacerbated the crises of social and urban fragmentation in Brazil.

Beginning with the FIFA Confederations Cup in 2013, it became apparent that Brazil had exposed itself to significant risk in the pursuit of mega-events. An a priori assumption of hosting mega-events is
that they will serve to attract international media attention, stimulating tourism, business and national pride. With the advent of massive protests against the exorbitant public spending on the World Cup, it became clear that Brazil was risking its international image and that the Workers’ Party, the largest element in the governing coalition, was alienating its political base through its acquiescence in FIFA’s stringent demands. The chronic lateness or incompleteness of stadium, airport, communications and transportation infrastructure, as well as the public displays of disaffection between the 2014 Local Organising Committee (LOC) and FIFA further hurt Brazil’s image abroad.\textsuperscript{14}

The unprecedented scale and intensity of the protests during the 2013 Confederations Cup focused greater international attention on FIFA’s business model than ever before. The federal government dealt with this crisis situation through heavy-handed policing and strategic negotiations with key social actors.\textsuperscript{15} Despite the very real threats to a successful staging of the contest, including pitched battles between police and protesters at many venues, and repeated denunciations of human rights abuses, event organisers and international observers alike declared it a success.

Emboldened by the effectiveness of protests in bringing attention to the impact of the World Cup on Brazilian cities, protesters organised further strikes and public actions throughout 2013 and into 2014. One of the federal government’s primary responses was to create a 10,000-strong military shock force that could be rapidly deployed to potential trouble spots during the World Cup.\textsuperscript{16} This force, combined with an estimated BRL 1.9 billion (some US$780 million) in federal security spending and an additional 15,000 security officers, ensured that protesters threatening the staging of the World Cup would be contained.\textsuperscript{17} For the final, there were no fewer than 25,000 police personnel in Rio de Janeiro, and nineteen activists were arrested on the eve of the match.\textsuperscript{18}
Another major risk to the realisation of the 2014 World Cup was the derelict state of Brazil’s urban and inter-urban transportation. In order to guarantee uninterrupted urban traffic circulation and inter-city flights during the World Cup, each host city decreed a holiday on game days. This effectively cleaned the streets of their habitual users, diminishing the risk of traffic jams, over-stretched metro services or crowded airports.\(^1\) The suspension of urban normalcy across the Brazilian host cities was key to the operational success of the World Cup.

The response of the international sports organisations to the problems of hosting the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics has been tepid. Partially as a result of the pursuit of FIFA-standard stadiums for the World Cup, Brazilian football tickets are now the most expensive in the world relative to the national minimum wage.\(^2\) There has been no institutional reform of the cloistered and opaque CBF, and FIFA appears content to follow the Brazilian model of hosting in Russia and Qatar, where dissent and public protests are much less likely.

The preparations for the 2016 Summer Olympics are worryingly similar to those of the World Cup, although their effects are concentrated in Rio de Janeiro. The construction of three non-governmental regulatory agencies to deal with the financing and execution of Olympic-related projects has eroded democratic institutions and created significant vacuums of responsibility.\(^3\) Large-scale infrastructure projects that are part of Olympic and Paralympic transportation planning have removed tens of thousands from their homes without due process or compensation.\(^4\) These projects are accelerating and their impacts increasing as the Olympic deadline approaches.

The multiple levels of authority and bureaucracy have created a kind of shell game, in which no one agency or individual is responsible for the impact of a given project. The International Olympic
Committee (IOC), for example, is focused only on the delivery of housing, transportation, brand protection and venues for its competition; it is not concerned with how these projects are developed, or their impacts on residents. The Comité Organizadora dos Jogos Olímpicos e Paralímpicos Rio de Janeiro 2016 (Rio 2016) is preoccupied with Games operations, not infrastructure development. Two governmental oversight organisations (the Autoridade Público Olímpico and Empresa Municipal Olímpica) are responsible for project delivery, but the city government has taken the lead on the transportation infrastructure that will link the nominal Olympic zones. These multi-layered interventions are predicated on the content of and subsequent changes to the Rio 2016 bid book – a document that was prepared behind closed doors and chosen as the winning bid in the October 2009 IOC session in Copenhagen. All these projects benefit elite sectors of Rio’s vast metropolitan area, while socialising the costs and localising the negative impacts in Rio’s poorest communities.

It may be that the experience of Brazil 2014 and Rio 2016 will mark both the interventionist apogee and the social nadir of the era of mega-event gigantism. The massive public protests that rocked Brazil have sent a strong signal to the international community: sports mega-events are not worth it. While it is yet to be seen what the public reaction to Rio 2016 will be, the declining number of cities that are willing to host the Summer and Winter Olympics is perhaps a sign that the protesters’ message has been heard. Unfortunately, the FIFA World Cup in Russia looks as if it will employ the same kinds of security measures, privatisations and suspensions of urban normalcy learnt from Brazil’s ‘successful’ World Cup.

At the heart of the mega-event problem is a lack of transparency in bidding and building, an absence of public participation and deliberation and an unequal sharing of the economic burden between hosts and rights holders. Because the IOC and FIFA are monopolistic rights holders that enforce strict financial,
political, infrastructural, security, communication and other requirements for their events, but are unwilling to pay for any of these, the result is that citizens, cities and countries are forced to pay so that others can play. 29 Global and local resistances to these processes have been growing for some time. 30 The bidding process continues to be as opaque and non-participatory as ever. As the Brazilian experience has shown, this has dire consequences for cities, for economies and for the guarantee of human rights.

Notes

1 Christopher Gaffney is a Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Geography, University of Zurich.
3 The CBF has been mired in corruption and malfeasance scandals for decades, controlling Brazilian football through nepotism and political favouritism. (Terra (Brazil), ‘Promotor confirma que MP entrará com Ação Civil Pública contra CBF’, 3 February 2014, http://esportes.terra.com.br/flamengo/,9c5a1bc3b59f3410VgnVCM2000099ceeb0aRCRD.html; Folha de S.Paulo (Brazil), ‘Receita Federal Multa a CBF Em R$ 3 Milhões Por Sonegação de Imposto de Renda’ 29 August 2010, www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/790573-receita-federal-multa-a-cbf-em-r-3-milhoes-porsonegacao-de-imposto-de-renda.shtml) The same individual who has used intimidation tactics to maintain power while limiting the development of Brazilian Olympic sports has dominated the COB for two decades (Blog Do Juca Kfouri (Brazil), ‘COB acusado de calote’22 January 2013, http://blogdojuca.uol.com.br/2013/01/cob-acusado-de-calote/; ESPN (Brazil), ‘Exclusivo: Confederação brasileira de esportes no gelo é perseguida pelo COB por não apoiar Nuzman’, 3 October 2012, http://m.espn.com.br/video/284999_exclusivo-confederacao-brasileira-de-esportes-no-gelo-e-perseguida-pelo-cob-por-nao-apoiar-nuzman).
9 Law no. 12.348, Lei que permite a alteração de limite de endividamento dos municípios envolvidos com a Copa 2014 e Olimpíadas 2016; www2.camara.gov.br/legin/fed/lei/2010/lei-12348-15-dezembro-2010-609683-


11 Christopher Gaffney, 'A World Cup for Whom? The Impact of the 2014 World Cup on Brazilian Football Stadiums and Cultures', in Paulo Fontes and Bernardo Buarque de Hollanda (eds.), The Country of Football: Politics, Popular Culture and the Beautiful Game in Brazil (London: Hurst, 2014), https://www.academia.edu/8528132/A_World_Cup_for_Whom_The_Impact_of_the_2014_World_Cup_on_Brazilian_Football_Stadiums_and_Cultures


13 The Guardian (UK), 'Brazil’s World Cup courts disaster as delays, protests and deaths mount', 16 February 2014.


19 O Globo Extra (Brazil), 'Paes decreta feriados e suspende obras durante a Copa', 12 March 2014.

20 O Globo (Brazil), 'Ingressos para futebol no Brasil são os mais caros do mundo, aponta pesquisa', 24 March 2013.


Terra (Colombia), 'El COI se impresiona con los avances de Río', 9 June 2012, http://deportes.terra.com.co/mas-deportes/el-coi-se-impresiona-con-los-avances-de-rio,f7717eb12b670310VgnVCM20000099f154d0RCRD.html.


