TI: The 2005 edition of the National Index on Corruption and Governance has just been released for the third time, with some startling figures. What does the survey mean in practice?

EB: The National Index on Corruption and Governance was designed as a policy oriented tool, to provide clear direction for policy makers in 35 areas of public service delivery. It registers the experience of households in relation to the three levels of government, and even with private companies operating a public service. It not only measures the “petty corruption” of money paid by households for services, but by showing the repeated presence of corruption in a particular service, it highlights a larger structural problem for a government agency. Examining service provision to 22 million households, a pattern in “petty corruption” indicates that the problem of corruption goes beyond the personal integrity of a public servant, to a policy issue or an institutional design problem. More dramatically, a sort of “organised crime” network could be operating a parallel market for public service delivery. This can be particularly harmful to lower income households.

TI: In 2003, the average cost of petty corruption to low income Mexican households was 14 percent. In 2005, it has risen ten percent to 24 percent of household earnings. Why the slide from more successful numbers in 2003?

EB: On average, the net balance of corruption cases for these 35 public services (the national index) increased. At a disaggregated level, some states improved their situation while others did not. A detailed analysis shows that as in any competitive market, with bribery in public services there also are “winners” and “losers”, and that unfortunately the average result is negative for the country and its households in the 2005 edition of the index.

TI: Is this a sign that anti-corruption initiatives in Mexico are failing?

EB: Anti-corruption initiatives are not failing: our analytical tools for understanding the complexity of the problem are improving. The NICG shows that concrete actions to curb corruption are effective. Mexican states have been benefited from policies undertaken to improve concrete corruption-related problems. The index also shows that this needs to be a continuous effort, and that areas in which attention is reduced could very easily go back to their problematic state. Anti-corruption initiatives are increasing and their quality and depth is also improving. However, the frequency of corruption cases for the 35 services measured can change over time if government action is not clearly focused, or if there is a transition period between two democratically elected governments.

TI: What happened to the initial determination of the current Mexican government? Has its attention to corruption decreased?

EB: The existence of more than 30 legal structures in the country for preserving access to information, the independent commissions of the Congress, the openness of the Supreme Court - these among other examples show that the “initial determination” of President [Vincente] Fox has been just the beginning of a wider and more comprehensive effort by Mexican society. This is not just the fight of the president, but rather of our society as a whole.

TI: Are anti-corruption initiatives in general too focused on grand corruption?Which should be addressed first: grand or petty corruption, and which is more likely to positively change peoples’ lives?

EB: The National Index on Corruption and Governance brings a good opportunity to explore the theoretical dilemma between “grand” and “petty” anti-corruption efforts. In fact, the results may demonstrate that this dilemma does not exist when thinking about public policies. The Index shows not only the relationship of a household and a public service provider; it is also an indicator of more complex phenomena such as poor institutional design or misleading government action. In other words, the Index illustrates that the approval of a Freedom of Information Act, while desirable, will not automatically solve the problem of corruption in water and sanitation. The conclusion is clear: you have to address both problems simultaneously.

TI: What could explain the fact that corruption increased in some Mexican states and decreased in others?

EB: A very simple and concrete answer: corruption is not endemic to Mexico, it is epidemic. For years, corruption was seen as a cultural problem, involving factors such as the national identity or social values. These are very important issues to explain corruption as a social phenomenon, and give good orientation for media campaigns and the societal comprehension of the problem. But in terms of public policies, the presence of “bribes” seems to be more similar to an epidemic outbreak than to a cultural experience. Corruption in public service delivery appears in places where “prophylactic measures” are not in place. In the presence of these factors, among others, corruption patterns change and eventually the results of the Index follow.

TI: Which public services improved their ranking and why? Can this be linked to any specific anti-corruption initiative?

EB: Eleven services improved their ranking in the Index between 2003 and 2005. As the new data was just released, further research needs to be conducted to put the results into perspective. The initial results can be suggestive of a general trend: that some of the most powerful anti-corruption initiatives in public service delivery are just simple procedures and actions to accomplish what public service delivery is for. Hence, as Mexican households campaign for increased quality of public services, such as appropriate water supply, school registration or regular garbage collection, the risk of it being affected by corruption diminishes as its quality increases.

TI: What has been the reaction of the institutions and states surveyed?

EB: Encouraging. Most institutions and states have reacted favourably to the results and plan to give them further analysis. The results become tools for policy design or a form of external evaluation. At the end, the data comes from the households and not from the experts.

TI: The methodology of the Index is quite strong: a strictly random sample of 15,123 households at national level, less than one percent margin of error at the national level, and additional external monitoring, among others. TI chapters in Peru and Paraguay have already replicated the methodology. What would your recommend to chapters in other regions who might want to replicate it as well?

EB: Chapters in Peru and Guatemala have replicated the exercise as well as colleagues in Bolivia. Our recommendation is simple: use the information of these countries to see that in terms public service delivery similarities between countries are at least as relevant as our national differences.