Five years ago, Gazprom, a state-controlled company that is the world’s third richest corporation, took over Russia’s NTV television station in what was widely viewed as a Kremlin-orchestrated move to stifle criticism of the government. The purchase was followed by the departure of many of NTV’s leading journalists and a dramatic muting of the critical coverage for which it was known. News reports of a Moscow protest in April over the government’s grip on the media indicate that all nationwide networks have now come under tight state control. Gazprom recently purchased Izvestiya, one of Russia’s most respected newspapers, pushing the state’s control of the media into the print press.

Transparency International’s interview with Walter Mayr, correspondent in Russia for the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, suggests that in Russia, information is difficult if not entirely impossible to access, and bribes are the norm of daily life.

TI: Have you faced difficulties accessing public information, or information that should be public, in Russia? If so, how do these difficulties play out and what do you do about them?

WM: Difficulties accessing public information are the core problem a correspondent faces in Russia. Things have been aggravated within the last years by the Kremlin's drastic measures to cut down all aspects of civil society. In parliament, Russia is coming close to one-party rule [United Russia, President Putin’s political party]. NGOs are increasingly being threatened and observed. The separation of power -executive, legislative, judicial - is rather weak. The amount of potential and traditional journalistic sources, for example, people inside the power structures, unsatisfied with what is happening and therefore willing to talk, is exceptionally limited in Russia. Big deals like the pipeline project from Siberia to the Pacific Ocean (valued at some US $16 billion) or the gas business with Ukraine and the rest of Europe are decided and promoted in very small, closed circles.

What do I do about that? As any journalist, keep digging, staying in contact with those local journalists who keep doing investigative work and cooperating with the remaining NGOs.

TI: How does the amount of access that you obtain as a foreign correspondent compare with that of your local colleagues?

WM: It depends on the correspondent, but generally speaking, it's of course far less. Nevertheless, this is not the main problem, because reading something substantial in Moscow's morning papers, checking it and using it afterwards doesn't take long. "Exclusive" investigations by foreign correspondents are, in my opinion, a rare thing even in western countries.

TI: Has the recent increase in restrictions on NGOs affected your consultation of these organisations for background information or possible story leads?

WM: No, those who were here before and willing to talk, are still here and willing to talk. The new legislation might affect our work as soon as it prevents some NGOs from continuing their activities.

TI: You were one of six reporters that reconstructed the siege on Beslan’s School No.1 for Der Spiegel. As part of that project, you researched the terrorists’ background in Ingushetia and Chechnya. How cooperative were the authorities?

WM: Our investigation began soon after the tragedy. At that moment, the authorities didn't even have a common position on what had happened. I think most of the local authorities in the Caucasus were still waiting for the Kremlin version. By the way, the official investigation by the Duma Committee has not been published to this day. Having said this, the authorities did what they are accustomed to doing with journalists; keep them guessing, spreading rumours, describing the enormous amount of work they have dedicated to the fight against terrorism in the past. Correspondents in Russia have to work with methods appropriate for the country, for example, balancing statements of the Federal Security Service (FSB) with those of the Interior Ministry and Ministry of Defence. There is substantial rivalry between the different “Siloviki”, or strongmen, in different branches and comparing their versions of what had happened in Beslan may give hints to find out the truth.

TI: What other effects did this have on your research?

WM: You have to multiply the number of sources, especially among ordinary people involved. Official confirmation or assistance is virtually non-existent and the way to ask for it is time-consuming. Typical responses: "Please ask written questions”, “We'll call you then"; "No fax received"; "The one in charge is hospitalised".

TI: What role did corruption play in the Beslan siege?

WM: Corruption most probably opened the door for the terrorists to come to Beslan. The border where they crossed into North Ossetia from Ingushetia is a well-known and well-observed smugglers’ transit road. Without having bribed police in the border region, they could not have gone unnoticed.

TI: You wrote a story in October 2005 entitled, “Spinning Out of Control in Dagestan” which said the government is “collapsing under a mountain of corruption”. It seems based on a report to President Putin by one of his envoys. Did that report come to you voluntarily or was it public? Is it standard practice to make such documents public? Have you faced difficulty obtaining government reports?

WM: The document was public at the time my article was published. It was leaked to the press shortly after having been handed over to Putin by his envoy to the South of Russia, Dmitry Kozak. This is not standard practice in this country and therefore caused considerable repercussions. The very fact that this document was "leaked" was mostly seen as an indication of how serious the situation in Dagestan is. Usually, government reports of this kind are labelled classified.

TI: How much corruption have you encountered in the Caucasus, and in what areas is it more challenging to research?

WM: Corruption is an everyday phenomenon in the Caucasus. Money helps to resolve any sort of problem. Terrorists pay in order to be allowed through roadblocks, businessmen pay in order to be given first-class investment sites, parents pay in order to prevent their sons from being drafted for the Chechen war. The most challenging aspect of this phenomenon is that it is a practice almost generally agreed on. Where nobody openly complains or no longer complains, because of the risks involved with openly complaining about something that ties society together, there is not much room left for public confidence in the power structures.

TI: What, in your opinion, are the most underreported corruption stories in Russia?

WM: Maybe underreported because difficult to prove, however, regularly asserted: corruption on the highest state level, starting with government officials taking money just for meeting with foreign investors, and with high-profile members of the Kremlin administration being deeply involved in multi-billion-dollar-projects. It's enough to compare the official salaries of those in power with their barely concealed life-style.

TI: Have you had any personal experiences of corruption? What were they?

WM: Petty corruption is everywhere, every day, visible for everyone. Your wife is going to give birth to a child, and you want both of them to survive: drop something extra for the head of the clinic. You broke some traffic rule: drop something extra in cash in the policeman's car, but never expect him to touch it, as long as you are near. You need an urgent visa for a family member (urgent means within less than two weeks): refer to the mostly underpaid people in the ministries, who know how to solve the problem, even within a day.

Der Spiegel (www.spiegel.de ) is the leading German newsmagazine.