The Helpdesk is a knowledge service offering the TI network and selected stakeholders on-demand research on corruption within 10 days. It is a key component of TI’s Anti-corruption Solutions and Knowledge Programme (ASK).

All answers listed below are accessible on the Chapter Zone: https://ticz.transparency.org/Working_Together/ask/ or on request at: tihelpdesk@transparency.org.

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ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS

Regulating the legal profession
Question submitted by TI Ireland, December 2011, Nr 2011/57

Regulating the legal profession aims at promoting public interest in the provision of efficient, accessible and ethical legal services as well as at providing avenues of redress for consumers. This can contribute to building efficient judiciary, avoiding judicial corruption as well as corruption in business transactions. Regulations of the legal profession have to address issues that affect consumers, guarantee that the highest ethical standards are in place as well as ensure independence to legal practitioners. This can be done either by direct government regulation, by rules adopted by self-regulatory professional bodies or a combination of both. Experts usually recommend using a combination of both approaches to promote both the interests of consumers of legal services and the independence of legal practitioners.

Asset declaration for politicians
Question submitted by TI Germany, November 2011, Nr 2011/55

Asset declaration regimes aim at preventing conflicts of interest among public officials and members of the government and avoiding illicit enrichment or other illegal activities by monitoring wealth variations of individual politicians and civil servants. In the absence of agreed international standards on asset disclosure requirements, a set of core principles should be considered: asset disclosure regimes should cover the leadership of the three
government branches; they should clearly define who should declare what to whom, at which frequency; they should cover a wide range of issues – income, gifts, assets, liabilities, conflict of interest; they should be publicly available; and they should establish a credible review mechanism and applicable sanctions for failure to declare.

Regulations on loans in the funding of political parties
Question submitted by TI Georgia, December 2011, Nr 2011/20

The increasing costs of election campaigns and party operations combined with stricter rules on political funding have made parties and individual candidates look for alternative sources of funding, including loans. While loans can be a legitimate source of funding, they can also be used to cover illegal private donations (e.g. if they are not repaid, or if they are agreed under advantageous conditions). Countries are slowly closing the gap and have started regulating under which circumstances and from whom candidates and parties are allowed to take loans.

Entities related to political parties
Question submitted by TI Georgia, December 2011, Nr 2011/19

Political parties can use other institutions as conduits for funds or services, often referred to as affiliated organisations or third parties as a way to circumvent party finance regulations. Affiliated entities are organisations that are related to political parties, such as research institutes, interest groups, trade unions or political foundations. Although financial transactions between parties and their affiliated organisations occur frequently, the majority of countries still do not regulate them. Against this background, the Council of Europe calls for countries to apply their legislation on political parties also to entities directly or indirectly affiliated to them and also to require that political parties include in their annual account and campaign reports the activities taken by these entities.

Disclosure requirements for contributors to political parties
Question submitted by TI Georgia, November 2011, Nr 2011/17

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) calls for state parties to take measures to enhance transparency in political finance. Disclosure requirements for parties and candidates are essential to achieve such transparency. Besides provisions requiring political parties and individual candidates to disclose the donations they receive, a few countries such as Australia, Ireland and Bulgaria have also adopted reporting and disclosure requirements for companies and individuals who have donated to political parties or candidates.

The impact of banning legal entities’ donations to political parties
Question submitted by TI Georgia, November 2011, Nr 2011/18

The relations between party financing and corruption, particularly the excess of private money in politics, have been addressed in several countries through internal party reforms and legislative measures. Poland, Portugal, France and Belgium, have restricted donations from legal entities in an attempt to curb political corruption and reduce the dependence on private financing. There is little evidence of the impact of such regulations on transparency in party finance. Country case studies indicate that while a ban on legal entities donations to political parties provide disincentives for corrupt practices, it is not sufficient to enhance transparency and effectiveness on party finance in a country. There need to be accompanied by other measures such as disclosure, and an independent oversight body.

Domestic and international legislation on facilitation payments
Question submitted by TI-S, November 2011, Nr 2011/15

Facilitation payments are usually defined as any facilitating or expediting payment to a public official in order to expedite or secure the performance of a routine governmental action. They are illegal in almost all countries. However, the USA and some other countries provide an exception for ‘facilitating or expediting payments’ made to foreign officials to secure or expedite the performance of a ‘routine governmental action’. The UK Bribery Act makes no reference to facilitation payments as they are considered to be bribes and therefore fall under the provisions of the Bribery Act. Other countries have explicitly prohibited facilitation payments in their domestic legislations, but prosecution is still decided on a case by case basis.
Anti-Corruption Constitutional Provisions in Tunisia
Question submitted by TI-S, October 2011, Nr 2011/2

There are conflicting views on whether corruption should be dealt with as a constitutional issue and traditionally, anti-corruption measures are left to the legislation. However, corruption can be addressed implicitly in the constitution by organizing the state through a constitutional structure that addresses incentives for corruption as well as by including clauses that explicitly commit the state to controlling corruption (Rose Ackerman). Corruption can also be addressed in a constitution by including a general section on public integrity. Other authors also recommend the constitution to prohibit situations of conflict of interest and include assets declaration requirements for public officials.

The potential of UNCAC to combat illicit financial flows
Question submitted by U4, March 2011, Nr 2011/32

Both developed and developing countries need to implement policies to fight corruption and illicit financial outflows, putting special emphasis on addressing mechanisms that allow banks and financial centres to facilitate the absorption of these flows. UNCAC has the potential to address these various dimensions through its extensive preventive measures, designed to prevent corruption from occurring in the first place, and illicit flows from being generated and through its anti-money laundering measures.

Assessment methodologies of anti-corruption laws
Question submitted by U4, July 2011, Nr 2011/44

Confronted with the challenge of bringing domestic legislations in line with their international obligations, several countries (in Africa and beyond) have conducted compliance reviews and gap analyses to examine whether their domestic legal framework is in conformity with international and regional anti-corruption conventions’ requirements. Such exercises typically rely on a broad consultative process involving important local stakeholders, coordinated by a national expert team and supported in some cases by international experts. The publication and wide dissemination of the findings to key stakeholders is also important to secure.

Foreign exchange controls and assets declarations for politicians and public officials
Question submitted by U4, June 2011, Nr 2011/41

A few countries such as Venezuela, Nigeria, Kenya and Bangladesh restrict or prohibit politicians or public officials from establishing and holding overseas bank accounts as a way to prevent corruption and money laundering. Typically, such restrictions are not specific to politicians, but imposed on citizens as part of a country’s foreign exchange control regime. Restrictions can include disclosure requirements, strict prohibition or the written authorisation of the central bank or the taxing authority to open and maintain overseas accounts.
INSTITUTIONS

**Accountability of public officials**  
*Question submitted by TI Fiji, November 2011, Nr 2011/16*

The concept of public accountability broadly refers to the obligation for public agencies or officials to submit themselves to another’s oversight and scrutiny and provide information and justifications for their actions and decisions to guarantee that these meet their stated objectives and the needs of the citizens. The literature usually distinguishes between three forms of accountability, horizontal – obligation to report sideways, subjecting public officials to restraint and oversight, vertical - means through which public officials are held accountable to the electorate or citizenry – and diagonal accountability – which engages citizens directly in the working of horizontal accountability institutions.

**Indicators for measuring the effectiveness of law enforcement reforms and institutions**  
*Question submitted by U4, November 2011, Nr 2011/51*

Key issues to consider for measuring the effectiveness of law enforcement reforms and institutions relate to aggregated versus disaggregated indicators, subjective versus objective data, rule-based versus outcome based indicators, and quantitative versus qualitative data. As indicators need to be tailored to the specific circumstances of the country, there is no list of recommended indicators. However, indicators can be constructed based on the specific functions the institutions are supposed to perform such as for example, general management of the institution, production, management, and sharing of knowledge, enforcement, legislation, prevention, inter-agency cooperation, international cooperation, civil society participation and business cooperation.

**Monitoring public institutions’ integrity plans**  
*Question submitted by U4, September 2011, Nr 2011/47*

Monitoring integrity requires a conceptual framework that defines integrity as well as set clear objectives, targets and SMART performance indicators by which progress can be measured. The OECD has developed a comprehensive integrity assessment framework, which aims at: 1) collecting valid and reliable data on the existence and functioning of the key instruments, processes and actors in place for defining integrity, guiding integrity, and monitoring and enforcing compliance and; 2) comparing them with benchmarks compiled across comparable government institutions.

**Overview of discussions, approaches and actors in public service integrity**  
*Question submitted by U4, August 2011, Nr 2011/45*

The concept of public integrity needs to be operationalised into enforceable ethical standards - usually based on core values such as justice, equity to promote the public interest, transparency, openness, accountability and efficiency - and made context, sector and profession relevant. Components of a comprehensive public sector integrity framework include both core integrity instruments explicitly aimed at enhancing public sector integrity as well as complementary interventions, that, although not directly focussing on ethical standards can have an impact on public sector integrity. Core integrity instruments cover issues such as leadership, codes of conducts, rules for conflict of interest, asset and income declaration schemes, integrity training and management. Complementary integrity instruments fall into the remit of personnel management, financial management, information management, quality management and others.

**Integrity management systems in global bodies: Examples from the UN, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; and the European Union**  
*Question submitted by U4, February 2011, Nr 2011/26*

Having a comprehensive integrity system is seen as an important defence against corruption, whether for countries or organisations. In the area of development and aid, many organisations have come to view integrity systems as an important part of their efforts to fight corruption. Global bodies engaged in development often have similar anti-corruption and integrity systems. A mapping of anti-corruption systems was done for three organisations with global reach: the United Nations (including its separately administered funds and programmes); the Global Fund to
Multilateral Development Banks’ integrity management systems
Question submitted by U4, January 2011, Nr 2011/59

Although few studies focus on corruption risks in multilateral development banks (MDBs), there is a broad consensus that corruption affects MDBs financed projects in all sectors. MDBs have started addressing these issues by developing “zero tolerance” anti-corruption policies, reviewing internal procedures, setting up fraud and corruption investigative bodies, and supporting partner countries’ anti-corruption initiatives. In line with other MDBs’ initiatives, the African Development Bank’s efforts have focussed on strengthening its anti-corruption framework along four major dimensions, namely prevention, detection, investigation and sanctions.

Overview of international and regional associations of anti corruption authorities and their experiences
Question submitted by U4, October 2011, Nr 2011/50

Regional anti-corruption conventions provide a good framework for creation and functioning of regional association of anti corruption authorities whether in Africa or in other regions of the world. Recent years have seen the emergence of several anti-corruption networks and groups. However, they are still relatively new and at an early stage of activity to make well-researched and documented assessments on their impact. Most anti-corruption networks established at regional and international level have been set up in recent years with the objective of facilitating knowledge sharing and peer to peer learning between the countries.

ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOLS AND APPROACHES

Codes of conduct for public officials and members of the government
Question submitted by TI Luxembourg, November 2011, Nr 2011/13

Codes of conduct are valuable tools used throughout the world to set ethical standards and behaviour in public administration. Codes of conduct can cover different actors to address the specific interests, incentives and challenges they face in the exercise of their public functions. While codes of conduct for public officials typically address general principles of ethics, conflicts of interest, gifts and favours, outside activities, use of state property, codes of conduct for members of government also typically include additional provisions on lobbying, and on the relation between Ministers and public officials, Parliament and other members of the Government.

Codes of conduct for parliamentarians
Question submitted by TI Lithuania, December 2011, Nr 2011/58

This question was posted as an urgent request for information and background information on codes of conduct for parliamentarians. It provides preliminary information as well as references to recent resource material on the topic.

List of international election monitoring organisations
Question submitted by TI Kuwait, December 2011, Nr 2011/26

This answer provides a list of organisations that could potentially send an election observation mission to Kuwait or help identify monitoring organisations that could be approached.

Examples of election monitoring approaches
Question submitted by TI Slovenia, October 2011, Nr 2011/8

There are various approaches that have been used by national chapters in the ECA region to monitor electoral processes. These include 1) monitoring of campaign finance through independent expenditure tracking; 2) media
monitoring of the quality, quantity and access to media coverage; 3) monitoring of abuse of administrative resources during election campaigns and 4) monitoring of Election Day procedures and adjudication of disputes.

**Country examples of citizen’s charter**  
*Question submitted by TI India, November 2011, Nr 2011/11*

A citizen’s charter (CC) or a Service Charter is a formal document produced by a public agency or institution aiming at facilitating access to its services and making its activities more transparent and accountable. It consists of a written declaration by a public service based on specified standards, which then allows citizens to measure whether services really matches their needs. This answer describes the ideal framework of a citizen’s charter, and discusses the experiences with citizen’s charts in the UK, Bangladesh and Australia.

**Broadening sanctions for corruption offences according to damages done**  
*Question submitted by U4, September 2011, Nr 2011/48*

Damages awarded in corruption cases are often confined to the amount of the bribery, monetary losses, and sometimes, to disgorgement profit from the advantages gained through corrupt acts. However, the effects of corruption are broader, as corruption undermines the social fabric as well as causes substantive damages to the environment. In areas such as illegal logging for example, the consequences include the loss of biodiversity, decrease in agricultural production, climate change and degradation of forest governance. The concept of social damages is emerging in corruption litigation as an opportunity to address these losses. In a recent landmark case in Costa Rica, the claim for social damages has been argued successfully by the Attorney General.

**Sequencing law enforcement intervention to fight corruption**  
*Question submitted by U4, September 2011, Nr 2011/49*

Donor-supported approaches to fight corruption have tended to focus on measures that support effective law enforcement in a country. In many cases, independent oversight bodies and mechanisms, including anti-corruption commissions (ACCs), have formed a key part of the changes. However, oversight mechanisms only can work within the system that they were set up to oversee. What has been shown from experience is that there is no one-size-fits-all for ordering anti-corruption reforms or the types of measures pursued. Understanding the local context – in this case, Indonesia – is the best way to begin the process.

**Anti-corruption commitments for developed countries**  
*Question submitted by U4, February 2011; Nr 2011/24*

Developed countries have a key responsibility to prevent international corruption and promote a better use of resources. Three major levels of interventions can be envisaged in this regard. The first level of intervention consists of addressing the supply side of corruption by applying global anti-corruption conventions and initiatives at home. The aim is to tackle bribery and corruption in the private sector as well as to address weak transparency and accountability in international trade, taxation and export credit regimes that may facilitate corruption. Combating money laundering and closing international loopholes that facilitate tax evasion and illicit flows is a second important area of intervention. Thirdly, development assistance can also contribute to support the fight against corruption by safeguarding aid from corruption and supporting partner countries’ efforts against corruption.

**Examples of integrity agreements for consultants and advisors**  
*Question submitted by U4, May 2011, Nr 2011/38*

Because of the sensitive nature of their work, consultants and advisors may encounter a wide range of ethical dilemmas in the course of their services to their clients, including issues of professional standards and performance, confidentiality of information, independence and conflicts of interest. These dilemmas are addressed from the consulting sector with codes of professional conduct that are meant to protect the integrity of the profession. On the client side, ethics clauses or integrity agreements can be integrated in the consultancy contracts to address such integrity dilemmas faced by consultants and advisors.
**Campaign success and failure factors**  
*Question submitted by U4, February 2011, Nr 2011/28*

Corruption is multi-faceted and difficult to package into a single message. The topic is also culturally specific, with different manifestations in different countries and societies. It therefore presents a tough communication challenge. At present, the number and quality of campaign evaluations in the area of societal value change, including those related to anti-corruption, is limited. It is clear however that some campaigns have been more successful than others. Lessons can be learned from community-level campaigns aimed to empower individuals, national campaigns focused on specific target groups and international campaigns requiring long-term, collective action.

**Use of governance / corruption indicators in incentive programmes**  
*Question submitted by U4, February 2011, Nr 2011/23*

Conditionality mechanisms such as incentive programmes can work as a means of bolstering policy changes, signalling particularly important reforms and stiffening the resolve of reformers. Governance and corruption indicators can play an important role in assessing eligibility and monitoring progress in performance-based aid disbursement projects. Research reveals that corruption / governance indicators that can satisfy the particular needs of benchmarking and performance monitoring in incentive programmes are still largely absent and donors tend to rely on existing, broader, governance assessment tools.

**Use of mobile phones to detect and deter corruption**  
*Question submitted by U4, April 2011, Nr 2011/35*

New technologies offer remarkable opportunities for promoting good governance, increasing accountability and fighting corruption. Experience indicates that these technologies can be used as efficient social accountability tools, empowering local communities to engage with political and decision making processes as well as providing effective voice mechanism to hold local leaders accountable. They have also been used to facilitate the reporting of corruption, allow the monitoring of projects, budgets, elections, financial transactions and public service delivery, as well as to promote transparency in operations by providing information to service users. In spite of their potential, new technologies have not yet realised their full potential in the anti-corruption arena.

**Good practice in strengthening transparency, participation, accountability and integrity**  
*Question submitted by U4, March 2011, Nr 2011/31*

Transparency, participation, accountability and integrity are closely interconnected concepts and constitute the integral and overlapping elements of any comprehensive anti-corruption framework. Transparency initiatives typically involve promoting information disclosure and access to information for a wide range of government processes. Participatory approaches aim at empowering beneficiaries to participate at all stages of the decision making, implementation and monitoring processes as a means to promote vertical forms of accountability. But transparency and participation approaches are more likely to be effective if they are combined with more traditional forms of accountability such as monitoring, control and oversight by other public institutions that can question and eventually sanction improper behaviours. Integrity cuts across all these interventions as the underlying principle underpinning transparency, participation and accountability.
Good practices in mining auctioning processes
Question submitted by TI Georgia, October 2011, Nr 2011/5

Corruption is perceived to be widespread in mining auctioning and licensing. Research has highlighted the multiplicity of incentives that companies may have to pay bribes during the auction design and bidding process, rigging the bid; as well as red flags to watch out for including suspicious similarities in the applications made by companies. Best practices have been developed to address these risks, including comprehensive application forms for each company to submit prior to the auction, circulating clear auction guidelines, and enlisting an autonomous regulatory body to make checks and balances at each stage of the process.

Fighting corruption in procurement at the local level
Question submitted by TI Germany, October 2011, Nr 2011/4

Risks of corruption at the local level are often exacerbated due to the proximity of all local actors and include various practices such as mismanagement of resources, bribe paying and most importantly state capture from local patronage networks. Transparency International’s Integrity Pact can be used to fight corruption at the local level with open public hearings allowing civil society to participate in public procurement process. Other possible tools to fight corruption at the local level include the introduction of codes of conduct, effective complaints mechanism, regulation of conflicts of interest or e-procurement.

Costs of corruption in the construction sector
Question submitted by TI Germany, Nr 2012/1

There are major methodological challenges involved measuring the costs of corruption in the construction sector it is particularly hard to quantify cost because much corruption related damage can be found out later, for example if lower quality materials were used for an infrastructure project. The paper looks specifically at direct and indirect economic costs, ‘soft costs’ such as environmental or social costs, and also human cost where lives have been lost due to corruption.

Corruption and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
Question submitted by U4, December 2011, Nr 2011/52

There is a broad consensus that corruption represents a major obstacle to reaching the eight MDGs that more than 180 countries have committed in 2000 to achieve by year 2015. A recent report by transparency International provides evidence that countries with higher levels of corruption have made less progress on improving education (MDG 2), maternal health (MDG5) and access to clean water (MDG7). As corruption impedes efforts to achieve the MDG, designing MDG action plans that integrate anti-corruption interventions is critical to achieve the 2015 targets.

Corruption in the justice and security sector
Question submitted by U4, May 2011, Nr 2011/40

Although there are common causes and types of corruption in both sectors, there are also issues that are specific to each sector and the institutions within them. Causes that are common to both include lack of oversight and monitoring, as well as personnel related issues such as low salaries, insufficient training and unfair recruitment processes. Causes specific to particular institutions include political inference in legal systems and the lack of transparency in defence procurement. There are also a number of links and overlaps between the two sectors, such as the role of the police in bringing criminals to courts.

Dealing with petty corruption in fishing and small-scale farming
Question submitted by U4, February 2011, Nr 2011/25

As is the case with other resource sectors, the most effective way of combating petty corruption in farming and fisheries appears to be through strengthening transparency and accountability. At the local level, this can be achieved through greater public disclosure of official documents, changes to the governance structures of the
Evidence of illegal cross-border flows in South Asia and their impact on corruption
Question submitted by U4, April 2011, Nr 2011/37

The illegal flow of funds, goods and services, and people within and across borders plagues numerous countries and regions in the world. In Asia, the borders that Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan share with each other and neighbours make them particularly vulnerable to related challenges. Among these challenges is corruption, which can be both the result of and facilitator of illicit flows. Illicit cross-border flows also involve a network of actors and different countries. Global evidence suggests that these networks take advantage of existing weak governance and corruption in a country to establish their operations. At the same time, by bringing the country into their network, corruption is worsened as it becomes the medium for ensuring the movement of illicit flows.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC INFORMATION

Countries performing well in the CPI
Question submitted by TI Israel, November 2011, Nr 2011/12

Finland, Sweden, Denmark and New Zealand consistently perform well in the Corruption Perceptions Index and other major governance indicators. While these countries share common characteristics that may create enabling conditions for controlling corruption such as high GDP per capita, equity and literacy rates, media freedom and government openness, etc, there are not many studies that document whether, why and how these countries have managed to limit levels of perceived corruption. This answer focuses more specifically on some of the transparency and accountability mechanisms that could potentially contribute to controlling corruption, such as, among others, open government initiatives, regulation on procurement, special anti-corruption agencies, performance budgeting.

Corruption statistics on Italy and Spain
Question submitted by TI UK, November 2011, Nr 2011/9

The UN Global Compact estimates that the cost of corruption equals more than 5% of global GDP (US $2.6 trillion), with over US $1 trillion paid in bribes each year. In Italy, bureaucratic corruption cost Italian taxpayers between €50 and €60 billion in 2008 while in Spain €10 billion on tax fraud was recovered in 2010. Moreover, Italian and Spanish governments are also making losses due to the large size of their underground economy. Reports have shown that both countries, together with Greece, have the largest size of shadow economy among high income OECD countries.

Corruption statistics on Greece and Portugal
Question submitted by TI UK, October 2011, Nr 2011/10

There are many methodological challenges involved in assessing the cost of corruption and no readily available figures on corruption in terms of share of gross domestic product for these countries at such short notice. The CPI provides a snapshot of perceived levels of corruption in these countries and could be a good place to start. In view of the current crisis, a previous Helpdesk answer also provides some element of information on the extent to which Greek money has been stored in tax-havens outside of Greece, and how much tax has been evaded.

Greek budget deficit and tax evasion
Question submitted by TI UK, October 2011, Nr 2011/6

Greece’s budget deficit was 10.5% of its GDP in 2010, and is estimated to be 8.6% in 2011 by the EU and IMF. It is attributed in part to the widespread tax evasion in the country. One method in which tax is evaded is to store assets outside of the country in tax-havens, like Switzerland. Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimates that $160 billion has been lost over the last decade in unrecorded payments and balance transfers, costing Greece at the highest estimate, €36 billion in taxes.
Arab spring: Stolen assets in the Middle East
Question submitted by TI UK, October 2011, Nr 2011/3

Publicly available figures indicate that up to $190 billion dollars of public money has been siphoned off by the former leaders of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. The stolen assets are allegedly held in a number of onshore and offshore tax havens, as well as investments in many countries, including the purchase of real estate, especially in the West. Swiss banks have come under particularly scrutiny, with the Swiss government identifying $1 billion worth of assets from dictators, including a figure of $32 billion, belonging to the Syrian leader, Bashar Al-Assad. This suggests that not only are dictators embroiled in criminal activity involving the stealing of public monies for private gain, but that Western banks are all too often complicit in the harbouring of these illicit accounts.

Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Albania
Question submitted by U4, July 2011, Nr 2011/43

Since Albania made the transition from communism towards electoral democracy, the country continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, organised crime and widespread corruption. Albania is characterised by very high levels of perceived corruption, which manifests itself through various forms at all levels of government. The health sector, customs and tax officials are often referred to as the most corrupt institutions, followed by the police and the judiciary. There is very little research available on corruption in the environmental and resource management sectors. The overall legal and institutional anti-corruption frameworks are mostly in place and the government has also adopted an anti-corruption strategy and action plan 2007-2013.

Anti-corruption progress in Georgia, Liberia, Rwanda
Question submitted by U4, July 2011, Nr 2011/42

Countries like Georgia, Liberia and Rwanda are largely perceived as having achieved remarkable progress in the fight against corruption over the last few years. In spite of their apparent diversity, these three countries have benefited from certain common conditions that may have contributed to their success in fighting corruption, including a radical regime change or post-conflict context which created a momentum for reform, and a strong political will to eliminate corruption.

Integrating anti-corruption measures in Georgia's newly established competition agency
Question submitted by U4, April 2011, Nr 2011/60

The literature shows that effective competition authorities share a set of common features including a clear vision of the agency’s purpose and strategic priorities, an appropriate structure and transparent processes, sound case and project management systems and human resources practices as well as an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism. The independence and accountability of the institution also needs to be ensured. Anti-corruption measures can be built up in the institution by promoting transparency and access to information on the agency’s operations and decisions, introducing the right set of staff incentives and rules, establishing effective internal and external oversight mechanisms as well as encouraging safe whistle-blowing.

The impact of Chinese investments on national procurement rules
Question submitted by U4, March 2011, Nr 2011/34

Within a decade, China has become a powerful player in the world economy, including global procurement markets. Its participation has been either as a bidder on government and donor projects (including multilateral banks) or as a direct procurer of goods and services by Chinese companies (as a result of lending agreements with countries). Critics have alleged that China is not complying with good procurement standards, particularly on issues related to labour, the environment and overall governance (transparency, accountability and integrity principles), and perceptions of experts to point to a concern about Chinese company behaviour abroad. However, there is currently little specific research that shows China’s engagement in procurement offers more risks as compared to other countries.
Elements of information on China and enforcement of anti-corruption laws abroad  
Question submitted by U4, February 2011, Nr 2011/29

This Expert Answer addresses Chinese legislation on foreign bribery and other anti-corruption commitments. It also addresses governance and anti-corruption in relation to Chinese investments and trade.

Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Ghana  
Question submitted by U4, February, Nr 2011/27

Major governance indicators show that Ghana has achieved significant progress over the last few years in terms of government effectiveness, transparency of the regulatory framework and control of corruption. However, corruption remains a significant problem in the country. Sectors most affected by corruption include the police, political parties, and public financial management. With the recent discovery of offshore oil fields, the country’s past record in managing its mineral wealth has raised concerns over its ability to manage oil revenues in a transparent manner and avoid a “resource curse”. The government has a strong anti-corruption legal framework in place, but faces challenges of enforcement.

Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Angola  
Question submitted by U4, February 2011, Nr 2011/30

Emerging from nearly three decades of conflict and instability, Angola continues to face major challenges of weak governance and widespread corruption at all levels of society. Corruption manifests itself through various forms, including bureaucratic, political and grand corruption, embezzlement of public resources, systematic looting of state’s assets, and a deeply entrenched patronage system that operates outside state channels. The scale of corruption and mismanagement has been particularly immense in the extractive industries. The government has introduced important reforms in recent years, especially with regard to revenue and budget transparency, and recently called for a crackdown on corruption in 2009. In spite of progress made, Angola’s overall legal and institutional anti-corruption framework remains highly inadequate.

Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Sudan  
Question submitted by U4, January 2011, Nr 2011/22

After decades of political turmoil, unrest and civil war, Sudan faces many of the governance and corruption challenges that affect both conflict torn and resource rich countries, including fragile state institutions, low administrative capacity, weak systems of checks and balance, and blurred distinctions between the state and ruling party. Corruption in the police and security forces undermines internal security and abets abuses of civil and political rights, while the lack of transparency in the oil sector contributes to fuel political instability between Northern and Southern Sudan. Against this background, Sudan has a poor record of confronting corruption due to its weak administrative set up, lack of resources and capacity and wavering political will.

Sources of information on corruption in Rwanda  
Question submitted by U4, March 2011, Nr 2011/33

The sources consulted in this report suggest that remarkable progress has been made in terms of anti-corruption since the 1994 genocide. Rwanda has gone through a painful process of reconstruction, including rebuilding the whole governance systems, structures and institutions. A number of institutions are now in place aiming at fighting corruption. These efforts seem to have yielded results, with the country performing better than many other African countries in terms of control of corruption on most governance indicators. In spite of these efforts, there are a number of areas in which corruption still needs to be addressed.