Transparency Watch (TW): Historically Bangladesh has one of the lowest scores (highest levels of perceived corruption) out of all the countries covered in Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Do you think the situation has improved?

Muhammed Zamir (MZ): I believe the CPI up to 2006 reflected the governance structure of Bangladesh. Corruption intensified in our country due to abuse of power, political partisanship, lack of transparency and accountability [see TI-Bangladesh press release]. Since the beginning of 2007, this critical situation is being addressed with vigour and seriousness. The Anti-Corruption Commission has been reconstituted and made more effective. There is also greater independence of the judiciary after amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code. A sensitisation drive by the Anti-Corruption Commission and the interim government is also underway at the grass root level to change the mind-set of the people with regard to accepting corruption as a normal aspect of daily life. Consequently, there have been improvements in the service delivery sectors – telecommunications, utilities, issuing of passports, registration of documents and collection of government revenue. There is also a growing awareness among those in high places that no one is beyond the reach of law. I believe the 2008 CPI should reflect these improvements.

TW: In the run up to the elections at the end of the year, what obstacles, in your opinion, need to be overcome in order for them to be free and fair, and for power to be peacefully transferred to the people’s elected representatives?

MZ: There have been several detracting factors that have affected the electoral process in the past – a defective electoral roll, and the absence of an independent Election Commission and Election Secretariat. There has also been very little financial accountability associated with the democratic process and also within the political parties themselves. In the past these shortcomings have resulted in nepotism and dictatorial decision making within the party structure, particularly in the nomination and selection of electoral candidates – effectively crippling the fifteen years of the past three elected governments.

We are hoping that the creation of a new electoral roll (expected to be completed by July 2008), amendments to the Electoral Framework Order and compulsory registration of political parties with the Election Commission (to ensure transparency, accountability and democratic process within each party) will enable the holding of a free and fair election by the end of 2008. The credibility of the electoral process will also determine whether the transition to a political government will take place peacefully. Such a possibility will be encouraged if the present Administration creates a level playing field, permits politicians not convicted of any charge of corruption to participate in the election process, lifts the current emergency restrictions and allows all the political parties to freely engage in discussion and electioneering. These measures will ensure the participation of all political parties in the next election and contribute towards future participatory democratic governance.

TW: Former prime ministers Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Sheikh Hasina Wajed of the Awami League have both been charged with graft. If either or both of them are convicted, what response could be expected?

MZ: Both these political parties have been demanding the immediate release of their respective leaders and have also threatened that they might not participate in the next election if their demands are not met. Nevertheless, a judicial process has already been initiated which is being questioned and labelled by politicians as being motivated and aimed at excluding these two leaders from the next election [see Reuters]. Others have expressed concern about whether due process of law is being correctly followed [see Human Rights Watch]. One can only hope that justice will be served. Perceived absence of justice will definitely evoke an acrimonious response.

TW: What, in your opinion, have been the successes and shortcomings of the interim government?

MZ: The successes of the interim caretaker government have included overall improvement within the matrix of governance. This has been achieved through corrections, capacity building and reforms within the institutional structures of the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Central Public Service Commission and the Election Commission. The creation of the Regulatory Reforms Commission and the Better Business Forum has also been positive. It has also successfully handled the effects of the two massive natural disasters (dual floods and a cyclone) that hit Bangladesh last year, reduced fundamentalist terrorism and considerably improved the functioning of the Chittagong seaport.

However, there have also been several shortcomings. Public opinion believes that the government has been unable to stop petty corruption, to contain the unusual rise of price levels pertaining to food and ensure energy security [see The Economist]. There is also a view that a hidden agenda exists with regard to the selection of alleged offenders of corruption and in the listing of those contravening emergency provisions [see CNN]. This, some observe, is indirectly also affecting the process of requisite investigation, inquiry and trial of alleged offenders.

TW: According to a recent report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group: "There is now fear the government is undermining the very democratic institutions it set out to rescue" (28 April 2008). Would you agree?"

MZ: The anxiety contained in their latest report has probably stemmed from the ongoing concern within the country about certain prospective measures that are reportedly on the anvil of this current government. Lack of transparency, open discussion and sufficient dialogue with the important stakeholders have raised suspicions in the minds of ordinary citizens that such steps might undermine existing democratic institutions. These relate to pivotal institutional steps expected to be put in place before the next election – the formation of a National Security Council, the constitution of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the re-calibration of the powers and responsibilities between the president and the prime minister, and also the future relationship between the armed forces and the elected civilian leadership. Some, like me, believe that such extraordinary measures should be taken only after the election of an elected government on the basis of a parliamentary debate and consensus and not through the promulgation of ordinances.

TW: Is there a risk that the next government will overturn the reforms implemented by the interim government?

MZ: I believe there has been a change in the public perception of politics and activities of political parties since 11 January 2007. The prosecution of important political leaders, businessmen and bureaucrats on charges of corruption and their subsequent convictions have encouraged the view that there is need for reforms and corrective steps within institutions associated with governance and the maintenance of law and order. In view of the above, I believe that it will be difficult for the next elected government to ‘overturn’ most of these corrective measures being introduced by the interim government. The continuity and acceptability of the reforms would however be ensured if the current administration would lift the present emergency provisions and allow open dialogue among all stakeholders – representatives of political parties and civil society – about the reforms. Such a process would identify least common denominators and avert subsequent controversy.

TW: In the past, corruption charges have been reportedly used as political weapons against government officials and politicians. How can the next parliament ensure that anti-corruption mechanisms are not used in this way?

MZ: The best way for the next parliament to stop abuse of the anti-corruption mechanism through political partisanship would be to ensure the presence of the following: the appointment of an Ombudsman, the establishment of a functional National Human Rights Commission, the strengthening of the autonomous nature of the Anti Corruption Commission (with the proviso that it also remains accountable to the judicial process for any illegal and mala fide action undertaken by its officials) and the creation of a permanent Parliamentary Standing Committee on corruption (to be chaired by a representative from the largest opposition party in parliament).

TW: Do you think that concerns about the creation of a National Security Council, to institutionalise the army’s role in politics, are well-founded?

MZ: Creating a National Security Council (NSC) for Bangladesh is not a new idea. The Cabinet Division issued a circular in 1996 creating a 23 member NSC headed by the prime minister. It was given a wide range of responsibilities ranging from ensuring national security to accountability of the government. The concept was however stillborn and eventually fizzled out. Currently a NSC for Bangladesh seems imminent and might be in place within a few weeks. Such a prospect is however not being received with great enthusiasm. Some analysts have questioned the desire within the military to be given a major role in running the country [see BBC]. Others have pointed out that such an important measure should be discussed further in depth (to avoid the creation of an authoritarian institution unsuitable for the democratic process) and a blueprint prepared for the consideration of the next political government. The concept of a NSC exists in many countries. It is an interesting idea, has merits and demerits, but its implementation (institutionalizing the armed forces’ role in politics) should be left to an elected government. Otherwise, establishing a NSC could be seen as being counter to established democratic norms, unless the real source of authority and power is ensured to be in the hands of the elected representatives and the chief elected executive of the country.

TW: How does corruption manifest itself in the water sector in Bangladesh? What are its effects?

MZ: Corruption in the water sector in Bangladesh has usually manifested itself in the following areas: (a) in matters of delivery both to households as well as in irrigation, (b) in improper billing of water supplied and consumed, (c) during civil construction work undertaken for water storage and maintenance and in the (d) lack of strict monitoring of sewerage facilities and effluent discharge by industrial units. Such corrupt practices cause losses in revenue, unnecessary additional expenditure in public works and environmental degradation to water bodies.

All of the above elements juxtapose together and impact on the humanitarian rights of individuals and societies to access clean drinking water. This subsequently translates into poorer health for infants and school going children. The creation of poor sub-standard infrastructure in terms of storage and delivery due to corruption also means more breakdowns and greater cost in terms of maintenance of facilities.

TW: Have you ever had any personal experience with corruption?

MZ: Yes. In the context of my past administrative experience, I have had to deal with corrupt practices of some officials responsible for service delivery. I had to take immediate corrective measures including the imparting of due punishment on the basis of existing regulations. This included suspension and also dismissal.