

4.3 Cricket in Bangladesh: challenges of governance and match-fixing

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The context

Cricket, the proverbial gentlemen's game,² has only recently become the most popular sport in Bangladesh. Although cricket was introduced in Bengal by the British East India Company in the eighteenth century, Bangladesh did not become an associate member of the International Cricket Council (ICC) until 1977, or a regular member until 1997, finally achieving the status of test-playing nation in June 2000. Bangladesh has increasingly become an important actor in global cricket,³ and has captured the imagination of millions of Bangladeshis at home and abroad, men and women, and especially youth and children. Cricket is not simply a game in the country; it is a symbol of national unity.⁴ Corresponding to this growth in domestic interest, however, and in keeping with global and regional trends, Bangladeshi cricket has also become a huge money-making mechanism,⁵ making the game vulnerable to corruption and in need of strengthened, robust and effective governance structures.

As with other cricket-playing nations, competitive matches in Bangladesh were played until recently in the form of test matches and one-day tournaments between national teams. When the Bangladesh Premier League (BPL) was introduced in 2012 as a competition of franchises – clubs formed specifically for the league and essentially as business enterprises – profit-making became a key factor in cricket. The Bangladesh Cricket Board (BCB, described further below) demonstrated an enthusiasm for this short-term profitability, even at the possible expense of the longer-term development of the sport. This was evident when the BPL was given a better time slot in the 2013/14 domestic cricket calendar at the expense of the Bangladesh Cricket League, a first-class (that is, higher-quality, and thus more important for national development) competition.⁶ Profit-

making became clubs' preoccupation, leading to irregularities in the form of match-fixing and spot-fixing,⁷ linked with betting, in which players and officials became easy recruits. The governance deficit in the game has compounded the problem further.

The main theme of this study is that the two parallel sets of challenges – of the governance of the BCB, on the one hand, and of the wider problem of match-fixing, on the other – need to be addressed effectively, in the interests of cricket in Bangladesh and for it to realise its full potential. Much-needed improvements in the governance of the BCB will also enhance the capacity to prevent and control match-fixing.

Cricket governance

The Bangladesh Cricket Board, affiliated with the National Sports Council of Bangladesh (NSCB)⁸ within the Ministry of Youth and Sports, is responsible for the operation and development of cricket in the country.⁹ The Parliamentary Standing Committee of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, as the oversight body for the ministry, is also tasked with overseeing the work of the BCB.

The BCB generates income from TV rights, sponsorship,¹⁰ donations, income-sharing with the ICC from global cricket, and tournament fees as an organiser of ICC events, among other sources.¹¹ It also receives government allocations (through the NSCB), and generates revenue from investments. The BCB is governed by its own constitution¹² and is comprised of 27 board directors, a board president and 20 operational committees.¹³

The legal classification of the BCB's corporate structure is uncertain. It is neither a corporate body, such as the ICC, nor a statutory body, as is its counterpart in Pakistan, nor a 'registered society' (typical of charities), as is the case with India.¹⁴ There is no formal mechanism within Bangladesh to hold the BCB accountable. It operates as an autonomous body, and is regarded as a subsidiary of

the Ministry of Youth and Sports. In practice, however, the BCB operates on its own with hardly any relationship of accountability with the Ministry and the NSCB, while the Parliamentary Standing Committee rarely exercises or enforces its oversight functions.¹⁵

This is consistent with ICC guidelines for national cricket boards, so that government interference in cricket governance is minimal and the autonomy of the national cricket associations is maintained.¹⁶ Former BCB officials have nevertheless claimed that the BCB is subject to government and political influence, especially in terms of its leadership and management, and in the election of its board president and members.¹⁷ The BCB directors amended the BCB's constitution on 1 March 2012, following which an election was held for the first time within the BCB to choose board directors. The current president was also chosen, unanimously, in this election. Despite the introduction of elections, partisan and political interests still prevailed in the nomination process for the president's and directors' posts.¹⁸

Although the BCB constitution calls for representation from all over the country, most board members represent Dhaka-based clubs and have links to the ruling party. There are also allegations of board directors arbitrarily amending the constitution to suit the interests of the current leadership.¹⁹ The president nominates five councillors of the General Council²⁰ and chooses the operational committee members, thus paving the way for BCB operations to be controlled by the president or his chosen few. The selection of certain match venues is also alleged to take place according to political interests.²¹ In addition, there are allegations of conflicts of interest, including, for instance, a BCB director who worked as a coach for a franchise team in the BPL.²² The BCB is also criticised for having no long-term plan for the development of cricket, and no specific programmes for behavioural change and ethics education.²³

There is no specific law addressing corruption in sports in Bangladesh.²⁴ The Bangladesh Penal Code of 1860 and the Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2004 include provisions against dishonest conduct and corruption in general, but there is no particular set of rules, regulations or protocols for the investigation of allegations of corruption in cricket. The ICC has its Anti-Corruption Code for Participants, to try and prevent corruption in global cricket, and has set up an Anti-Corruption Security Unit (ACSU), both of which have responsibility for ensuring discipline and integrity in international cricket. The BCB adopted its own such code on 1 October 2012, and revised it on 1 January 2013 to ensure consistency with the ICC Code. The BCB's Anti-Corruption Code allows a two-stage appeal process.²⁵ If there is a complaint against a player or player support personnel, under article 5.1.1 of the Code, the BCB will formulate a 'provisional' Disciplinary Panel (DP), headed by a chairman, who will establish an Anti-Corruption Tribunal of three individuals who are independent of the parties and have had no prior involvement with the case.²⁶ The tribunal will hear the case and make a judgement, and parties can lodge an appeal with the DP. Should the complaint still not be resolved, the second stage allows an appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), based in Switzerland.²⁷

Establishment of the Bangladesh Premier League

Against this governance backdrop came the tumultuous establishment of the BPL, which was done in an ad hoc manner without proper policies and rules for the tournament. The franchises determined the rates and payments of players' fees without following any well-defined criteria. The BCB and the franchises failed to secure permission for income-generating activities or foreign currency payments from the National Board of Revenue and Bangladesh Bank, the central bank, making franchises unable to pay some players' signing fees.²⁸ This oversight and the common use of cash payments to players create circumstances conducive to tax evasion.²⁹ There are also allegations of a lack of transparency in procurement activities.³⁰

Match-fixing: money the spoiler

Sport has enormous influence in shaping social values and attitudes, because it provides role models, particularly for young people.³¹ The popularity and influence of cricket, particularly among the youth, have been huge in Bangladesh, where 63 per cent of the population is under the age of 25.³²

The increased flow of money has exposed cricket to higher risks of bribery and other illegal practices, including match-fixing and spot-fixing, and has raised concerns about an erosion of integrity in the game. The shorter version of cricket, especially the Twenty20 format of the BPL, is considered a quick profit-making venture for cricketers, teams, organisers and other stakeholders.³³ Fixers allegedly infiltrate in the guise of being involved in one or other aspects of the business venture, all the while building relationships with teams, players, umpires and sponsors. Some of these relationships transform into collusion and even coercion, especially in the case of young players, many of whom come from modest backgrounds and are more vulnerable to corruption.³⁴

With regard to players, in a high-profile case of corruption, former national captain Mohammad Ashraful – who made history in 2001 by being the youngest cricketer to score a test century, at the age of 17 – accepted a substantial sum of money for spot-fixing in various matches and tournaments. Ashraful ultimately admitted to accepting an advance from a bookie of BDT 0.7 million (some US\$10,000) for his complicity in spot-fixing in a test match in January 2010, though in the end he had failed to deliver as a result of being out early.³⁵ He admitted this was later transferred to another match in the 2012 Twenty20 World Cup in Sri Lanka³⁶ and also admitted to accepting US\$10,000 in another deal for spot-fixing during the 2012 Sri Lanka Premier League.³⁷ In addition, he was reported to have taken part in spot-fixing during a match in the 2012 Twenty20 World Cup in exchange for BDT 2.5 million (around US\$30,000).³⁸ The BCB Anti-Corruption Tribunal found Ashraful guilty of spot-fixing in the second edition of the BPL, fined him BDT 1

million (some US\$13,000) and banned him from cricket for eight years; this was later reduced to five years upon appeal, with a possibility of a further reduction by two years contingent upon a certificate of 'good conduct' from the ICC.³⁹

Umpires too have been involved in match-fixing. Take the case of Nadir Shah, for example, who was banned by the BCB in March 2013 for 10 years for allegedly agreeing to give decisions favouring players in exchange for a fee in an undercover sting broadcast by India TV.⁴⁰ Bookies have also been found to be actively encouraging corrupt practices in the game. In February 2012 Sajid Khan, a Pakistani citizen, was apprehended while trying to enter the players' zone illegally, and was handed over to police suspected of match-fixing in a BPL match between the Chittagong Kings and the Barisal Burners.⁴¹ In the 2014 Twenty20 World Cup in Dhaka, Indian national Atanu Dutta⁴² was reportedly arrested three times in April for alleged involvement in illegal betting related to the tournament.⁴³ Both were arrested and released on bail with no further action to date.⁴⁴

The BPL itself has not proved immune to these threats of corruption. The ACSU brought charges against the Dhaka Gladiators after reportedly receiving a complaint from their head coach, Ian Pont.⁴⁵ Pont stated that he had been asked by team owner Shihab Chowdhury to lose a match in November 2013 against the Chittagong Kings by fixing certain elements.⁴⁶ The ACSU did not inform the BCB or the law enforcement authorities about the disclosure, despite the BCB having earlier entered into an agreement with the ACSU under which the latter was to assist the BCB in overseeing, managing, implementing and enforcing all aspects of the BCB Anti-Corruption Code.⁴⁷ The ACSU did not exercise its authority to call off the match, and allowed it to go ahead despite the credible risk of match-fixing.

On receiving notice from the ACSU, the BCB formed a tribunal, which charged nine cricketers and officials, including three foreign nationals.⁴⁸ It found Shihab Chowdhury guilty, barred him from

cricket for 10 years and fined him BDT 2 million (about US\$25,000).⁴⁹ The fine was later withdrawn upon appeal. The tribunal acquitted six others accused for lack of evidence of involvement, while two confessed.⁵⁰ The BCB and ACSU later filed a joint appeal against the acquittal of Salim Chowdhury, another owner of the Dhaka Gladiators and father of Shihab Chowdhury; ultimately he also received a 10-year ban.

Looking ahead

The BCB has recently made efforts to strengthen its Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), by taking actions such as sending an officer to South Africa for anti-corruption training. With the help of the ACSU, the BCB now also conducts anti-corruption orientation sessions before every international match or series.⁵¹ While this is useful, more fundamental reforms are needed, especially in terms of a long-term anti-corruption strategy. The independence, professionalism and effectiveness of the ACU must be ensured by the provision of the necessary human and technical skills, giving it the capacity to prevent corruption as well as to control it, by means of prompt and efficient investigation and prosecution. The ACU should be endowed in particular with capacities to strictly monitor compliance with the BCB's Anti-Corruption Code. Legal provisions must be created to criminalise match-fixing, spot-fixing and other forms of cheating.

An independent, permanent Office of Ombudsman for Cricket should be set up by law, and endowed with the power to investigate and prosecute allegations of corruption and irregularities in the game. While administrative sanctions in the event of violation of the Code should continue to remain within the jurisdiction of the BCB, the Ombudsman should be empowered to ensure the accountability of all stakeholders, including players, coaches, umpires, clubs, franchises and the BCB Board and top management. The Office of Ombudsman should also receive and act upon complaints of irregularities, corruption and conflicts of interest in financial arrangements and related business aspects, including the allocation of media rights and sponsorships and other risk

areas involving the integrity and reputation of the game. Given full independence of the Office, the Ombudsman ought to be able to ensure the desired autonomy of the sport.

In order to improve the governance of the BCB, it should be accountable to and subject to oversight from the Sports Ministry and the Parliamentary Standing Committee. Consistent with the government's National Integrity Strategy for fighting corruption,⁵² the mandate of the BCB's ACU should be expanded to become an Integrity and Anti-Corruption Unit, with the objective of strengthening the preventive work, including greater integrity and ethics awareness and education.

It is imperative that all stakeholders involved in cricket matches and tournaments, especially the franchises, managers, coaches, captains, players and media houses, whether national or international, formally sign a commitment to uphold the ICC's Anti-Corruption Code, and thereby deter illicit conduct. All such individuals, including those involved with the BCB and their immediate families, agents and gate-keepers, should be subjected to the proactive disclosure of their income and wealth and to disciplinary action in cases when income and wealth are disproportionate to legitimate earnings. Specific programmes of information, education and communication need to be undertaken to change behaviour in young cricketers, strengthening both the demand and the supply sides of the governance and anti-corruption infrastructure of cricket.⁵³

Notes

¹ Iftexhar Zaman is Executive Director of Transparency International Bangladesh. The author was assisted by Rumana Sharmin and Mohammad Nure Alam. Data and information for this case study have been collected through primary and secondary sources. Interviews with former and current players, Bangladesh Cricket Board officials, sports journalists and experts have been conducted to collect primary data, and websites, media reports and relevant documents have been reviewed for secondary data.

² Reference to the game of cricket can be traced to the thirteenth century. It gained popularity among English aristocrats in the seventeenth century who insisted cricket would be played in 'a gentlemanly manner'.. For example, if a batsman knew should be out, he should walk, even if the umpire judged otherwise. See *The Times of India*, 'Why Is Cricket Called a Gentleman's Game?', 17 April 2011, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/stoi/Why-is-cricket-called-a-gentlemans-game/articleshow/8003522.cms>; and Quora.com, 'Why is cricket called a gentleman's game?', 18 November

2012, www.quora.com/Why-is-cricket-called-a-%E2%80%98gentleman%E2%80%99s-game%E2%80%99 (accessed 2 January 2015).

³ A former president of the BCB became president of the ICC in June 2014: Cricbuzz.com, 'Mustafa Kamal becomes 11th ICC president', 26 June 2014, www.cricbuzz.com/cricket-news/64129/mustafa-kamal-becomes-11th-icc-president (accessed 20 January 2015). A Bangladeshi also serves as chief executive of the Asian Cricket Council.

⁴ Saber Hossain Chowdhury, former BCB president, quoted by the BBC on 9 March 2011:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/cricket/other_international/bangladesh/9420128.stm (accessed 17 November 2014).

⁵ The influence of money has become so pervasive that the 'gentlemanship' of the game is considered to have been compromised. As the legendary Indian cricketer Erapalli Prasanna said, 'Money is ruling the sport now and it is no more a gentleman's game': <http://sports.ndtv.com/cricket/news/208732-cricket-no-more-a-gentlemans-game-erapalli-prasanna> (accessed 2 January 2015).

⁶ ESPN Cricinfo, 'Preference to BPL leads to clash in BCB', 6 August 2013, www.espncricinfo.com/bangladesh/content/story/659477.html.

⁷ 'Match-fixing' takes place when the entire result of a match is determined in advance. 'Spot-fixing' takes place when specific incidents within the game are prearranged. Match-fixing is considered more difficult than spot-fixing because, as a minimum, it requires more players, including the captain, to build a nexus.

⁸ The NSCB is an autonomous government organisation under the Ministry of Youth and Sports, established by the National Sports Council Act 1974, which was later amended in 1991, 2003 and 2011. It is an apex organisation, mandated to develop and control sports. See www.nsc.gov.bd (accessed 11 March 2015). As is the case with other federations, there is BCB representation on the NSCB (article 4(e), National Sports Council Act 1974, amended 19 February 1991): www.nsc.gov.bd/rules/nscact.pdf (accessed 24 March 2015).

⁹ See the BCB's website, www.tigercricket.com.bd/bcb/aboutbcb (accessed 28 October 2014).

¹⁰ The BCB controls cricket sponsorship business. India's business giant Sahara Group became the sponsor of the Bangladesh cricket team after offering US\$9.4 million over four years in a tender process. Previously Grameenphone had paid the BCB US\$1.22 million for a two-year deal, which expired in December 2011. See <http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/article/idUKL4E8GU6Y820120530?irpc=932> (accessed 17 November 2014).

¹¹ Data obtained from key informant interviews with BCB officials on 19 October 2014 (anonymity requested) and other secondary sources, including the BCB constitution.

¹² See BCB, 'Constitution: Amended in 2012' (Dhaka: Bangladesh Cricket Board, 2012), www.tigercricket.com.bd/assets/pdf/BCB-Constitution-2012.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).

¹³ The committees are: Cricket Operations, Media and Communications, Disciplinary, Game Development, Tournament, Age-Group Tournament, Grounds, Facilities Management, Umpires, Marketing and Commercial, Medical, Tender and Purchase, Finance, Audit, Women's Wing, Logistic and Protocol, Security, Cricket Committee of Dhaka Metropolis, High Performance (newly formed) and Technical (newly formed).

¹⁴ BCB, 'Before the Chairman, the Disciplinary Panel' (Dhaka: Bangladesh Cricket Board, 2014), www.tigercricket.com.bd/assets/pdf/appeal/decision.pdf (accessed 19 March 2015), p. 41.

¹⁵ Key informant interviews with BCB officials on 19 October and 22 November 2014, and former directors on 30 September and 19 October 2014 (anonymity requested).

¹⁶ Article 2.9, 'Independence of member boards', of the amended and restated memorandum and articles of association of the International Cricket Council.

¹⁷ Key informant interviews, former BCB directors, 30 September and 19 October 2014.

¹⁸ The current President is also a Member of the Parliament from the ruling party. The same is true for previous Presidents. See: BCB, 'List of Presidents', www.tigercricket.com.bd/bcb/former-president (accessed 25 March 2015).

¹⁹ Key informant interviews, former BCB directors, 30 September and 19 October 2014, and other secondary sources.

²⁰ BCB (2012), 'Constitution', article 9.3 (9.3.8), p. 7.

²¹ For instance, Bogra was not selected under one administration for an event despite having a world-class venue (Bogra-Shahid Chandu Stadium), and similarly Sylhet was not selected under another despite its international-standard stadium, in both cases under the consideration that the respective venues were built during the time when political opponents were in power. Source: Key informant interviews, former BCB directors, 30 September and 19 October 2014.

²² The franchise system (leasing the rights of a team and its brand) was originally introduced in Bangladesh for a period of three years, and because of its success it has now become a permanent part of domestic cricket.

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- ²³ Key informant interviews with current national cricket team player on 23 October 2014, and former national cricket team captain and current BCB Operations Committee member on 28 October 2014 (anonymity requested).
- ²⁴ BCB, 'Before the Anti-Corruption Tribunal: Case no. 1/2013' (Dhaka: Bangladesh Cricket Board, 2014), www.tigercricket.com.bd/assets/pdf/anticorr/detfinal.pdf (accessed 19 March 2015), p. 16.
- ²⁵ ESPN Cricinfo, 'ICC, BCB to appeal BPL anti-corruption tribunal's verdict', 18 July 2014, www.espnricinfo.com/bangladesh/content/story/761553.html (accessed 5 November 2014).
- ²⁶ According to clause 5.1.2 of the BCB's Anti-Corruption Code, 'One member of the anti-corruption tribunal, who shall be a retired justice of Supreme Court of Bangladesh/retired District Judge, shall sit as the convener of the tribunal. One member shall be drawn from the persons having expertise in cricket. The other one shall be appointed from socially well-recognised civilians.'
- ²⁷ The CAS is an international quasi-judicial body established to settle disputes related to sport. Its headquarters are in Lausanne, and its courts are located in New York, Sydney and Lausanne.
- ²⁸ For instance, because written permission was not received from the revenue board or central bank, contracting fees have still not been paid to a number of foreign players. As a guarantor, the ultimate responsibility for paying these fees goes to the BCB, which has been gradually paying them. The BCB never acquired any formal document from the franchises or players detailing these payments, however. The BCB board has continued to extend deadlines for the franchises to provide this information, which is still pending at present. Key informant interviews, BCB officials, 19 October and 22 November 2014; *The Daily Star* (Bangladesh), 'BCB chasing its own tail', 2 November 2012, http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/print_news.php?nid=255855 (accessed 17 November 2014).
- ²⁹ Key informant interviews, BCB officials, 19 October and 22 November 2014.
- ³⁰ Key informant interviews, BCB officials, 19 October and 22 November 2014; journalists on 28 September and 3 November 2014; former BCB Directors, 30 September and 19 October 2014.
- ³¹ TI, 'ICC Governance Review: Submission on behalf of Transparency International' (London: Transparency International, 2011).
- ³² US Department of Commerce, 'Population Trends: Bangladesh', PPT92-4 (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 1993), www.census.gov/population/international/files/ppt/Bangladesh93.pdf.
- ³³ Key informant interviews with journalists on 28 September and 3 November 2014 (anonymity requested).
- ³⁴ Key informant interviews, BCB officials, 19 October and 22 November 2014, former national cricket team captain and current BCB Operations Committee member, 28 October 2014, and current national cricket team player on 23 October 2014 (anonymity requested).
- ³⁵ BCB, 'Before the Anti-Corruption Tribunal: Case no. 1/2013: Determination' (Dhaka: Bangladesh Cricket Board, 2014), www.tigercricket.com.bd/assets/pdf/anticorr/detreason.pdf; *Prothom Alo* (Bangladesh), 31 May 2013.
- ³⁶ *Prothom Alo* (Bangladesh), 31 May 2013.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*
- ³⁹ The tribunal took into consideration his confession of guilt, on the basis of articles 6.4, 6.3.3, 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, 6.1.2.3, 6.1.2.7 and 6.1.2.8 of the Anti-Corruption Code: BCB (2014), 'Determination'; *The Daily Star* (Bangladesh), 'Ashrafu's ban now for 5 yrs', 30 September 2014, www.thedailystar.net/ashrafu-ban-now-for-5-yrs-43961 (accessed 20 November 2014); BCB (2014), 'Before the Chairman'.
- ⁴⁰ ESPN Cricinfo, 'BCB allows Nadir Shah to officiate in match', 28 September 2014, www.espnricinfo.com/bangladesh/content/story/785529.html.
- ⁴¹ ESPN Cricinfo, 'Cloud over BPL after fixing arrest', 27 February 2012, www.espnricinfo.com/bangladesh-premier-league-2012/content/story/555380.html (accessed 18 November 2014).
- ⁴² The 40-year-old had previously been arrested at Benapole Land Port, Bangladesh, on 3 April 2014, with the World Twenty20 under way. Three days later he was again arrested, in Dhaka, by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB).
- ⁴³ *Bdnews24.com*, 'Indian bookie arrested for third time', 13 April 2014, <http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/04/13/indian-bookie-arrested-for-third-time> (accessed 18 November 2014).
- ⁴⁴ *New Age*, 'Arrested Indian 'bookie' released on bail', 11 April 2014, <http://newagebd.net/1831/arrested-indian-bookie-released-on-bail/#sthash.i4bskmIr.LMM7KrPK.dpbs> (accessed 4 May 2015).
- ⁴⁵ Ian Leslie Pont is a former English cricketer, who mainly played for Essex. He served as head coach of the Dhaka Gladiators franchise during the second BPL edition and was the first individual to inform ACSU officials about the match-fixing conspiracy: *The Daily Star* (Bangladesh), 'Reason judgement on BPL corruption', 11 June 2014, www.thedailystar.net/sports/reason-judgement-on-bpl-corruption-28052 (accessed 17 November 2014).
- ⁴⁶ Details of the match-fixing and spot-fixing were discussed during the night of 1 February 2013 and disclosure was made by Pont the following day to Peter O'Shea, the ACSU anti-corruption manager. It was

also clear from the witnesses that, well before the match was played, details of how the Dhaka Gladiators would lose the match, who would be involved and how the acts of spot-fixing would take place were known to the ACSU. BCB (2014), 'Case no. 1/2013'.

⁴⁷ BCB, 'Before the Anti-Corruption Tribunal: Case no. 1/2013: Determination: Conclusions and Orders' (Dhaka: Bangladesh Cricket Board, 2014), www.tigercricket.com.bd/assets/pdf/anticorr/detconclusion.pdf (accessed 19 March 2015); key informant interviews, journalists, 28 September and 3 November 2014.

⁴⁸ Shihab Jishan Chowdury (owner of the Dhaka Gladiators), Salim Chowdury (owner of the Dhaka Gladiators), Gaurav Rawat (Dhaka Gladiators official), Mohammad Rafique (player), Mosharaff Hossain (Rubel) (player), Mahbubul Alam (Robin) (player), Darren Stevens (player), Kaushal Lokurachchi (player) and Mohammad Ashraf (player): BCB (2014), 'Case no. 1/2013'.

⁴⁹ BCB (2014), 'Determination'.

⁵⁰ *The Daily Star* (11 June 2014).

⁵¹ Key informant interviews, BCB officials, 19 October 2014; other secondary sources.

⁵² The National Integrity Strategy is a comprehensive set of goals, strategies and action plans aimed at increasing the level of independence to perform, accountability, efficiency, transparency and effectiveness of state and non-state institutions in a sustained manner over a period of time: Chancery Law Chronicles (Bangladesh), 'Framework of National Integrity Strategy: An Inclusive Approach to Fight Corruption' (Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, 2008), www.clcbd.org/document/download/143.html (accessed 8 March 2015).

⁵³ In a unique example of such an initiative, as a result of advocacy by TI Bangladesh, the country's national cricket team took a pledge to 'Say No to Corruption' on the eve of the International Anti-Corruption Day 2013, demonstrating their public commitment to abstain from corruption: Transparency International Bangladesh, 'Bangladesh National Cricket Team Says No to Corruption', 8 December 2013, www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/index.php/en/activities/4460-bangladesh-national-cricket-team-says-no-to-corruption. The need to sustain and scale up such efforts and engage more stakeholders, including the BCB, cannot be underestimated.