Historically, Russia had no culture of civil society. Civil society activity blossomed at the beginning of the 20th century, but that ended in revolution. Then we had seventy years of communist rule, with no civil society to speak of. The introduction of glasnost and perestroika in the 1990s saw an explosion of civic organisations, especially think-tanks and policy organisations, funded by foreign donors. All of the major civil society organisations (CSOs) started as foreign-financed entities dealing with situations that the government at the time could not.

By 2000, independent media outlets were systematically put under pressure because of debt, bad credit or other liabilities. Most businesses (including media) that started during the ‘90s acquired wealth in quasi-legal or suspicious ways. The state began to acquire partial or total control of media outlets, one by one, through intimidation, blackmail or other forms of pressure. By 2003, independent media had been nearly eliminated.

Political opposition was also disintegrating. A new registration law and financial rules for political parties was passed with requirements too complicated for most parties to understand. A new electoral code provided 20 ways to block a candidate’s registration. The result? By 2005, there was no free media or political opposition to speak of. The only remaining independent sector was civil society. Though not as strong or developed as in the West - and still largely foreign-funded - our organisations were still independent and intact.

Then the government introduced what is known as the "NGO (non governmental organisation) law". There had been a feeling of foreboding among the community of Russian civil society organisations that something negative was coming, but no one expected anything as damaging as this. It amended existing laws regulating CSO activities, creating a very heavy formal burden for civil society organisations. For example, the law required some CSOs to re-register with the state, along with bi-annual reports to the Ministry of Justice on daily activities for all civil society organisations in Russia.

Slowly, the government created an atmosphere of mistrust around civil society organisations. It began with the infamous story of a transmitter hidden in a rock. A primetime programme on ORT – the main state controlled television channel - alleged that British diplomats had sent confidential data via a transmitter concealed in an artificial rock in a Moscow park. In the same breath, authorities disclosed that the diplomats had also been funding civil society organisations, including the Moscow-Helsinki Group, a human rights institution in operation since the Soviet era. While there were no concrete accusations, it was enough to create the impression that civil society organisations with foreign words in their titles – such as Transparency International – represented a liability for Russia, potentially weakening it and making it dependent on external powers.

The groundwork for this view had been laid earlier in 2005 by Vladislav Surkov, a Kremlin aide, who had labeled opposition groups, particularly those with outside funding, as "fifth-column", a Spanish civil war term for a loose network of insurgent agents.

By spring of this year, the increasingly negative atmosphere allowed the government to publicly justify the repression of civil society. In addition to rising public distrust, formal procedures for CSOs have become much more complicated. Registration, tax regulations and grant registration procedures are more difficult. Public criticism of the government is riskier, because it could trigger greater scrutiny and a further tightening of procedures.

Transparency International Russia currently faces a 138-page reporting form for submission to the government by 1 October. It requires a detailed listing of all meetings, press conferences and other gatherings held in the past year related to its charter. In practice, this can mean providing information for up to three items per day. Another large international civil society organisation hired a full-time employee to complete their form. Processing data from the forms has reportedly required the creation of over 30,000 jobs in the Russian bureaucracy.

The atmosphere is especially oppressive for organisations that receive foreign funding; with no tradition of Russian business supporting civil society, this means nearly all CSOs. In the 1990s, business was just beginning its development, and in 2000 the country was still grappling with poverty on a massive scale. Then the oil started to flow; the Russian government overcame its dependence on foreign aid and private business flourished. But even under these more favourable circumstances, a supportive culture for civil society did not exist. Everyone understood the need for foreign funding.

Soon after Mikhail Khodorkovsky started "Open Russia", the first Russian fund for CSOs, he was arrested. "Open Russia" supported service delivery CSOs, journalism associations and policy organisations. The government opposed foreign funding of these entities, especially those that went beyond service provision into advocacy, yet they also prevented domestic funding.

This was blatant hypocrisy. The government’s position seems to be that it is okay to save whales and help kids, but as soon as a civil society organisation looks into environmental laws or criticises childcare policy, they cannot receive foreign funding, and will get no government support.

At TI Russia, we are looking for ways to finance our activities while avoiding the trap of registering foreign grants. After 1 January, when old grants expire, the new laws will apply. I suppose that even if we could not get new funds, most of our staff would still work voluntarily. I have not received a salary since last spring, but provide for myself by lecturing, publishing articles and finding work as a political analyst.

The situation in Russia brings us to an obvious crossroads: do we at TI Russia want to limit ourselves to harmless activities such as awareness-raising, courses on ethics and handing out brochures? Or do we want to be the organisation saying there is a problem with Germany’s former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder being on the board of Gazprom, or that there is a problem with electoral funds? Do we want to be a critical voice?

Russians like the idea of transparency, but they remain dependent on an administration that is completely opaque. New laws and appointments emerge from nowhere. Concepts like TI’s Integrity Pacts are perceived as a joke to most people who must pay bribes just to get through the day. When you have a systematically corrupt country, you cannot fight it by signing nice treaties that are not implemented.

That’s why this year’s G8 Statement on High-Level Corruption was so innovative. It was an official document talking about high-ranking corrupt officials as a systemic problem, going on to state that corruption undermines democratic growth. At TI Russia, we saw it as a direct message to Russia. People were calling TI Russia all day. It was a sensation.

2007 is an election year in Russia. Perhaps there will be some room for change. But whatever happens, the best way to show that we are a normal organisation is to adhere to our mission, to go about our work without paying too much attention to what others are saying. If we need to go to court, we will go to court. If we need to go to the media, to the TI movement, we will do that.