BUILDING ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS TO ACHIEVE SYSTEMIC CHANGE

QUERY

Could you provide an overview of what the literature says about the potential for civil society to build on social (protest) movements to achieve systemic change?

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SUMMARY

Over the past 10 years there has been a grassroots "eruption against corruption", led by a “coalition of the concerned” (including citizens, civil society organisations (CSOs), the private sector and government officials) fighting to curb corruption in their communities and countries (World Bank 2017).

There is some evidence that CSOs promoting good governance reforms are a necessary condition to translate anti-corruption campaigns and protests into sustainable reforms. In countries as diverse as Georgia, Brazil, India and Romania, organised civil society groups have been able to capitalise on spontaneous, visceral outpourings of citizen anger at high-profile corruption scandals as well as on more coherent social movements to achieve systemic change. This has been made possible by providing strategic leadership, direction and a sense of purpose to such movements. As such, harnessing popular social movements and joining forces in loose coalitions could be viewed as a viable strategy for CSOs seeking to achieve lasting change in the fight against corruption.

While there is no silver bullet to achieve such outcomes, a few lessons can be drawn from these examples. Developing a sound understanding of the local corruption context to be able to deploy appropriate tactics, harnessing the power of the media, building awareness and channelling the negative “outrage” into positive “hope” are some of the key lessons learned from the case studies of Georgia, Brazil, India and Romania explored in this answer.

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Civil society and social movements

A mobilised citizenry is a powerful counterweight to corrupt activities, and popular collective outrage has the potential to be channelled into strong anti-corruption initiatives (Martin 2012). Larsson (2016) lists a host of countries that have witnessed large-scale anti-corruption protests in 2016 alone, including but not limited to Brazil, Iraq, Haiti, Lebanon, Moldova, South Africa, Guatemala and Malaysia.

A common thread cutting across these diverse movements was the outrage that ordinary citizens felt, and Martin (2012) has argued that increasing and directing such public outrage should be a key objective of civil society anti-corruption campaigns. The pivotal question is how can these movements, driven by anger, be channelled into achieving long-term change. Strategic alliances between civil society and social movements may be one answer to this question.

While definitions of who and what constitutes a CSO can vary significantly (Chandhoke 2002; Laine 2014), a common characteristic is that they are organised expressions of civic political participation distinct from the state, which engage in formal political processes such as consultations on new laws or policies. They have been defined by Anderson and Parker (1964) as “a form of dynamic, pluralistic behaviour which progressively develops a structure through time and aims at partial or complete modification of the social order” (Shah 2017). Social movements, on the other hand, are typically more fragmentary and less formal.

As such, civil society groups can be seen at one end of a spectrum of collective action ranging from nascent protest movements to formalised or even institutionalised organisations. An interesting question is the extent to which groupings at different points along this spectrum can come to together to combine the dynamism and broad base of single-issue, flash-in-the-pan protest movements with the nous, connections and experience of more established organisations. Over time, if the often diffused and even centrifugal elements in social movements can be held together, such loose coalitions might have the potential to coalesce into more mature partnerships able to achieve lasting, systematic change. Organised civil society organisations can play an instrumental role in facilitating this process.

Indeed, while citizens and activists are generally on the frontline in social movements, Johnston (2012) notes that it is typically more organised civil society groups who translate reformist pressure into tangible results by negotiating with and around existing power structures. This is because civil society lends credibility to anti-corruption initiatives and uses its often-trusted position within communities to bring together otherwise disparate groups (Wheatland 2016). Thus, it acts through “social capital” – the capacity of people to act together willingly in their common long-term interest (Doraiswamy 2007). Civil society can adopt a variety of roles to foster this process Doraiswamy (2007):

- watchdog against the violation of human rights and governance deficiencies
- advocate of marginalised groups’ interests
- agitator on behalf of aggrieved citizens
- educator of citizens on their rights, entitlements and responsibilities on one hand and the government about the pulse of the people on the other
- service provider to areas and people not reached by official efforts or as the government’s agent
- mobiliser of public opinion for or against a programme or policy

The cases of women’s suffrage and civil rights in the United States, the Indian independence struggle, Greenpeace International’s environmental protection efforts, the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe, the challenge to Apartheid and the Arab Spring are examples of ordinary citizens banding together against the powerful, directed in many instances by organised civil society groups (Thörn 2006; Johnston 2012; Satell and Popovic 2017).

However, when it comes to anti-corruption movements, Johnston (2012) contends that examples of civil society playing an important role in pushing for sustainable, systemic change are few and far between, with Georgia being a notable success story. Thus, the need may be for civil society to tap into this under-exploited potential to use social protests for longer-term anti-corruption reforms.
The role of civil society in channelling social movements

The outpouring of citizen anger about grand corruption in the last decade or so – as seen in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere throughout the Arab Spring – lays down the gauntlet to the more organised expressions of the anti-corruption movement (Johnston 2012). It also poses a pertinent question as to whether anti-corruption CSOs can ride the wave of public anger, or whether they are viewed by these protest movements as part of the establishment, and consequently part of the problem. Naturally, the answer will be context-specific; as Grimes (2008) argues, the problem is not whether CSOs can participate in a larger process of checks and balances but rather under what conditions and in what capacity.

As efforts to control corruption are inherently political in nature and result in winners and losers (Johnston 2012), evidence shows that, in the absence of formal CSOs campaigning for reforms, sustainable improvement in anti-corruption outcomes is improbable and any gains made are likely to be short-lived. Mungiu-Pippidi (2013), for instance, stresses that the development of normative constraints capable of ensuring sustainable good governance is reliant on a virtuous combination of four elements:

- values (such as fairness and honesty)
- social capital (engaging in collective action around shared interests, purposes and values)
- civil society (network of voluntary associations)
- civic culture (sustained participation and political engagement of the people)

Moreover, boiler-plate anti-corruption tools typically fail when used in isolation, and even formal transparency (as indicated by a country having a freedom of information act, for instance) only becomes meaningful when it interacts with a healthy civil society able to make use of this framework (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013).

As such, it is apparent that civil society involvement is key to securing lasting improvements by shaping both societal attitudes and formalised anti-corruption frameworks. The question of anti-corruption campaigners’ tactics vis-à-vis mass movements is, however, less clear. Evidence suggests that anti-corruption approaches are most effective where they combine complementary (top-down and bottom-up) approaches (Chêne 2015).

Given this, theoretically at least, different reformist actors collaborating in an anti-corruption coalition could apply pressure at different levels to achieve systemic change. For example, while protest movements can mobilise a critical mass of citizens against a corrupt politician or even the entire political class, CSOs with established connections to the state institutions could be well-placed to distil this message into realistic and articulate demands (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013).

One would therefore expect that the chances for meaningful change are at their highest when civil society and broader social or protest movements act hand in glove in a concerted and sustained campaign. In practice, building trust between different reformist actors can be difficult, as formal CSOs with a history of working with governments may be seen as too close to the establishment by more radical protest movements.

Moreover, formal CSOs and protest movements may have divergent priorities, interests and incentives. While CSOs often have to be concerned about their funding, establishing a political dialogue all while battling the institutional framework as they push for systemic change, protest movements may be more inclined to target individuals and just want quick solutions (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013; Chenoy 2014; Chêne 2015).

Coalition building in such a scenario is made all the more fraught by issues as suggested by Johnston (2012) and Martini (2013):

- Setting out an agenda: the need for a distinct purpose becomes evident when unsuccessful movements are examined. For example, the Occupy movement “had plenty of grievances, aimed mainly at the ‘oppressive’ power of corporations”, but they “never got beyond their slogans”. Thus, it is not enough to point out only what is the cause of the outrage but also to formulate what the movement wants to achieve (Satell and Popovic 2017). Moreover, agenda setting in a coalition with a plethora of voices needs to be handled with tact (Satell and Popovic 2017).
- Demonstrating credibility: social movements are mainly comprised of a loose coalition of individuals. It is civil society that often organises these
coalitions into a solid force to be reckoned with. However, as mentioned, established civil society actors often carry with them the weight of existing biases and histories which, in turn, can make it difficult for protestors to trust them. Thus, it is imperative for a successful coalition to identify and band together its spectrum of allies to ensure a united front (Satell and Popovic 2017).

- Defining a governance structure: characteristics of social movements unable to realise their full potential are loose coalitions often without a clear plan of action and division of labour to see that plan through (Satell and Popovic 2017). Thus, solid change requires good planning and organisation (Martini 2013).

- Providing incentives to secure the participation of volunteers: long-term volunteer participation requires an upkeep of the momentum of motivation and making sure that the various forces within a movement are both kept in line with the agenda, and yet made to feel that their voices are represented. Therefore, cheap, easy-to-replicate, people-powered, low-risk tactics, which are most likely to succeed and offer short-term victories, go a long way to motivate volunteers (Satell and Popovic 2017).

Grimes (2008) suggests that civic engagements are more likely to succeed when a small number of professionalised organisations take the lead but can rely on a wider infrastructure of actors and organisations capable of generating broad-based citizen mobilisation when needed.

There are three major challenges to studying the impact of such disparate anti-corruption coalitions. First, there is a methodological challenge involved in measuring corruption and its evolution over time, which has been documented in a number of papers (see Knack 2006). The effects of social movements and civil society on corruption cannot be limited to a certain timeframe for study as these effects unfold in various fashions. It is only in hindsight that a particular effect may be traced back to a movement, which might have been recent or not. Since the “causality chain” between reform and eventual impact on corruption is long, there are no valid and reliable indicators that can indicate progress in the fight against corruption in the short term (Chêne 2015).

Second, how is systemic change defined in the context of anti-corruption coalitions? Such systemic changes could take place in different spheres – from the institutional to the attitudinal. Generally speaking, such change is likely to be reflected in adherence to the rule of law, effectiveness of prevention, detection and sanctioning of corrupt acts and declining tolerance of corruption in all its forms. As mentioned, measuring such incremental improvements is no mean feat, but for the purpose of this answer, systemic change shall be any lasting or continuing achievements that coalitions of civil society and protestors accomplished.

Finally, the evidence base is rather patchy, with Georgia being the standout contender of systemic success.

Thus, while this answer seeks to provide examples of CSOs building on social movements with the objective of effecting systemic changes, their involvement in the reduction of the level of corruption cannot be evaluated in quantitative terms.

2 CASE STUDIES OF COALITIONS

The success of a coalition is determined via a host of factors, broadly split into its own designs and operations and the contextual reality that it functions in (Upadhyay 2012; Martini 2014). As mentioned, a social movement is largely a loose coalition of individuals and CSOs that express public outrage at what they deem unjust. The following case studies pose as examples of formal CSOs harnessing this raw energy of protests and reformist movements.

Though these various campaigns have differing degrees of success, and in some cases their effects are still unfolding, they adequately highlight this need for protests to transform into more formal coalitions to achieve systemic change in the way corruption operates in a given milieu.

In Brazil, CSOs first formalised their structures and then proactively sought support from ordinary citizens. In India, a people’s mass movement united around a charismatic leader, organised itself as a formal movement that later evolved into a political party to advocate for reforms. More recently, Romanians have discovered that mass peaceful protests can go a long way to achieving change.
Georgia

The Rose Revolution

Georgia's Rose Revolution of November 2003 was effectively the first bloodless change of power in the history of the Caucasus region (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007). Political turmoil, armed conflicts, widespread corruption and the growth of organised crime and smuggling in post-Soviet Georgia were rampant (Kukhianidze 2009). Deeply corrupt networks, dubbed "Kanonieri kurdebi" (thieves-in-law), had captured the state, and the unchecked entry of criminal elements into the government and law-enforcement structures caused a profound political crisis in the country (Kukhianidze 2009).

Drawing on the popular discontent against the incumbent government, the glaring falsification of the November 2003 parliamentary poll, civil society, made up of an alliance of political parties, NGOs and leading elements of the free media, forced the then-president Shevardnadze, whose rule led to a rise in corruption, to resign 20 days after he was elected (Broers 2005; Kukhianidze 2009).

The peaceful protest movement, however, saw civil society ultimately sweep to power as the Rose Revolutionaries won the subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections (Broers 2005), which established the United National Movement as the dominant ruling party (Angley 2013).

Although the newly elected parliament and government inherited a host of socio-economic issues, the overall assessment of governmental activities at first glance by the CEE Bankwatch Network (2007) was deemed "amazing" in terms of what followed. In the immediate years after the revolution, the country's budget began to increase dramatically, laws supporting economic liberalisation were adopted with ease and Georgia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, declaring European and Euro-Atlantic integration as its foremost priority (Chipashvili 2007).

While certain governance issues endure, government transparency has shown signs of improvement in recent years (Freedom House 2016).

Civil society coalition

When examining civil society's contribution to the developments that culminated in Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation, assessments often fall into one of two traps (Angley 2013). First, studies often assert that civil society was a factor but fail to provide sufficient evidence regarding civic groups' specific contribution to the process. Second, they tend to focus almost exclusively on either Kmara (Enough), the Georgian youth organisation that became the face of the revolution, or the funding that influential NGOs received (Angley 2013).

Although Kmara was created to influence the 2003 election, the main actors behind Kmara were civic groups that had a much longer history than the short campaign period during which Kmara emerged on the scene (Broers 2005 Angley 2013).

Angley (2013) opines that the Kmara youth movement was a tight-knit set of NGOs, several of which had been operating as human rights organisations or thinktanks since the mid-1990s. The earliest manifestation of the student group, Kmara, was "midwifed" by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Liberty Institute, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), the Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) and the Association for Law and Public Education (ALPE) (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007; Angley 2013). These organisations were instrumental in facilitating the creation of both material and networking opportunities for Kmara (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007).

The Liberty Institute was responsible for coordination with the political opposition, training young activists, regional outreach, and public relations (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007). The Liberty Institute was also the driving force behind the Kmara youth movement and was so intimately involved in every aspect of its operations that one observer characterised the youth group as “essentially a Liberty Institute invention” (M. Mullen, personal communication to Angley, April 12, 2008) (Angley 2013).

Kmara was mainly funded by the Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF), and was rumoured to

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1 The USA alone contributed US$3 million in election support, while the remainder of the international community added a further US$1 million (Broers 2005).
have received amounts ranging from US$175,000 to US$500,000 (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007; Broers 2005 Angley 2013).

The movement was perhaps the best example of the extensive degree of collaboration among civic groups that occurred in preparation for the parliamentary elections. These cooperative efforts involved various NGOs, the Rustavi 2 television station (which provided the maximum media coverage for the movement), as well as opposition political parties like the National Movement Party, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, and the Burjanadze Democrats led by Nino Burjanadze, the speaker of parliament.

The interplay of the activities of all the CSOs working towards a common cause was displayed in the day-to-day functioning of the movement. The Liberty Institute sent Kmara activists to Serbia to meet with members of Otpor, and Otpor activists conducted training courses for students on techniques of non-violent protest at which NDI’s Mark Mullen served as an instructor (McKinnon 2007). Lawyers from GYLA defended Kmara activists on occasions when they were detained during protests, as were lawyers from the ALPE under the leadership of Gigi Ugulava (Kandelaki and Meladze, 2007; Angley 2013). Kmara even ran a series of OSGF-sponsored commercials on Rustavi 2 television channel that depicted Shevardnadze’s bloc as a group of corrupt officials.

Protest model and strategies

Georgia’s adoption of an "electoral revolution model," rekindled hope that democracy could triumph in both the country and the region in the post-Soviet period (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007; Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Angley 2013). This model was borrowed from the Serbian Otpor (resistance) student protests of 2000 to oust the then Serbian president (Angley 2013). This model was borrowed from the Serbian Otpor (resistance) student protests of 2000 to oust the then Serbian president (Angley 2013). Angley (2013) states that Georgian civil society went on to become an indispensable base for the revolution by deploying various strategies concurrently that contributed to its success and sustainability including:

- **Flat hierarchy structure**
  A united opposition front was asserted by promoting an informal horizontal hierarchy that kept the movement going even if the top activists were arrested (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007).

- **Media support**
  An important contributing factor was accessing pro-opposition media outlets like the Rustavi 2, which helped garner considerable attention for the cause (Jones 2006; Angley 2013). Critics of the Rose Revolution have insisted that a whole range of ploys were used to “create the revolution” on television, at least in the earlier stages of protest (Broers 2005). These include the intelligent use of camera angles, moving the same crowd to different locations and attaching other parties’ insignia to National Movement buses to give the impression of a wider support base (Broers 2005).

- **Providing for accountability mechanisms for social change**
  Tools for accountability, in the form of extensive election monitoring efforts, agenda setting and awareness-raising activities implemented on both a national and international level were prepared. ISFED deployed some 2,300 observers while GYLA deployed 500 (Broers 2005). ISFED also executed the country’s first parallel vote tabulation (PVT), an alternative vote count that would present a means to verify or contradict the official vote tally (Angley 2013). The importance of the PVT lay in its capacity to establish that fraud had taken place in this particular election (Angley 2013). After the election, ISFED’s PVT results provided opposition politicians with concrete statistical evidence that the government had manipulated the vote on a grand scale. Youth activists even distributed leaflets announcing the PVT results to draw more supporters to the protests (Wheatley 2005; Angley 2013).

- **Awareness raising**

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2 Otpor was initially founded to resist the regime’s repression of universities after the University Law in late May 1998 restricted Belgrade University’s autonomy and free expression. Otpor shifted its focus, however, to ousting the then Serbian President Milosevic, leaving other issues at the margins until that primary objective was achieved. The strategy to achieve this was to transform the political culture; as Srđja Popovic, one of the movement’s founders put it, it was Otpor’s “ambition is to change the political consciousness of the ‘Serbian populace’” (Kurtz 2010).
“Get-out-the-vote” initiatives, aimed at raising public awareness about the elections and at encouraging active participation in voting (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007), were deployed. This was largely executed by Kmaru but supported by the OSGF and the ISFED (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007; Angley 2013). A variety of activities were carried out within the framework of the programme, such as television advertisements, concerts, sports competitions and the distribution of posters and t-shirts (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007).

Peaceful protests

Large-scale peaceful demonstrations (Angley 2013) were conducted. “Clean Up Your Street – Clean Up Your Country” became the battle cry for the peaceful protestors (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007). The countrywide network of the movement was used to run “chain-campaigns” (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007). At its peak, the protest reached 20,000 standing outside parliament (Zhvania 2003). The revolution, in fact, derives its name from the decisive moment when demonstrators, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, who was subsequently elected president, stormed the parliament session with red roses in hand.

Civic groups also fulfilled various other democratic roles. They encouraged active involvement with political topics and helped to develop new leaders, many of who served in Saakashvili’s government. A few notable examples include Zurab Tchiaberashvili (ISFED) who became chief of the Central Electoral Commission within 10 days of the Rose Revolution, Alexander Lomaia (OSGF) was named education minister, and Vano Merabishvili (a former member of parliament with close ties to the Liberty Institute) was named secretary of the National Security Council (Angley 2013). Today, the Georgian parliament has a due process to have regular meetings with NGOs (Freedom House 2016).

The same electoral revolution model went on to be used in the Ukraine Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Kyrgyzstan Tulip Revolution in 2005, and these three successful anti-regime efforts came to be collectively known as the Colour Revolutions (Angley 2013).

Overall, the success of the civic groups was due to the collaborative strategies they deployed and the media help they sought out (Kandelaki and Meladze 2007; Broers 2005). However, the role inadvertently played by Shevardnadze should not be overlooked, as he nurtured a political climate, which drove disgruntled citizens to the opposition groups (Broers 2005; Kukhianidze 2009).

Brazil

Birth of the Ficha Limpa

Brazil, the fifth largest country of the world, is tied with Belarus, India, and China at 79 out of 176 countries in the 2016 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and ranks 140 out of 180 in the 2017 Heritage Index of Economic Freedom.

Corruption in Brazil is often taken to be a fact of life (Glickhouse 2011). Beer (2016) reports a widespread belief in the Brazil that “corruption is cultural”, and that a “corrupt mind set” is the principal driver of widespread and scandalous illicit acts that have rocked the country over the past few years. Beyerle (2014) likewise notes that a common expression in Brazil, “rouba, mas faz” (“he steals, but he gets things done”) is testament to the general resignation and tolerance of corruption.

Thus, like many countries of the world, it was not unusual for candidates competing for political office in Brazil to have a criminal record (Panth 2012). In 2010, for instance, 147 out of the 513 members of congress in Brazil either faced criminal charges or were under investigation (The Economist 2010; Panth 2012). It was the same for 21 of the 81 senators, and most of the accused were involved in flouting campaign finance laws or abusing public money through corrupt behaviour (Panth 2012).

A popular people’s movement emerged with the aim of putting an end to the political class’s apparent impunity (Panth 2011). In April 2008, 44 CSOs came together to establish a non-partisan coalition called the Movement Against Electoral Corruption (MCCE) with a simple yet sweeping objective: “to prevent individuals with criminal backgrounds from running for elected office at all levels of government” (Beyerle 2014).

MCCE’s composition included various forms of CSOs, such as the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil (CNBB), the Brazilian Justice and Peace Commission (CBJP), the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB),
grassroots organisations linked to the Catholic Church, trade unions and other professional groups – for example, nursing, accounting and biology organisations (Beyerle 2014). To meet its simple yet challenging objective, the MCCE partnered with Avaaz, a worldwide digital movement with the goal of bringing “people-powered politics to decision-making everywhere” (Beyerle 2014; Avaaz 2017). With this, the Ficha Limpa (Clean Slate) movement was born.

**Strategies deployed**

The path to achieving this goal was not an easy one, as the eligibility criteria for bills being submitted by citizens are stringent in Brazil, requiring the collection of handwritten, documented signatures from a minimum of 1 per cent of the electorate spread across at least five different states (Beyerle 2014). Only then could the proposed legislation be submitted to the congress, where it would be reviewed by applicable committees and then passed in both the chamber of deputies and the senate (Beyerle 2014). Once these hurdles were cleared, the law has to be presented to the president, who could choose to veto it. Finally, the law has to receive validation from the supreme court (Beyerle 2014).

MCCE had its work cut out to achieve its vision of cleaning up Brazilian politics. Its members realised that to change cultural attitudes to corruption and vote buying they would have to deploy the following strategies:

**Mobilisation of citizens**

The population was directly involved in the process (Beyerle 2014). Formal CSOs encouraged the wider population to accomplish systemic change, launching the Ficha Limpa movement with the slogan, “A vote has no price, it has consequences” (Voto não tem preço, tem consequências) (Panth 2011; Beyerle 2014). Through this, MCCE’s campaign was able to draw legitimacy from the fact that regular citizens owned it. One politician commented that it was “easier for a cow to fly than this initiative to get approved in Brazil” (Beyerle 2014). MCCE understood that without massive civic mobilisation, it was unlikely that the Ficha Limpa law would ever be passed, and that is when they sought a partnership with Avaaz.

**Online tactics**

Massive online (managed by Avaaz) as well as offline (managed by MCCE) campaigns were used, framing Ficha Limpa as an issue that no one would dare oppose by mobilising sustained and overwhelming public pressure along with positive media attention (Beyerle 2014; Panth 2012). The campaign also raised support from within congress by partnering with sympathetic politicians and those who saw personal political opportunity in the movement. Thus, during the parliamentary process, attempts at thwarting and delaying the bill’s passage were mitigated (Beyerle 2014).

**A united alliance**

A national civic alliance was built, mobilising people, developing relationships with honest politicians and other powerholders. Avaaz campaigner Tanaka credits the MCCE for taking the struggle to a point where citizens already wanted to participate by the time that Avaaz got involved, setting the foundation for its digital resistance (Beyerle 2014).

**Small campaigns adding-up**

The campaign maintained several mini-campaigns to engage and mobilise ordinary citizens, as well as politicians and legislators, through regular email messages, direct phone calls to legislators and constantly posting alerts to social media platforms like Facebook and Orkut (Beyerle 2014).

**Seeking institutional legitimacy**

The movement also sought support and institutional validation from the Catholic Church, which is a predominant force in shaping the opinions of a large section of Brazilian citizens (Beyerle 2014).

**Impact**

By the end of the campaign, 1.6 million signatures had been manually collected, and there were further three million online supporters of the bill (Panth 2011). In June 2010, two years after the start of popular initiative, the president of Brazil signed the Ficha Limpa bill into law (Panth 2011).

Even before the bill was approved, the movement compelled several politicians to step down. For example, a deputy of the Brazilian Workers Party who
was being investigated for at least 20 transgressions, including the embezzlement of public funds announced his resignation on Twitter (Panth 2012).

The day after the law went into effect, there were widespread protests against officials suspected of criminal activity (Panth 2012). Beyond questions around the enforcement of or compliance with the law, it is believed that the campaign has had some effect in changing the electorate’s attitudes and by extension their voting patterns (Panth 2012; Beyerle 2014).

The ripples of the Ficha Limpa movement are still felt in Brazil. This may be validated by the subsequent waves of mass protests against corruption that started in São Paulo in 2013 against a R$0.20 (US$0.06) increase in public transportation fares, slowly grew to a massive collection of demonstrations in 100 Brazilian cities bringing around 1 million to the streets for reasons ranging from corruption to generally poor public healthcare and education (The Economist 2013; ERCAS 2015). In 2016, Brazilian political parties implicated in the massive Petrobras corruption scandal, including that of President Michel Temer, suffered major setbacks in municipal elections showing that voters were capitalising on their collective power (Boadle 2016).

India

India (joint 79 in the 2016 CPI) suffers from extensive and varied forms of corruption (Singh and Sohoni 2016; Transparency International 2017). Corruption is also widespread and extends far beyond the political class and public sector to virtually every sphere (Banerjee 2011). A symbiotic relationship between bribe giving (by common citizens seeking civic facilities, or in urgent need of immediate relief) and individual bribe taking (by petty government functionaries, private school managers, property dealers, or hospital staff) has formed across the social strata (Banerjee 2011). Despite this, grand corruption and huge scams involving public money still have the power to exercise and anger citizens.

The Jan Andolan (people’s movement) and the India Against Corruption (IAC) campaign

Around 2011, the central government was rocked by a series of scandals, and the 2010 Commonwealth Games scam was one that particularly aggrieved Indian citizens.

By 2011, the mood of the citizenry in India had reached boiling point, and hundreds of thousands united around the figurehead of Anna Hazare, a Gandhian activist, who chose that moment to launch his campaign for a Jan Lokpal Bill (people’s ombudsman bill) under the auspices of the India Against Corruption Jan Andolan (people’s movement) (Banerjee 2011; Singh and Sohoni 2011). Supporters of the Jan Lokpal Bill argued that the current laws were inadequate in light of the large number and size of scandals in India (Singh and Sohoni 2011).

The anti-corruption campaign, bombastically labelled the “second freedom struggle”, spread quickly across the country by mid-2011 with peaceful protests taking place, involving student bodies, prominent bureaucrats, corporate groups, film industry representatives and even a few politicians coming forward to support the movement publicly (Kurian 2012).

The Jan Andolan serves as a classic example of showcasing how a popular reformist movement that appeared sporadically was brought under the guidance of the formal civil society. Ultimately, it was civil society veterans who consolidated both the movement, in terms of its operations and hierarchy, and posited themselves as the medium of communication between the thousands of protestors around the country and the government (Banerjee 2011; Kurian 2012; NDTV 2011). Thus, the formalised and organised India Against Corruption (IAC) was called into existence with a mandate to run the movement.

The government acceded to the demands of the movement and added five external representatives to the ten-member drafting committee of the law. The

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3 The corrupt directors of Brazil’s national oil company, Petrobras, from the leftist Workers’ Party (PT), secretly diverted funds valued at up to 3 per cent of all contracts to the PT and its coalition partners. Some of the directors accumulated funds of more than US$100m in Swiss bank accounts (Leahy 2016).

4 According to I Paid a Bribe, the value of bribes reported on the site stands at ₹2875 crores (US$446 million).

5 The Central Vigilance Commission, responsible for investigating the alleged corruption, found discrepancies in tender payments to non-existent parties, willful delays in completion of contracts, inflated prices in the purchasing of equipment through tendering, and misappropriation of funds (Arora 2015).
were chosen from among prominent leaders of the IAC who had been long-standing figures in Indian civil society (NDTV 2011). These five leaders of the IAC represented the entire mass movement involving millions across the nation at the drafting table. They included Hazare, Santosh Hegde – a former justice of the Supreme Court of India – Arvind Kejriwal – a right to information activist – Shanti Bhushan – a former law minister – and Prashant Bhushan – a prominent lawyer (NDTV 2011).

The original IAC movement has subsequently split into two factions, with one forming a political party called Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) under the leadership of Arvind Kejriwal, who was the second in command at the IAC after Hazare. While the Gandhian believed that his movement did not need be politicised, Kejriwal opined that he needed to be a part of the political system to bring about the desired change. Hence, he and others from the IAC (including but not limited to Kumar Vishwas, Manish Sisodia, Prashant Bhushan, Sanjay Singh) branched out of the social movement and formally launched the AAP on 26 November 2012 (Elections 2017).

AAP carved a niche for alternative politics in India when, in its electoral debut in 2013, it unseated the Congress party stronghold in the state of Delhi (Rai 2017). Thus, a spontaneous movement, initially lead by an individual activist, led to an organised movement under the IAC banner and eventually diversified and evolved into a political party.

**Strategies**

Hazare’s and the IAC strategies were largely based on the Gandhian principles of Satyagraha (civil and non-violent resistance) (Sezhiyan 2011). The tactics the movement used were:

**Mass protests**

The IAC organised and managed mass protests across 40 cities in India, as well as New York City, Washington DC and Los Angeles (where Indian expatriates rallied) (Solo 2014). Elites and ordinary citizens participated alongside the activist groups (Kurian 2012).

**Deploying “brand Anna”**

Hazare, with his fast until death, embraced Gandhian principles of non-violent resistance, and his arrest in 2011 created a massive groundswell of support for the IAC (Solo 2014).

**Media management**

IAC successfully managed to leverage support from both television and social media. The IAC’s Facebook page was a tool of communication that kept the masses informed about the movement and the next steps, and the IAC core team also uploaded pictures of the rallies. There were also media coordinators within the movement (Manish Sisodia and Shazia Ilmi) who took charge of how the movement was to be portrayed (Solo 2014). The IAC’s Facebook page, founded in 2010, today has 1,280,563 and it still operational, highlighting corruption issues in India (Facebook 2017).

**Civil society alliance**

While the leadership of the movement was clearly defined under the IAC, it still coordinated with a wide network of educational organisations and formal CSOs across the nation (Solo 2014).

**Development of an “us versus them” rhetoric**

Civil society under team Anna was painted as good and those against the IAC were painted bad (Solo 2014). This created peer and social pressure for collective action considerably cutting down the “free riders” problem.

**Outcomes**

The final version of the law received presidential assent on 1 January 2014 and came to be known as the Lokpal and Lokayukta Act of 2014 (L&L Act).

The L&L Act 2014 provisions called for the establishment of a body called the Lokpal at the central level to handle complaints of corruption against multiple sections of public servants and commission enquiries, investigations and prosecutions, as warranted (Johri 2014). The Lokpal would have responsibility for processing corruption complaints against the prime minister, ministers, members of parliament, officers of the central government (all levels), representatives of any entity that is wholly or partly financed by the government with an annual
income above a specified limit, and also, all entities receiving donations from foreign sources in excess of 1,000,000 rupees (US$15,500) per year (Johri 2014).

Although the passage of the law is lauded as a significant achievement on the part of civil society, it has been critiqued on various levels and is yet to be implemented by the new Bharatiya Janta Party government that came to power on a platform of creating a corruption-free India (Johri and Bhardwaj 2017).

As for AAP, it is grappling with its own issues and seems to have missed the opportunity to position itself as the principal opposition to the BJP (Rai 2017). The anti-graft activist, Anna Hazare, has hinted at starting another mass agitation to protest the Narendra Modi-led BJP government’s alleged apathy in failing to appoint the Lokpal even after three years in power (Banerjee 2017). Nevertheless, the magnitude of the campaign and its achievements to bring corruption as an issue to the forefront and garner systemic change in India should be given due credit. With the birth and relative success of AAP in gaining national importance, the one thing the movement did achieve was to show that once consolidated, people power can lead to systemic changes over a period of time.

**Romania**

Having joined the European Union in 2007, Romania was deemed to be making slow but steady progress towards curbing corruption with its powerful Anti-Corruption Directorate (Paun and Gurzu 2017). However, this advancement was at risk of being undermined by a decree passed by the incumbent government earlier this year. The move sparked citizen outrage in the country and led to the largest public demonstrations in Romania since 1989, when a mass uprising led to the collapse of the Ceausescu regime (One Young World 2017; Paun and Gurzu 2017).

**Mass protests**

Corruption has become the central political issue in the country, which is ranked 57 in the CPI (Clark 2017; Transparency International 2017). The emergency decree passed by the incumbent government of the Social Democratic Party would have made official misconduct punishable by incarceration only in those cases in which the economic damage is more than US$47,000, threatening to overturn limited progress in the country’s anti-corruption efforts (Karasz 2017).

More than 600,000 Romanians took to the streets to protest the law (that was even criticised by the president), furious at the self-serving character of the government’s intentions (Karasz 2017; One Young World 2017; Clark 2017). Liviu Dragnea, the leader of the governing Social Democratic Party (PSD), who is currently banned from ministerial office following a conviction for ballot rigging, is among those who stood to benefit from this law as he faces charges of abuse of power involving a sum of US$25,800 (Clark 2017; Karasz 2017). This proposal to decriminalise corruption offences requiring a value threshold threatened to create a category of acceptable theft, which would be disastrous for a country that loses an estimated US$16-33 billion to corruption each year (Clark 2017).

The protests, mainly mobilised by the youth to express their dissatisfaction with political decisions, have their origin in the on-going struggle taking place within Romanian society over corruption, social inequality and inept policies (Margarit 2017).

The success of the movement is reflected in the fact that, by the sixth day of the protests, the government had repealed the controversial decree (Carmen and Gurzu 2017). Moreover, Romania’s parliament has agreed to hold a referendum on fighting official corruption following pressure from the ensuing public protests (French 2017).

**A golden opportunity for civil society?**

Romania is currently at a crossroads and running the risk that it will become trapped in a “debilitating state of political warfare over the issue of corruption unless a new national consensus emerges about how to tackle it” (Clark 2017). The fight is far from over, as Clark suggests, as the government is set to reintroduce the same decree in a legislative bill, while the opposition remains angry and mobilised. Such a situation requires a strong civil society to leverage the momentum created during the mass protests to usher in meaningful change.

What Romania is witnessing is the emergence of a civil society needed to use this mass anger and
channel it towards better corruption control (Margarit 2017). The country’s example shows that the anti-corruption fight is an on-going process that may not always have clear-cut victories. However, this should not undermine the efforts of the civil society acting in congruence with the larger social base. Indeed, the Romanian example is said to have inspired civic action in other countries (Ciobanu 2017), notably Slovakia, where thousands of students took to the streets to protest corruption and secretive business-government relations. The protests received backing from civil society, liberal media and even the Slovak President Andrej Kiska (Tamkin 2017; Kalan 2017).

3 BUILDING ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS – RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CIVIL SOCIETY

Collaboration between broad social movements and civil society can be mutually beneficial and help to achieve systemic change, as seen the examples of Georgia, Brazil and India. Where social movements and civil society share a common objective in addressing corruption, there are a few recommendations that can be drawn from the literature regarding how both groups can act in concert effectively.

A common refrain in the literature is that a simultaneous top-down and bottom-up approach may be imperative (Beyerle 2014; Chêne 2015; Hough 2013). This suggests that a coordinated division of labour between civil society and social movements could be effective, focusing on their respective strengths and avoiding duplicating their efforts. As a broad social movement mobilises citizens to bring pressure to bear on the government, organised civil society can exploit its established position to make specific recommendations to government on what key reforms need to be enacted.

Lessons drawn from the cases

A detailed analysis of the case studies mentioned above acquaints us with a range of contexts, strategies and outcomes. While Georgia was a clear success story, Brazil and India experienced short-term successes and still have a long way to go. On the other hand, Romania witnessed a protest movement with potential that does not yet appear to have been capitalised on by the civil society.

A common thread running through all these cases is that, when it comes to bottom-up approaches, building and sustaining broad coalitions encompassing organised CSOs, protestors, journalists and, in some cases, opposition politicians may be the key to unlocking systemic change.

Collective action and coalition building are intensive exercises. The success of a coalition depends to a great extent on its capacity to effectively articulate, plan, mobilise, and campaign/advocate for its ideals and goals. This requires great leadership, managerial and technical skills (Martini 2014). While there are a host of recommendations, the crucial ones are as follows:

1) Anti-corruption civic initiatives can either precede or follow in the wake of democracy movements. However, the multiple benefits of a united collaboration should never be undermined (Beyerle 2014). Unity of several organisations also increases the diversity of dissent, and coalitions are effective means to amplify impact as seen in the Rose Revolution and Ficha Limpa movement (Martini 2013; Beyerle 2014).

2) Understanding the political context and conditions in which corruption operates is imperative for a civic engagement’s success. To help in understand such concepts, when examining the relationship between the supply side of corruption and civic engagement, Bauhr (2016) suggests that need corruption leads to indignation and engagement, while greed corruption instead tends to breed a withdrawal from attempts to influence the state of affairs. Thus, instances of need corruption ought to be used as a fuel for public outrage as seen in the anti-corruption movements of Georgia, Brazil, India and Romania which were largely a response to such a form of corruption.

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6 Bauhr (2016) suggest that citizens are more likely to engage in the fight against corruption when corruption is needed to gain access to “fair” treatment (need corruption) as opposed to special illicit advantages (greed corruption). Using data from the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the study suggest that need corruption mobilises citizens, in particular, if they perceive that fellow citizens will also engage, while greed corruption leads to secrecy, demobilisation, and a propensity to “free ride” on other citizens’ anti-corruption efforts.
3) Specific, clear and inspiring objectives, a clear-cut plan for the movement, and a well organised and defined governance structure, as well as incentives for stakeholders are necessary to engage citizens, produce evident outcomes, gain incremental victories and build an overall track record of success (Martini 2013; Beyerle 2014). Coalitions involving professional CSOs that doggedly seek and compile information, file claims and put pressure on institutions of horizontal accountability are more likely to succeed than the loosely held social movements (Grimes 2008). The Ficha Limpa and Rose Revolutions are good examples here.

4) Legitimacy and credibility stemming from collective responsibility, an honest image, joint ownership of the struggle, and a discourse that resonates with the public is fundamental to any civic movement (Beyerle 2014). Civic action without mobilisation of identified stakeholders is meaningless (Martini 2013; Beyerle 2014). This is to be achieved using mass actions, framing the struggle and emboldening individual acts of defiance (Beyerle 2014). The India Against Corruption movement adopted this model during its campaign.

5) Successful bottom-up civic initiatives targeting corruption are built upon existing social foundations, including social structures and relationships, prevailing culture, and the history of the struggle. Thus, efficient and credible strategies, tactics and the discourse, should resonate with home-grown settings, rather than from externally developed, formulaic approaches to citizen engagement (Beyerle 2014). A similar view is held by Hough who suggests unique “menus” catering to individual anti-corruption needs (Hough 2013). In each of the case studies, a common link was a connection with the masses that was achieved by tapping into the dormant and explicit anger around corruption.

6) The strategy of a movement must translate into action. Disrupting systems of graft and abuse, weakening those systems from the inside by pulling people from within the system towards civic action, and applying non-violent pressure to change the status quo are some tactics that may be applied (Beyerle 2014). Beyerle defines four tactical methods:

- Disruption: depending on the struggle context, disruption tactics may vary. For example, public pledges can constitute tactics of disruption as well as engagement. Behavioural pledges to desist from corrupt activities can potentially disrupt the systems of graft and abuse. The signatures of Brazil’s Ficha Limpa movement serve an as example of such tactics.

- Engagement: mobilising large swathes of people is not the same as keeping them engaged in the cause and outcomes of the movement. Volunteers must feel that they are contributing to something larger than themselves, as seen in the case of Georgia, India and Romania.

- Empowerment: the transformation of dormant people power into a force to reckon with relies on the empowerment of the masses. The IAC movement widely used this tactic of empowering all with a sense of owning the movement.

- Additional delineation for defining methods: Beyerle argues that, based on the situation, a movement should have its goal, structure and methods well described so as to facilitate efficiency and clarity.

7) Harnessing the Gandhian precept of non-cooperation with oppressors applies equally well to fighting graft and abuse as seen in the India Against Corruption movement.

8) Advantage ought to be taken of top-down, institutional tools and mechanisms, such as laws, judicial processes and anti-corruption bodies to obtain information and resist crackdowns (Beyerle 2014). The Rose Revolutions used the media to stay safe from government repression, and the Ficha Limpa and IAC mobilised supporters within the government.

9) While getting the media on board is a part of various other tactics and recommendations, it deserves singular recognition. Media involvement can legitimise both the cause of the movement and the movement itself (Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2012). As seen in Georgia, it was certain media outlets which depicted the movement in rather grander terms than what it initially represented. The cases of India, Brazil and Romania show the effectiveness of the media as a mobilising tool. Thus, having the media on the movement’s side helps in tapping into latent people power.
10) Education, training and awareness building contributes to building capacity, resilience, and citizen confidence, courage and hope, thereby affecting systemic change (Martini 2013; Beyerle 2014). All case studies have exhibited this need.

11) Lastly, anti-corruption struggles by nature are born out of dispiriting circumstances: high levels of corruption (Beyerle 2014). Thus, a predominant lesson for civic movements is to reframe this discourse by balancing the negatives that fuel anger (oppression, injustice, suffering) with positives (collective empowerment, material outcomes, hope, incremental victories, and affinity for one’s community, country, or entities and groups fighting corruption and seeking accountability) (Beyerle 2014; Satell and Popovic 2017). Once again, all the case studies reflect this.

Ultimately, people power, backed by civil society is a formidable force that constructively confronts injustice while seeking engagement and effecting long-term change (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013; Beyerle 2014). Civil society can play a central role in such efforts, not by seeking to monopolise ownership of the struggle but by helping to provide social movements with a sense of ambition yet feasible objectives, strategic approaches to planning the campaign and helping to negotiate with existing institutions to translate popular demands into concrete achievements.

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